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FOREWORD
Economic and political hardships associated with plant closure may be 
easily forgotten in the current environment of real growth, rising capaci 
ty utilization and declining unemployment. However, plant closure is an 
ongoing, chronic problem, which does not disappear during times of 
economic recovery. We need to consider policy options that recognize 
the tenacity, special nature, and institutional context of this problem.
Collective bargaining appears to be the institutional context in which 
the solution to the plant closure problem is most likely to be found. Since 
labor costs, work rules and productivity frequently are cited as reasons 
for closure, collective bargaining appears to be the mechanism ideally 
suited to resolving these issues. However, critics of collective bargaining 
have emphasized that unions have only one objective: delaying closure as 
long as possible.
This study contains a new proposal on the use of collective bargaining 
to resolve differences between labor and management that have hitherto 
resulted in plant closure. The proposal put forth by Wendling mandates 
bargaining over the decision to close, but incorporates measures that will 
eliminate bargaining in circumstances where bargaining is not likely to 
lead to a solution. Furthermore, limits are placed on the length of time 
allowed for a resolution of differences in order to encourage good faith 
bargaining and achieve a solution that will maintain profitable opera 
tions and preserve jobs.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibili 
ty of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Robert G. Spiegelman 
Director
May 1984

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this study is to answer the following questions. First, 
what is the potential for bargaining to alter the decision to close when 
continued operation is a reasonable alternative? Second, can bargaining 
over the effects of closure provide a reasonable opportunity for workers 
to mitigate some of the consequences? Third, have management and 
labor used formal contract negotiations to obtain protections and to 
develop solutions for workers and firms "at risk of closure?"
The question may be raised: Why the interest in collective bargaining 
as a tool to alleviate the plant closure problem? First, a significant pro 
portion of closures takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas a survey 
of Fortune 500 firms determined that 52 percent of the establishments 
were unionized, 66 percent of the closings involved unionized 
establishments. Second, the reasons for closure cited in surveys and court 
cases tend to be amenable to resolution through collective bargaining. 
The above survey revealed that 21 percent of the respondents cited high 
labor costs, 17 percent listed price competition from lower cost labor, 
and 10 percent referred to crippling union work rules. Reasons for 
closure cited in court cases have included low productivity, high wages 
and inflexible work rules. Thus, there are a significant number of in 
stances in which the reasons cited for closing are topics that have been 
and could be handled through the collective bargaining process.
The plant closure issue must be placed in perspective. It appears to be a 
relatively infrequent event. For example, the Bureau of National Affairs 
reported that in 1982, a year marked by a deep recession, there were 619 
closures affecting 215,525 workers in the United States. Of these 
closures, 424 were manufacturing facilities and resulted in putting 
146,900 employees out of work; but this represented approximately 1 
percent of both the manufacturing facilities and the manufacturing 
workforce.
Given the nature of the reasons for closure and the magnitude of the 
problem, collective bargaining may be the most appropriate institution 
to solve the problem. Collective bargaining can address the specific issues
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in a plant and may be able to tailor a solution that meets the needs of 
both parties, management and labor. Legislation cannot possibly accom 
modate all of the varied circumstances in which closure is considered.
To understand and evaluate the role that collective bargaining could 
play, both the case law that has evolved in the formulation of the judicial 
interpretations and the actual contract provisions negotiated in major 
collective bargaining agreements are examined. Furthermore, several 
rules and procedures which have been proposed to facilitate the deter 
mination of whether there is a duty to bargain over the decision are 
analyzed.
The examination of the judicial interpretation of the duty to bargain 
has found several troublesome areas. First, substantive labor law has 
been formulated regarding plant closure based on cases in which the par 
ties to the dispute had not negotiated a formal contract. The closure oc 
curred almost on the heels of the union winning the representation elec 
tion. Thus, a determination has been made on the efficacy of collective 
bargaining resolving an issue even though the parties have never bargain 
ed. In fact, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this issue oc 
curred in First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor 
Relations Board, a case in which the parties did not have an established 
bargaining relationship.
Second, there has been the overriding concern with the terminology 
used in cases of displacement, rather than with the outcome. For ex 
ample, subcontracting has been differentiated from replacing existing 
employees with independent contractors. The outcome has been the 
same, the process very similar, but the duty to bargain over the decision 
differs. A similar demarcation has occurred between plant closure and 
relocation.
Formal collective bargaining already occurs over plant closure, or at 
least over provisions to minimize the effects of closure. The results of the 
econometric analysis of major collective bargaining agreements has 
determined that workers at risk are not necessarily obtaining these pro 
tections. Variation in closure rates by industry is not a significant deter 
minant of variations in contractual outcomes. Instead, the regression 
estimates show that the contractual outcomes are less sensitive to changes 
in employment and instead more dependent on the bargaining power of 
the union.
Due to the confusion created by the case law and the lack of consisten 
cy in the determinants of outcomes of formal negotiations, amending the
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National Labor Relations Act's definition of mandatory topics of 
bargaining under "terms and other conditions of employment" to in 
clude bargaining over the decision to close may be one policy alternative 
for the plant closure dilemma. There are positive and negative aspects to 
this approach. One positive feature is that coverage would be uniform 
throughout the United States. A negative feature is that the National 
Labor Relations Act covers only those plants and workplaces where 
employees have elected a bargaining agent. Since plant closure is not 
restricted to unionized plants, protection will not be afforded in all in 
stances.
This monograph contains a new proposal. Specifically, the proposal 
assumes that plant closure is a mandatory topic of bargaining. Steps are 
incorporated that ensure that actual bargaining occurs only in those in 
stances in which there is a real probability that bargaining could lead to a 
solution. However, in no instance would more than 90 days elapse be 
tween the notice of closure and resolution of the situation, be it either a 
new agreement permitting continued operations or closure of the plant.
Neither management not labor have perfect foresight. Formal negotia 
tions every two or three years cannot accommodate all contingencies. 
Equity considerations suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity 
to minimize earnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing so also im 
poses costs on employers, the proposal has been structured to be flexible 
and to expedite the bargaining process.
IX
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Chapter 1 Introduction
I am fully aware that in this era of automation and onrushing 
technological change, no problems in the domestic economy 
are of greater concern than those involving job security and 
employment stability.
(Statement by Justice Potter Stewart in Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board 
(85 S. Ct. 398,411 (1964)).
The scope of public policy relating to plant closure and to 
those workers who are displaced is still unresolved. Should 
something more be done for the employees or required of the 
employer after a facility closes? Before it closes? Are the ef 
fects of closure mainly short term and corrected by the 
market? Are there long term consequences? Could collective 
bargaining play a greater role in solving this problem?
There are three ways in which collective bargaining may 
mitigate the problems associated with plant closure. First, 
judicial interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act 
have held that the employer must negotiate with the union 
over the effects of a decision to close a plant ("effects 
bargaining"). Second, although the decision by the United 
States Supreme Court in First National Maintenance Cor 
poration v. National Labor Relations Board (101 S. Ct. 2573 
(1981)) held that a firm need not bargain with the union over 
the decision to close one plant of a multiple plant operation 
("decision bargaining"), this avenue has not been closed 
completely due to limitations in the opinion. For example, 
relocating one operation of a firm may require decision 
bargaining. Third, a union and employer may use the formal 
collective bargaining process to negotiate contract provisions
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covering plant closure. Advance notice, severance pay and 
transfer rights are examples of these types of provisions.
The objective of this monograph is to answer the follow 
ing questions. First, what is the potential for bargaining to 
alter the decision to close when continued operation is a 
reasonable alternative? Second, can bargaining over the ef 
fects of closure provide a reasonable opportunity for 
workers to mitigate some of the consequences? Third, have 
management and labor used formal contract negotiations to 
obtain protections and to develop solutions for workers and 
firms "at risk of closure?"
Plant closure is of significant legislative interest. The 
States of Maine and Wisconsin and the City of Philadelphia 
have enacted legislation that prescribes necessary action by 
firms to close a plant, and 17 other states had legislation on 
this issue formally introduced in their legislative sessions be 
tween 1979 and 1981 (McKenzie and Yandle 1982). Califor 
nia and Illinois adopted programs in 1982 to assist workers 
affected by plant closure and Rhode Island has established a 
special commission to study the problems caused by plant 
closure (Nelson 1983). In 1983, the States of Alabama, Con 
necticut and New York also acted to assist workers displaced 
by shutdowns or relocations (Nelson 1984). In addition, at 
least four proposals have been introduced in the United 
States Congress in previous sessions and the National 
Employment Priorities Act (H.R. 2847) was introduced in 
the 1983 session. Finally, employee stock ownership plans to 
purchase establishments have been facilitated by legislation 
and have been used to avert closure (Stern, Wood and Ham 
mer 1979). In fact, Wintner (1983) reports that of approx 
imately 60 employee buyouts, ony 2 have failed, and approx 
imately 50,000 jobs have been preserved through this pro 
cess.
Aside from the legislative interest in plant closure, the 
topic is of policy interest because it raises several complex
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philosophical questions about the course and control of 
economic activity. First, there is the question of whether the 
rights of owners of physical capital should take precedence 
over the rights of owners of human capital. Are firms and 
workers equally positioned to respond to economic change? 
Second, there is the conflict between equity and efficiency. Is 
it necessary that individuals suffer earnings losses so that 
corporations can maximize profits? Conversely, the mobility 
of workers and capital are both considered to enhance effi 
ciency, but should restrictions be placed on the latter and not 
the former? Finally, there is the role of government policy. If 
government policies and actions increase the probability of 
closing a plant, can or should government policy be neutral 
towards the effects of closure?'
One such philosophical question arises when examining 
the unequal ability of firms and workers to respond to 
economic change (Martin 1983). For instance, a firm may 
make a capital investment in an industry. Due to changing 
market conditions, however, the firm recognizes that its 
future financial health is at stake unless it diversifies or 
changes markets. The firm redirects its resources and invests 
in a new activity, all of which may be done while it is still 
engaged in the original enterprise. In addition, the firm's 
new investment may be eligible for favorable tax treatment.
The situation facing the worker is quite different. The 
worker also invests in the firm through the accumulation of 
firm-specific skills. Assuming the worker recognizes that 
continued investment in the firm does not prevent displace 
ment, he/she faces considerable difficulties in repositioning 
and diversifying his/her human capital. Time is required to 
develop new human capital before it can be sold in new 
markets, whereas the old human capital cannot be sold as 
scrap in a secondary market. Furthermore, investments to 
broaden one's human capital are not given special tax treat 
ment, whereas investments to deepen it—such as investing
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more in one's current obsolete skill—are considered tax 
deductible. Since diversification may be necessary to 
minimize the impact of displacement, firms and workers are 
unequally positioned to respond to economic change.
However, it is necessary to place the plant closure issue in 
perspective. What is the magnitude of the plant closure prob 
lem? Since no governmental agency is charged with record 
ing the closing of a plant or counting the number of workers 
directly affected, the exact magnitude of the plant closure 
problem is unknown. Consequently, several researchers have 
used auxiliary data to infer the extent of closure or have at 
tempted to count the number of closures and workers im 
pacted.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) and Birch (1979) have used 
the Dun & Bradstreet data, which are actually collected to 
develop credit profiles of firms, to estimate the incidence of 
closures, start-ups and relocations. The Bureau of National 
Affairs (1983) has begun to tabulate the number of closings, 
but uses a combination of newspaper clippings, union 
reports and informed sources to develop their count of 
closures and affected workers. Schmenner (1982) has 
assembled data on the number of plant closures in the 1970s 
by surveying Fortune 500 firms.
Bluestone and Harrison's analysis of the Dun & Bradstreet 
data indicated that of every 10 manufacturing plants 
employing more than 100 workers open in 1969, 3 had closed 
by 1976. They also showed that the incidence of closure 
across the four major regions of the United States was quite 
similar during this time period (see table 1.1). In fact, the 
North Central region, which stretches from Ohio to North 
Dakota, had the lowest incidence of closure (25 percent) and 
the South, which ranges from Maryland to Oklahoma, had 
the highest incidence of closure (34 percent).
Table 1.1
Incidence of Closure by Region
Among Manufacturing Plants Employing More Than 100 Employees 
From 1969 and 1976
Incidence of closure
Number of plants Number in sample of 1969 plants 
Region Number of states in 1969 sample closed by 1976 by 1976
Northeast
North Central
South
West
TOTAL
9
12
16
13
50
4,576
3,617
3,101
1,155
12,449
1,437
904
1,042
344
3,727
.31
.25
.34
.30
.30
SOURCE: Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982, Table 2.2).
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Birch (1979) provided closure information on service 
establishments, which is presented in table 1.2. Although 
plant closure research has tended to emphasize manufactur 
ing facilities, the service sector has grown in importance to 
the economy over the past two decades. Also, the impact of 
closure on individuals is not likely to vary significantly just 
because it is a service establishment and not a manufacturing 
facility. Furthermore, two of the three key U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions pertaining to the "duty to bargain over the 
decision to close a plant" have involved service operations.
The data shown in table 1.2 indicate a relatively high rate 
of closure among large service establishments, and a rate 
that is quite uniform across regions. Thus, the implication 
from these two tables is that the closure of firms is not sim 
ply a regional phenomena, but is prevalent throughout the 
United States.
Another approach to counting the number of displaced 
workers is to consider the population at risk. Risk can be 
evaluated along several dimensions; industry, occupation, 
age, region or tenure on the job are valid criteria. Alter 
natively, severity of unemployment can indicate a "risk 
group." For example, it most likely is a reasonable assump 
tion that job losers who are associated with a declining in 
dustry are at risk of never getting back their positions and 
therefore of being displaced. Individuals who have been 
separated from their jobs for more than 26 weeks also have a 
diminishing probability of returning to their jobs.
The Congressional Budget Office (1982) has provided an 
estimate of the number of workers in January 1983 who are 
at risk of being displaced. Job losers were categorized along 
the dimensions listed above, with those meeting the criteria 
considered to be at risk. The results are provided in table 1.3.
The Bureau of National Affairs (1983) reported that there 
were 619 closures directly affecting 215,525 workers in 1982;
Table 1.2
Incidence of Closure by Region
Among Service Establishments Employing More Than 100 Employees 
From 1969 and 1976
Region
Northeast 
North Central 
South 
West
TOTAL
Number of states
9 
12 
16 
13
50
Number of 
establishments 
in 1969 sample
633 
433 
476 
284
1,826
Number in sample 
closed by 1976
237 
172 
182 
117
708
Incidence of closure 
of 1969 
establishments 
by 1976
.37 
.40 
.38 
.41
.39
SOURCE: David Birch, The Job Generation Process (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Program on Neighborhood and Regional Change, 1979, Appen 
dix D).
o
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424 closures were manufacturing facilities and resulted in 
putting 146,900 employees out of work. 2 There were over 
300,000 manufacturing establishments employing 18.8 
million workers in 1982. Thus, slightly more than 1 percent 
of the manufacturing facilities and slightly less than 1 per 
cent of the manufacturing workforce were affected.
Table 1.3
Estimates of Jobless Workers
at Risk of Displacement in January 1983
Under Alternative Eligibility Standards
Number of workers 
________Eligibility criteria_____________(OOOs)
Declining industry 880 
Declining occupation 1,150 
More than 45 years of age 890 
Declining industry and 45 or more years of age 205 
Declining industry and other unemployed in
declining area, and 45 or more years of age 395 
Declining occupation and 45 or more years of age 280 
More than 26 weeks of unemployment___________560____
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, Dislocated Workers: Issues and Federal Options, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. This estimate, which is based on 
tabulations from the March 1980 Current Population Survey, also assumes that the number 
of displaced workers would not change between December 1981 and January 1983. Thus, 
these figures are conservative estimates of the actual figures.
Additional evidence on the incidence of plant closure is 
provided by Schmenner (1982) who collected closure data for 
the 1970s from Fortune 500 firms. During the 1970s, these 
firms closed approximately 8 percent of the plants that had 
been in existence at the start of the decade. 3 Although 
averages can be misleading, less than 1 percent of the existing 
plants of Fortune 500 firms were closed per year, a rate 
which is consistent with the BNA findings for 1982. The in-
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cidence of plant closure by industry as tabulated by Schmen 
ner is reported in table 1.4.
Table 1.4
Percentage of Plants Closed in Manufacturing Industries 
in the 1970s by Fortune 500 Firms
Industry
Food & Kindred Products (20)
Tobacco Manufacturers (21)
Textile Mill Products (22)
Apparel (23)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Furniture & Fixtures (25)
Paper & Allied Products
Printing & Publishing (27)
Chemicals & Allied Products (28)
Petroleum Refining (29)
Rubber Products (30)
Leather & Leather Products (31)
Stone, Clay, Glass
& Concrete Products (32)
Primary Metals Industries (33)
Fabricated Metal Products (34)
Machinery, Except Electrical (35)
Electrical Machinery (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Scientific Instruments (38)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (39)
Totals
Number of 
plants
2,174
32
383
267
401
183
907
258
1,739
397
494
80
648
603
947
1,056
965
607
326
212
12,679
Number 
closed
222
1
36
24
30
23
60
15
119
12
38
16
44
49
89
75
85
37
23
23
1,021
Percentage 
closed
10.2
3.1
9.4
9.0
7.5
12.6
6.6
5.8
6.8
3.0
7.7
20.0
6.8
8.1
9.5
7.1
8.8
6.1
7.1
10.8
SOURCE: Calculations based on computer printout provided by Roger Schmenner,
August 16, 1983.
NOTE: Two digit SIC code in parentheses.
It is obvious that there are significant differences in the 
estimates of the magnitude of the problem. The analysis bas 
ed on the Dun & Bradstreet data clearly signals a much 
higher rate of closure—over 4 percent of the plants closed 
each year—than do the Bureau of National Affairs and the 
Schmenner calculations, which indicate approximately 1 per 
cent of the manufacturing plants are closed each year.
10 Introduction
The relative accuracy of the estimates is more than an 
academic question because the magnitude of the problem 
conditions the potential policy responses. Although Schmen- 
ner and the Bureau of National Affairs are derived from in 
dependent sources, they appear to be consistent; consequent 
ly, these estimates will be accepted. Therefore, the analysis 
of this study will be based on the assumption that the closure 
of a manufacturing facility is a relatively infrequent event.
As the United States economy moves out of the reces 
sionary conditions that have plagued it since late 1979, there 
may be a tendency to forget about plant closures and the 
dislocated workers. The number of closures and the ranks of 
the dislocated always swell during recessions, and the 
assumption may be that the economic recovery will solve the 
problem.
This viewpoint does not recognize that closure and 
dislocated workers are chronic problems. Some plants are 
going to be shut down even while the economy is in a period 
of sustained growth, and consequently, workers are always 
going to be dislocated. Incentives that operate to concentrate 
the impact of closure on the older worker, or the immobile, 
will continue during recovery as well as recession. Consumer 
demands also change through time. Some industries will be 
growing and others will be declining. Since the most efficient 
locations for producing the new products may not be the 
same as for the old products, and since the skills required 
may not be identical, this process of change usually will 
generate some dislocation.
A more concrete example of this process is offered by the 
research findings of Schmenner (1983). He determined that 
for major firms in the 1970s, the average age of a plant at 
closing was 19.3 years and the median age of closed plants 
was 15 years. Fully one-third of the plants that were closed 
were only six years old or less, and two-thirds of the plants 
were modern single-story structures. Thus, the existence of a
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new plant in a community is not a guarantee that the 
workforce will not be displaced by a plant shutdown in the 
near future. Furthermore, although the average size of all 
plants in his study was approximately 490 employees, the 
average employment size of plants opening in the 1970s was 
approximately 240 employees.
The question may be raised: Why the interest in collective 
bargaining as a tool to alleviate the problem of plant closure 
and dislocated workers? First, a significant proportion of 
closures takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas 52 per 
cent of the facilities surveyed by Schmenner were unionized, 
66 percent of the closings involved unionized facilities 
(Schmenner 1982). Second, the reasons cited for closure in 
surveys and in court cases tend to be amenable to resolution 
through collective bargaining. Schmenner's survey revealed 
that 21 percent of the respondents cited high labor rates, 17 
percent listed price competition due to lower cost labor, and 
10 percent indicated crippling union work rules. (Multiple 
responses were permitted.) Reasons cited in court cases have 
included low productivity, high wages, and inflexible work 
rules. Thus, there are a significant number of instances in 
which the reasons cited for closing are topics that have been 
and could be handled through the collective bargaining pro 
cess.
Reich (1981) has argued that desired social goals could be 
achieved more efficiently through bargaining rather than 
regulation. Collective bargaining can address the specific 
problems of the plant and may be able to tailor a solution 
that meets the needs of all parties. Legislation cannot 
possibly accommodate all of the varied circumstances in 
which closure is being considered. Sometimes, the best solu 
tion for all would be the end of production. In other cir 
cumstances, changes in wages, operating procedures and the 
division of responsibilities would result in profitable opera 
tions and continued employment. (Wintner's (1983) study 
documented one situation in which a 25 percent cut in wages
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and changes in work rules were necessary to make the 
employee owned company competitive.) Furthermore, if col 
lective bargaining could lead to profitable operations and 
continued employment, some older workers would not be 
faced with the prospect of seeking new employment while 
possessing outdated skills, nor would the economic impact 
on the community be as severe. 4
The reasons listed above suggest that not only may the 
plant closure problem be amenable to mitigation through 
collective bargaining, but using collective bargaining may be 
more consistent with institutional and political considera 
tions than direct regulation. Bacow (1980) has written that 
we need to be concerned with more than economic efficiency 
as we seek solutions to problems.
If we are to develop a useful theory for matching 
tools to problems, then the criteria used for 
evaluating the match must reflect not only efficien 
cy considerations, but also the managerial, institu 
tional and political factors that determine the effec 
tiveness of policies in practice (p. 132).
The other area of concern of this monograph relates to the 
labor market. Research on plant closure has paid little atten 
tion to the actual functioning of the labor market and 
whether the proposed policies are designed to correct market 
imperfections. Instead, it has tended to concentrate on one 
theme, the reemployment experience of dislocated workers. 
The method of analysis usually has been the case study. Bas 
ed on this research, policies for alleviating the observed 
hardships associated with closure have been proposed.
Issues that have not been addressed or have been discussed 
only casually include the relationship between compensation 
schedules and estimates of earnings loss. Compensation 
schedules also could affect the structure of severance pay. 
An additional issue is the dichotomy between large local 
labor markets and small local labor markets. Another
Introduction 13
unresolved issue is whether compensating wage differentials 
exist for the positive probability of a plant closure.
The outline of this monograph is as follows. Chapter 2 ad 
dresses the functioning of the labor market in the presence of 
plant closure. Specific topics include: compensation 
schedules, estimates of earnings loss and the structure of 
severance pay; small and large local labor markets; and com 
pensating wage differentials for the probability of plant 
closure. One other labor market issue, the impact of closure 
on older workers, is treated separately in Appendix A.
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the judicial interpretation of 
the duty to bargain over the decision to close and effects of 
closure. Also analyzed are the related issues of plant reloca 
tion and transfer of work. Chapter 4 discusses guidelines, 
rules and tests that have been proposed to facilitate the deter 
mination of a duty to bargain over the decision to close. An 
alternate proposal also is presented in this chapter. The em 
pirical examination of the extent of bargaining over this issue 
is presented in chapter 5. The synthesis of the several aspects 
of this study and the conclusions are presented in the final 
chapter.
NOTES
1. Bluestone and Harrison (1980) asserted that the provisions of the tax 
code have provided indirect incentives to construct new facilities rather 
than rebuilding or renovating older facilities. These incentives include: 
(a) not treating land as a depreciable asset; (b) differential treatment of 
new and used facilities for purposes of accelerated depreciation; (c) tax 
credits that encourage the purchase of a newer vintage of tools and 
machinery; (d) tax deductibility of plant closure costs; (e) the special 
treatment of industrial development bonds; and (f) tax deductibility of 
many of the costs of homeownership.
2. Note that using the BNA calculation, the average numer of employees 
in the manufacturing facilities that closed was 348. The average number 
of employees in the typical manufacturing facility in the United States
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was 63. Given that the BNA data set basically was collected by means of 
newspaper clippings, there may be a bias to their figures that understates 
the number of closures and overstates the average size of the closed 
facility. The closure of a smaller facility simply may not be reported.
The data on closure may be confused at times with business failures. 
For example, approximately 17,000 businesses failed in 1981. Business 
failures are defined as "concerns discontinued following assignment, 
voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy, attachment, execution, 
foreclosure, etc.; voluntary withdrawals from business with known loss 
to creditors; also enterprises involved in court action, such as receiver 
ship and reorganization or arrangement which may or may not lead to 
discontinuance; and businesses making voluntary compromises with 
creditors out of court." (United States, Statistical Abstract, 1982-1983.) 
Thus, the definition of business failures is broader than that of plant 
closure which is the closing of a plant, establishment or company.
3. This calculation was based on information contained in a computer 
printout provided by Roger Schmenner to the author.
4. The role of collective bargaining in alleviating the plant closure prob 
lem was examined in more detail in late 1950s and early 1960s. Examples 
include the research of Killingsworth (1962) and Shultz and Weber 
(1966). At that time it was felt that "collective bargaining by itself cannot 
fully solve these problems." (Killingsworth, p. 210). Shultz and Weber 
wrote, "It has been asserted that collective bargaining cannot change the 
economic climate, that it can only ration the sunshine—or the rain as the 
case may be. ... It should not be concluded, however, that collective 
bargaining has or will play only a minor role in adjustments to 
technological and economic change." (p. 46).
The Functioning 
Chapter 2 of the Labor Market
Introduction
Plant closure is considered a significant problem by some 
primarily because of the labor market impacts of its after 
math: earnings losses, long spells of unemployment, and 
altered career expectations. The public policy debate has 
revolved around whether direct policy interventions are re 
quired to correct these labor market impacts (Gordus, Jarley 
and Ferman 1981). 1 Naturally, there are different viewpoints 
as to the significance of the problem and whether any solu 
tion is possible that will actually improve and not worsen 
conditions in the long run.
Some recognize that dislocated workers are the victims of 
closure, but assert that no specific policy is necessary because 
ex ante and ex post protections are in place. Specifically, it is 
asserted that wages paid to workers contain a component 
which compensates workers ex ante for the differential prob 
ability of being displaced (McKenzie 1981). Furthermore, ex 
post protection is afforded for those losing their jobs, even 
as a result of plant closure, through unemployment compen 
sation. Moreover, any attempt to alter the decision to close 
would impede the free movement of capital and lead to inef 
ficient outcomes (McKenzie 1979).
Evidence used to support direct intervention includes the 
initial and long term earnings losses experienced by workers 
as a result of the closure (Jacobson 1979; Holen et al. 1981).
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The increased incidence of physical and/or mental health im 
pairment among the displaced also is used to argue for in 
tervention (Kasl and Cobb 1979). Furthermore, there is the 
perspective that workers and firms are unequally positioned 
to diversify to meet changing economic circumstances (Mar 
tin 1983).
There also is considerable concern with the process of 
closure. Companies are thought to be acting irresponsibly 
and unfairly when profitable plants are closed because those 
resources can be invested more profitably elsewhere. A 
related issue is when plants are used as "cash cows": profits 
from the plant are not reinvested in that facility but are used 
elsewhere, and eventually the plant is closed. Reluctance to 
provide advance notice of the closure also is criticized 
(Blueston and Harrison 1980). Conversely, some adopt the 
stance that the decision to close is solely a management 
prerogative and intervention, such as bargaining with union 
representatives, is neither appropriate nor necessary.
As we consider the plant closure issue, the question we 
must attempt to address is: Assuming closure is a problem 
requiring a public policy initiative, how can policy be con 
structed so that its disruptive impact is limited, yet it is effec 
tive at correcting the problem? Therefore, it is important to 
investigate the functioning of the labor market in order to 
understand the basis of the undesirable effects and to deter 
mine if protections are in place and if they are adequate.
Three labor market issues will be addressed in this chapter. 
The first is the structure of compensation schedules, the 
resulting estimates of earnings loss and the equitable struc 
ture of severance pay. The second is the dichotomy between 
small and large local labor markets, with implications for the 
job search of displaced workers. The final one is the notion 
of equalizing differentials (ex ante adjustments) and its ap 
plicability to plant closure. Numerous other issues do in-
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fluence the debate, but an exhaustive treatment of them is 
beyond the scope of this study.
Compensation Schedules, Earnings Loss 
and Severance Pay
The compensation schedules used by firms is not a topic 
that has generated significant policy interest. It is important 
in the case of plant closure, however, because the type of the 
compensation schedule may affect the estimate of the earn 
ings loss and the structure of an equitable severance pay for 
mula.
Lazear (1981) suggests that firms may design efficient 
compensation schedules in which workers do not receive a 
wage equal to the value of their marginal product (VMP). 
The usual assumption is that the wage of the worker should 
equal his/her marginal productivity times the price of the 
product. 2 Lazear contends that it pays for firms "to enter in 
to long term wage-employment relationships which pay 
workers wage rates less than their VMP when they are 
junior, and more than their VMP when they are senior 
employees." (p. 607) The motivation of the employer for 
this schedule is that it should reduce shirking by workers and 
increase employee attachment to the firm because they will 
not receive the higher wages later on if they are terminated 
now. 3
An example of the type of compensation schedule con 
sidered by Lazear is presented in figure 2.1. V(t) is a 
representation of a worker's value of marginal product over 
time. W't is the schedule of reservation wages for the 
worker, the minimum wage at which the worker will supply 
labor to the firm. W(t) is a wage schedule in which the pre 
sent value of wages paid equals the present value of VMP, 
which is the schedule V(t). The worker beginning employ 
ment with the firm should be indifferent between being com-
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pensated according to the wage path represented by either 
V(t) or W(t). For purposes of analysis, we will use this 
schedule as representative for the entire firm, such that dif 
ferent points along the horizontal axis represent workers 
with different tenure.
Figure 2.1
W(t)
Wages, 
Value of 
Marginal 
Product
Tenure with Firm
Implicit in this form of compensation is employment 
through time T, which is the efficient date of retirement. 4 At 
this tenure, the worker has been fully compensated for the 
below VMP wages received earlier, and the value of his/her 
work with this firm is less than the value of his/her time 
away from this firm. However, if the employment contract is 
broken prior to T, the worker has not been fully compen-
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sated. Plant closure is one example of breaking an implicit 
contract. Thus, when this type of compensation schedule is 
used, an implicit obligation is created from the firm to the 
worker. The firm has "defaulted" to the worker because the 
worker has invested in the firm during the early stage of 
tenure by accepting a wage less than VMP with the expecta 
tion (condition) of being paid back by receiving a wage 
greater than VMP in the latter state of tenure with the firm. 5
An examination of figure 2.1 indicates the nature of the 
earnings loss. If V(t) also represents the likely next best alter 
native in the labor market for the displaced worker, the in 
itial earnings loss (L) will be: L = W(t) - V(t). The earnings 
loss for more senior workers will be greater than the loss for 
less senior workers. This relationship is reasonably consis 
tent with the findings of Holen et al. (1981) who determined 
that men under the age of 40 suffered a 13.4 percent drop in 
earnings in the first year after closure whereas men over the 
age of 40 suffered a 39.9 percent drop in earnings. 6
The earnings loss of workers can be analyzed further, as is 
presented in figure 2.2. Assume the worker has been with'the 
firm t* years when the plant closes. This worker's spot wage 
is exactly equal to his/her value of the marginal product. 
Given that s/he has been working with the firm since t, the 
worker has "invested" an amount equal to the area AVW, 
and the firm has implicitly agreed to pay back an amount 
equal to area ADE. Assuming that V(t) represents the next 
best employment opportunity, there is no immediate earn 
ings loss.
Assume there is another worker whose tenure with the 
firm is t** years when the plant closes. Given the same cir 
cumstances as in the previous example, the initial earnings 
loss will be CB. The firm has borrowed the amount AVW, 
repaid area ABC, but still is in default area BCDE.
The more senior worker is likely to suffer the greater in 
itial wage loss, but the lifetime earnings loss of the junior
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worker is significantly greater. The worker with tenure t* has 
not been paid area ADE, whereas the lifetime earnings loss 
of the worker with tenure t** is CEDE, which is the smaller 
amount.
Figure 2.2
Wages. 
Value of 
Marginal 
Product W(t)
t* t** T 
Tenure with Firm
This analysis of earnings loss is consistent with the 
estimates developed by Jacobson (1979). His analysis 
demonstrated that earnings losses over the course of the 
worker's lifetime rose as tenure in the job increased, reached 
a maximum at seven years of tenure, and then decreased with 
additional years of tenure. The principal reason for this find 
ing is that those individuals with greater tenure also tend to 
have fewer years left in the labor force, and therefore the 
compounded effect tends to be smaller.
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Thus, it is necessary to consider the two aspects of wage 
loss. There is the transitory wage loss which is the difference 
in the wage that one is able to obtain after closure relative to 
the previous wage. The second is the permanent earnings loss 
due to the interrupted work history, which changes the earn 
ings profile. In addition, there is the wage loss due to a spell 
of unemployment that may follow closure.
The usual diagram of earnings loss is presented in figure 
2.3. The distance MN in figure 2.3 corresponds to CB in 
figure 2.2, which is the transitory earnings loss. The usual 
estimate of earnings loss is the area of MNP, which cor 
responds to the loss incurred until the worker attains his/her 
former earnings. However, as Jacobson correctly points out, 
the real area of interest is MNQ, which measures both the 
transitory loss and the loss associated with a disrupted earn 
ings schedule.
An additional point needs to be made in regards to figure 
2.2. Suppose a worker is at tenure T when the facility closes. 
The measure of wage loss would be ED. However, the firm 
has no implicit obligation to the worker since it has fully 
repaid what it has borrowed. Conversely, the worker at t* 
would be judged to have suffered no immediate wage loss, 
although the lifetime earnings loss would be at a maximum. 
Therefore, examination of the differences in the wage receiv 
ed pre- and post-closure as a measure of policy necessity 
would lead to inappropriate judgments about instances in 
which there may be the need for remedial action.
The frequency of this type of compensation schedule is 
unknown. It may actually take the form of job ladders in 
which the marginal product expected increases less than the 
wage as one moves up the ladder. Furthermore, other im 
plications arise from this type of schedule. For instance, it is 
likely that workers demand that wage schedules correspond 
more closely to the value of the marginal product in firms 
where it is anticipated that closure is more likely. Converse-
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ly, firms that are risky undertakings have the incentive to 
establish a schedule which deviates considerably from V(t).
Figure 2.3
Earnings
earnings loss
Time
Earnings Losses Caused by Plant Closure
e^ = expected earnings profile of workers without 
plant closure
&2 ~ earnings of workers displaced by plant closure 
c = time of closure
Although the measured earnings loss may be somewhat of 
an artifact of the compensation schedule, workers who have 
worked less than T years for this firm do indeed incur an 
earnings loss if their employment is terminated. Lazear has 
shown that a lump-sum payment is a mechanism to fully 
compensate a worker whose accumulated compensation is
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less than the accumulated value of his/her marginal product 
as the result of the termination of an employment contract. 
One form of a lump-sum payment is severance pay, which 
has been incorporated in plant closing legislative proposals.
Severance pay is the compensation given to a worker who 
is terminated. The connotation associated with it is that the 
leaving is involuntary and perhaps unexpected. For example, 
severance pay is given to workers who are excised whereas 
pensions are paid to workers who retire. The usual presump 
tion is that severance pay is given to ease the pain and to tide 
the worker over until something new can be found following 
the involuntary separation. However, severance pay also can 
be used as an incentive, and as a form of deferred but earned 
compensation. Finally, severance pay can be used as a deter 
rent to closure. All four of these uses have direct bearing on 
the plant closure.
A key feature of the employment relationship is that both 
parties are bound by certain rules, obligations and expecta 
tions, with one expectation being continued employment. 
For instance, Hall (1982) determined that 51.1 percent of all 
men are likely to work 20 years or more for the same firm. 
When the expectation of continued employment is not met 
and where performance of the employee has been above cer 
tain prescribed levels, the implicit contract has been violated. 
To maintain respect for the implicit contract, a payment is 
made to the worker that indicates that management is ending 
the contract reluctantly.
The second role that the severance payment can play is 
that of an incentive. Consider the case of plant closure. As 
workers become aware that the plant is to close, they may 
engage in job search in order to find alternate employment. 
They may do this to get a head start on all the others who 
also will become involuntarily laid off or because they may 
be aware of specific opportunities.
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Workers quitting in order to find other employment may 
not be in the best interest of the firm as it attempts to con 
tinue production until closing. Those with the best alternate 
employment opportunities also may be the most skilled. 
Thus management may offer an attractive severance pay 
schedule, but only to those workers who stay until the plant 
closes. In order to maintain the most skilled workers, who 
may also be the most experienced, the severance pay 
schedule is positively correlated with years of experience, 
such as two weeks of pay for every year of experience. In this 
situation, severance pay is an incentive to stay, but with a 
very real cost to the worker if s/he leaves before the plant is 
closed.
The third role that the severance payment can play is that 
of deferred but earned compensation (Lazear 1981, 1982) 
and Stoikov (1969). The conventional schedule for severance 
pay establishes it as a positive linear function of the number 
of years worked. For example, legislation proposed in 
Michigan sought the following form of severance payment. 
"The severance benefit shall be equal to the average weekly 
wage of the affected employee multiplied by the number of 
full and fractional years for which the employee has been 
employed." 7 Adopting Lazear's formulation, this proposal 
would not fully compensate workers for the deferred but un 
paid compensation.
Examining figure 2.4, the conventional proposal envisions 
a severance pay schedule suggested by tAB. However, if one 
objective of severance pay is to fully compensate workers for 
the implicit obligation, the severance pay schedule should 
take the form of tAT. The tAT schedule would result in the 
severance paid to a worker who has T years of experience 
with the firm when the plant closes being the same as the 
payment to the person who retires normally: zero. 8
Why would a firm use a compensation schedule such as 
this? The argument is that it would reduce shirking. Why
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would the firm concern itself with making a severance pay 
ment? Again, it is the importance of maintaining the implicit 
contract. Reneging on workers by leaving them with a com 
pensation deficit would make it virtually impossible for 
firms to implement this type of schedule in the future. Firms 
would then have to devise an alternate method, which may 
be more costly, to police workers and to minimize shirking. 
Consequently, there are advantages for both the firm and 
employees associated with severance payments.
Figure 2.4
Severance 
Pay
The fourth role of severance pay is to increase the cost of 
closing a plant such that closing may be the costlier alter 
native. This role seems most appropriate to the circumstance 
when the firm is considering relocating the operation. The 
firm must compare the cost of continuing operations at the 
old site with the sum of the costs of closing the old site and 
producing at the new site.
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Consider the following simplified formulation. Define the 
cost of continuing operations at the old site as Co, where
and where
oo
£ fio/U + r) 1 is the discounted present value of future 
/ = ^ nonlabor factor of production at the old 
facility costs, and
oo
£ Wjo/(l + r)1 is the discounted present value of future
/ = ' labor costs at the old facility.
Define the cost of closing the old site and producing at the 
new site (over the same time horizon) as Cp, where
oo oc 
-fewip + £ 
i=7 1 = 7
and where
Xco is the fixed cost of closing down the old facility, and 
XCp is the fixed cost of starting production at the new 
facility,
and
fjp is the discounted present value of future nonlabor 
factor of production costs at the new facility, and
Wjp is the discounted present value of future labor costs at 
the new facility, and
Sjo is the severance obligation to the workers at the old 
facility.
Obviously, relocation will not take place unless Cp < Co; 
but Wjp < Wjo since fewer labor resources are likely to be
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used per unit of output. With regard to nonlabor factor of 
production costs, fjp^ fjo, since capital is being substituted 
for labor. Assuming f jp = fio , the problem becomes
(Wio " Wip)/(1 + ^ (Xco + xpn+
Therefore, as Sio is increased, it becomes more unlikely that 
wage savings at a new location outweigh the fixed costs of 
closure. Therefore, increasing the severance obligation of the 
firm raises the probability of Cp >Co, which would make 
the relocation uneconomical.
It is obvious that there is a conflict between designing a 
severance pay schedule that fully compensates workers for 
deferred compensation and a schedule that imposes signifi 
cant costs on a firm if it decides to close a plant. The pattern 
that closings appear to follow is that the actual closing is 
preceded by a significant length of time in which employ 
ment is reduced gradually. Due to seniority provisions incor 
porated into bargained contracts, those remaining at the 
time of closure are the most senior employees.
Consider a firm in which the following workers, categoriz 
ed by years of experience, are employed and eligible for 
severance pay when closure is announced.
Total
Years of 
Experience
20
15
10
5
Number of 
Workers
20
15
10
5
severance
Schedule A
$ 80,000
45,000
20,000
5,000
i raymeni
Schedule B
$ 4,000
15,000
20,000
5,000
Total $150,000 $44,000
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Severance payments under Schedule A are calculated as 
two weeks of average pay for every year worked, where the 
average pay is $200 for two weeks. The formula for Schedule 
B is designed to compensate for deferred earnings. Conse 
quently, two weeks of average earnings ($200) are payed for 
each year worked up to 10 years, at which time the schedule 
changes to $200 (10+ (11 - t))for each year worked more 
than 10 years. T, the efficient retirement tenure, equals 21 
years in this example. As can be seen, the severance payment 
owed by the firm under A ($150,000) is significantly greater 
than under B ($44,000), and therefore, Schedule A is much 
more likely to deter a closure.
Small Local Labor Markets 
Versus Large Local Labor Markets
The key element in the plant closure debate is the 
reemployment experience of those workers who are displac 
ed. Recognizing that the problem is one of scale, the public 
policy proposals have tended to include only firms employ 
ing more workers than some predetermined size. This ap 
proach, though, may ignore circumstances of the local labor 
market.
The concern is whether the local labor market approx 
imates a perfectly competitive labor market. Are workers 
likely to have alternate employment opportunities in that 
area? Or are real alternatives going to require relocation to 
another labor market? Are wages going to be competitive, or 
does the closing of the one plant depress the labor market's 
wage level?
If the local market is relatively large, as evidenced by 
numerous employers and therefore numerous employment 
opportunities, the market may approximate the competitive 
model. No change of residence is necessary to access new op 
portunities; perhaps only changing commuting patterns is re 
quired. Furthermore, since there are many employers, no
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one employer can establish a wage scale. Numerous employ 
ment opportunities enforce the competitive setting of wages 
because if one employer deviates too far from the com 
petitive wage, workers will leave and accept new employment 
opportunities.
A small local labor market may not approximate the 
perfectly competitive model. The local market may not pro 
vide the range of options necessary so that workers can 
change jobs without undue expense. Instead, job mobility 
may entail relocation to another labor market. 9 Further 
more, one employer may act as a monopsonist demander of 
labor, paying workers a lower wage than would be paid in a 
competitive market. 10 Jacobson (1979) determined that 
lifetime earnings losses resulting from a plant closure tend to 
be inversely related to the size of the local labor market.
Thus, the closure of a plant in a large local labor market 
may not require direct intervention because labor can be 
highly mobile among a number of alternatives. The incentive 
to bargain over the decision to close also may be limited due 
to the numerous options available. Relocation to find alter 
nate employment is not as likely to be necessary. Conversely, 
if that same plant closed in a small community, relocation 
may be necessary. Specifically, the market will not function 
as hypothesized because the conditions necessary are not pre 
sent. Workers in this circumstance may have a greater incen 
tive to obtain relocation allowances through the collective 
bargaining contract, grant more concessions to keep the 
plant open, or as Wintner (1983) has shown, buy out the 
plant so that it can continue operating.
The difficulty is in developing an administrative 
framework for determining whether the conditions for a 
smooth functioning market are present or not. When is a 
closure a serious problem in a local labor market? The usual 
approach is to require firms with more than 50 or 100 
employees to be subject to the statute. Obviously, the scope 
of the problem depends on the size of the local labor market.
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The closure of a facility with 100 employees may be inconse 
quential in a community of 250,000, whereas it would be 
devastating in a community of 5,000.
This comparison would suggest that one approach might 
be to convert the numer of employees affected to a percen 
tage of the local labor force. This also is problematic because 
the size of a facility can be a variable. The result could be 
that firms would not establish facilities that exceeded the 
percentage threshold. A notch would develop at this point; 
but this approach would be more acceptable than one that 
automatically covers all firms exceeding some size irrespec 
tive of the conditions in the local labor market.
Compensating Wage Differentials 
(Ex Ante Payments)
The theory of compensating differentials was introduced 
by Adam Smith who observed that some types of jobs re 
quired greater compensation than others because the work 
had certain undesirable characteristics associated with it such 
as greater hazards or frequent interruptions of employment. 
If the theory of compensating wage differentials applies to 
plant closure, workers employed in firms in which there is 
greater likelihood of permanent closure would receive a com 
pensating differential as part of their wage (an ex ante pay 
ment) . That differential would make their expected compen 
sation in that firm equal to the compensation they would 
receive in a firm with more stable employment prospects, 
everything else being equal. If this is the case, the affected 
workers would require no additional policy consideration 
because they already have been fully compensated by the 
firm. McKenzie (1981) asserts that workers are so compen 
sated.
Baily (1974) utilizes this theory in devising wage and 
employment strategies for firms. He writes, "To attract 
workers, the firm must pay a higher wage if there is some 
positive probability of unemployment than it would if
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employment were guaranteed" (p. 38). Abowd and 
Ashenfelter (1981) found evidence of compensating differen 
tials for workers in industries in which layoffs were an 
ticipated. Holding other factors constant, they found that 
the value of the differential was directly proportional to the 
extent of anticipated unemployment.
There are a number of questions relating to the relevance 
of the theory of compensating wage differentials to plant 
closure. First, is the permanent layoff resulting from plant 
closure anticipated unemployment? Baily (1977) wrote that 
workers "are assumed to have an expectation about the 
layoff policy of the firm. . . . This assumption is ap 
propriate where firms have a history of hiring and firing: a 
pattern or reputation for the firm is established." Differen 
tials result from accumulated knowledge, but the reputation 
developed from plant closure cannot be applied by the 
workers to the specific experience because there is no future 
employment opportunity with that firm in the local labor 
market. That is, there is no opportunity to recontract with 
the firm. There is, however, the opportunity to recontract 
with another firm in the same industry.
Second, in the theory of compensating wage differentials, 
how do workers obtain information about an attribute of the 
workplace or the firm? For example, an employee can 
observe the degree of workplace hazards and attempt to ob 
tain a new wage reflecting those conditions. However, infor 
mation about plant closure has been so scarce and 
fragmented, as is evident from chapter 1, that it is difficult to 
envision reliable estimates of the differential probability of 
closing. Schmenner's (1983) analysis, which found one-third 
of closures being of plants less than six years old, suggests 
that a large element of closure is random, which makes 
estimating the necessary differential very tenuous. Since the 
policy interest in this issue is leading to more data being col 
lected, more reliable probabilities of closure may be 
developed in the future.
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Summary
Casual observation of labor market outcomes pre- and 
post-closure may provide a distorted view of the earnings 
losses of workers. The tendency to emphasize initial losses 
rather than permanent losses concentrates attention on the 
older worker when, in fact, the worker in the middle of his 
career may be most severely impacted because the inter 
rupted work history decreases the expected lifetime earnings 
profile.
The local labor market is a key determinant of the impact 
of closure on workers. Jacobson found earnings losses 
associated with plant closure to be inversely related to the 
size of the local labor market. Policies that do not recognize 
these differences may be onerous in some instances and in 
adequate in others, which suggests that the policy approach 
needs to be flexible so that it can be adapted to the local cir 
cumstances.
Finally, the theory of compensating differentials probably 
does not hold in the case of plant closure. The inability to 
recontract with a closed firm coupled with the difficulty of 
obtaining reliable estimates of the differential probability of 
closure make it unlikely that ex ante protection is afforded 
workers. One possibility is to encourage recontracting with a 
firm that has a high probability of closing.
In conclusion, because the impact of closure depends on 
the specific circumstances of the workers, the firm and the 
labor market, a uniform policy may be successful in some in 
stances and deleterious in others. Collective bargaining, 
which by its nature is flexible and sensitive to local condi 
tions, may be a socially acceptable way to make adjustments 
to some labor market outcomes.
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NOTES
1. There have been two major types of plant closure policy initiatives. 
The first has been to prescribe the behavior of firms intending to close. 
Advance notice, continued wage payments, and severance payments to 
workers and communities are elements of this type of initiative. In some 
respects, the purpose of these requirements has been to make closure so 
onerous that firms would not carry through with a threat of closure. The 
second type has been to develop assistance programs for those workers 
displaced including job clubs, retraining, job search skills and relocation. 
This approach has been adopted more frequently by individual states, 
since it has been thought that the more prescriptive types of governmen 
tal action would place a state at a competitive disadvantage for economic 
development purposes.
2. The reader will note that according to the economic theory, the wage 
only equals the value of the marginal product of the last person hired. 
This assumes that workers are homogeneous and are working with a fix 
ed and identical capital stock. However, there are different job ladders 
within a firm, employees have different responsibilities and they are not 
necessarily working with the same capital, which requires deviations in 
compensation. Lazear's analysis addresses the long run compensation 
schedule within the firm.
3. Lazear develops the model further by demonstrating that firms will 
develop compensation schedules that are of this shape, but the present 
value of W(t) is greater than that of V(t). When the earnings stream is 
greater than the productivity stream, the cost of shirking to the employee 
increases, so the compensation schedule essentially becomes a policing 
mechanism. His analysis has other interesting implications for plant 
closure, but our present concern is with the implications of this schedule 
for the measurement of earnings loss.
4. Abraham and Medoff (1983) assert that a deferred compensation 
schedule requires that the relative protection against job loss also grows 
with length of service so that firms are not permitted to terminate 
workers once wages exceed VMP. In fact, they found that written provi 
sions specifying seniority as an important determinant of layoff priority 
are associated with a reduction in the vulnerability of senior workers los 
ing their jobs.
5. Lazear (p. 609) describes this process as follows: The firm has 
defaulted "since the firm essentially is borrowing from the worker by
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paying him less than VMP when he is young and repaying him by paying 
more than the VMP when old."
The relationship of the shape of the earnings profile to the shape of the 
value of the marginal product schedule also is an interesting issue. One 
set of possible wage paths would be as depicted in figure 2.5.
Value of 
Marginal 
Product W(t)
Tenure with Firm
This approach is flawed by the fact that anytime the worker's V(t) ex 
ceeds W(t) paid by the firm, there is the incentive to leave the firm. A 
firm would not adopt this type of schedule because (a) it does not reduce 
shirking, and (b) it does not increase employee attachment. Thus, 
although one can envision the situation in which the worker is in debt to 
the firm, particularly when there is significant firm-specific training, this 
type of schedule does not satisfy any of the motivations of the firm.
6. The initial earnings loss is not strictly a result of Lazear's formulation. 
For instance, Wachter and Wascher (1983) use a more general age- 
earnings profile and also derive an immediate wage loss that is the dif 
ference between the wage paid and the opportunity wage. Furthermore, 
in their formulation, the early wage with the firm is less than the oppor 
tunity wage. The distinction is that their age-earnings profile is the result 
of job-specific human capital. The implications of this profile may dif 
fer, however, and depend on the financing of the job-specific training.
7. This wording is taken from Substitute for House Bill No. 4330 "A Bill 
to Provide for Community Preservation and Recovery After an 
Employer Closes, Relocates or Reduces Its Operation." (1981)
8. Of course this ignores the role that pension payments play as deferred 
compensation.
9. Baily (1974) incorporates mobility costs in his model of wage and 
employment variation. He stresses the role that mobility costs play in the 
decision to change jobs and that mobility costs vary by training and the 
local labor market.
10. A perfectly competitive market also is a precondition for payment of 
an equalizing differential.
The Duty to Bargain
Chapter 3 Judicial Interpretations
Introduction
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted 
into law in 1935. It forms the basis of the legal framework 
for collective bargaining in the private sector in the United 
States. An administrative agency, the National Labor Rela 
tions Board (NLRB) is charged with administering the terms 
of the NLRA.
The National Labor Relations Act provides for the right 
of workers to organize and select a representative to serve as 
their exclusive bargaining agent. The Act also imposes "a 
mutual obligation of the employer and representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and condi 
tions of employment." 1 Because Congress did not specify 
what constitutes "other terms and conditions" in detail, 
there has been considerable uncertainty as to what actions 
and practices are covered by these words.
"Wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ 
ment" are mandatory topics of bargaining. They cannot be 
changed unilaterally by either party to the collective bargain 
ing contract. Mandatory topics must be negotiated to im 
passe. If unilateral changes are made prior to impasse, an 
unfair labor practice is committed. However, it is in the case-
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by-case determination of whether an unfair labor practice 
has been committed that the NLRB, the Circuit Court of Ap 
peals and the United States Supreme Court have decided 
what actions and practices are mandatory topics of bargain 
ing.
The evolving case law of collective bargaining over plant 
closure increasingly has changed the economic considera 
tions brought into the analysis. Arguments supporting no 
duty to bargain over the decision to close have moved from 
the right of management to run its business as it sees fit (the 
core of entrepreneurial control), 2 to whether the reasons are 
primarily economic in nature, 3 to whether the economic 
reasons are amenable to change through collective bargain 
ing. 4 Furthermore, the concepts discussed have advanced to 
include not only the capital investments by the owners of the 
firm, but also to include the human capital investments made 
by the employees. 5
The implicit assertion in the former arguments is that 
economic efficiency is maximized when the use and move 
ment of physical capital is unconstrained (McKenzie 1979). 
The implicit contention in the latter arguments is that strict 
economic efficiency ignores those costs which are borne by 
others as a result of the firm's action—the social costs—and 
considers only those costs borne by the firm (Coase 1971). 
Consequently, what is efficient for the firm may not be effi 
cient for society.
Bargaining over the decision to close a plant presumably 
could incorporate both private and social costs in the deci 
sion calculus so that a socially efficient decision could be 
reached. Conversely, bargaining is not costless. Imposing a 
duty to bargain over the decision to close in all partial 
closure circumstances could result in a socially inefficient 
solution if the extra bargaining costs exceed the benefits 
from bargaining.
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There are two types of noncontract bargaining over plant 
closure: decision bargaining and effects bargaining. Accord 
ing to the interpretation of the United States Supreme Court, 
there is no duty to bargain over the decision of the owner to 
close down the entire operation of a firm. 6 Recently, it was 
established that there is no duty to bargain over the decision 
to close one plant (facility) of a multiple plant (facility) 
operation, 7 but there is a duty to bargain over the effects of 
closure.
The labor law concerning the duty to bargain over the 
decision to partially close an operation has been described as 
a conundrum (Heinsz 1981). This description is most apt. 
The law generally has recognized that the owners of firms 
place their capital and their livelihood at risk, and should be 
free to take the actions necessary to protect their investment 
and to generate a satisfactory return. However, the law also 
is cognizant that employees also place their human capital 
and livelihood at risk when joining a firm. To some this con 
flict between physical capital and human capital may be an 
issue of equity versus efficiency. Thus, it is to be expected 
that the National Labor Relations Board and the Circuit 
Court of Appeals have reached different conclusions on 
whether "the mutual obligation of the employer and the 
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment" 8 also includes 
bargaining over partial closure of operations.
The United States Supreme Court, in its ruling in First Na 
tional Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Rela 
tions Board (101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981)), did not totally resolve 
the issue. 9 The Supreme Court held there was no duty to 
bargain over the decision to close one part of an operation 
under the National Labor Relations Act. However, even the 
Supreme Court's majority opinion states as limitations that 
(a) First National Maintenance Corporation "had no inten-
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tion to replace the discharged employees or to move the 
operations elsewhere," 10 and (b) the "union was not selected 
as the bargaining representative until well after the peti 
tioner's economic difficulties had begun." 11 Thus, the union 
was not the source of the financial difficulties, nor could it 
be expected that the union could effect changes to alleviate 
the difficulties.
Justice Stewart wrote almost two decades ago in his con 
curring opinion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation 
v. National Labor Relations Board (85 S. Ct. 398, 411 
(1964)) that "no problems in the domestic economy are of 
greater concern than those involving job security and 
employment stability." This statement probably has never 
been more appropriate than now. The economy of the 
United States has been undergoing a gradual structural shift 
and back-to-back recessions have exacerbated the perceived 
decline. Perhaps most important, the plant closure problem 
will not go away during a sustained economic upturn. 
Schmenner (1983) has determined that there is a long run 
process underway in which manufacturing will be shifting 
from larger establishments to smaller ones.
This chapter examines the efficiency and equity arguments 
associated with the judicial interpretations of the duty to 
bargain over the decision to close or relocate a part of an 
enterprise. It usually is argued that the unfettered movement 
of capital is necessary to achieving economic efficiency. The 
most efficient allocation of resources occurs when capital is 
free to move to its most profitable use. But a related question 
should concern the investment in human capital. Would this 
investment be less than optimum when workers are experi 
encing frequent earnings losses due to closure? Will there be 
a reluctance to undertake firm-specific training?
Although the profit maximization motive leads to the 
most efficient allocation of resources, there is the recogni-
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tion that some redistribution may take place. The implicit 
assumption is that the redistribution is among firms—that 
some will gain at the expense of others. However, these are 
potential equity implications of the redistribution involved in 
plant closure or relocation. Specifically, because firms are 
able to diversify and reposition more easily than workers, the 
firm may be maximizing profits at the expense of earnings 
losses of its workers.
The following review of the case law provides the institu 
tional framework and the background arguments opposing 
and supporting the duty to bargain. Based on these it may be 
possible to establish a per se rule—the assignment of 
rights—that will result in maximizing the production of 
goods and services given that social costs are accommodated. 
The next chapter examines alternate per se rules that have 
been proposed to solve this conundrum and puts forth a new 
proposal.
Judicial Interpretations
The conundrum surrounding the duty to bargain over 
plant closure has resulted from the conflicting decisions that 
have been rendered by the National Labor Relations Board, 
the Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme 
Court. The cases have been decided by relying on different 
sections of the National Labor Relations Act. Specifically, 
the National Labor Relations Board has emphasized Section 
8(a)5 which defines the refusal to bargain collectively with 
the elected representatives of the employees as an unfair 
labor practice. The Courts, by and large, have stressed defin 
ing the actions and activities that fall under the definition of 
other terms and condition of employment (Section 8(d)). 
Consequently, competing interpretations exist.
The question of bargaining over the decision to close a 
plant, to subcontract work or to move work from one plant
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to another hinges on whether the practice falls within the 
definition of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment. If it does, then it is a mandatory topic of 
negotiation. However, just because it is a mandatory topic 
does not mean that agreement must be reached. Instead, 
there simply must be an attempt at good faith bargaining. 
The first case presented here (Borg- Warner) established this 
principle. The following cases deal specifically with plant 
closure, subcontracting and movement of work issues, and 
whether negotiations occur during the course of a contract or 
while bargaining over a new contract. The description of the 
judicial developments below is not an exhaustive examina 
tion of all the cases pertaining to the interpretations of the 
duty to bargain. Other studies, such as Swift (1974), Heinsz 
(1981) and Miscimarra (1983) have already provided these.
National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster 
Division of Borg-Warner Corporation
(78 S. Ct. 718) (1958)
The United States Supreme Court decided this case in 
1958. The crux of the case was the distinction between the 
duty to bargain over mandatory topics as opposed to per 
missive topics.
Borg-Warner Corporation attempted to include two 
clauses in the collective bargaining contract it was 
negotiating with the United Automobile, Aircraft and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), the 
certified representative of the employees. One was the 
"ballot" clause which would require a prestrike secret vote 
of all employees on the company's last offer. If the 
employees reject the offer, the company would have the op 
portunity to amend the final offer. The other provision was a 
"recognition" clause which was an attempt to exclude the 
International Union of the UAW and recognize only the 
UAW local as the bargaining representative.
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The union rejected both ballot and recognition clauses 
saying each was totally unacceptable. Conversely, Borg- 
Warner Corporation indicated that no agreement would be 
reached unless it contrained both of these clauses. After a 
strike, the union gave in and signed an agreement incor 
porating both clauses. The International Union filed unfair 
labor charges with the National Labor Relations Board 
citing unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 
8(a) (5).
The Supreme Court analyzed Section 8(a) (5), which 
defines refusal to bargain collectively with the represen 
tatives of the employees, and Section 8(d), which requires 
bargaining over "wages, hours and other terms and condi 
tions of employment." The Supreme Court indicated that 
the duty to bargain is limited to the subjects of wages, hours 
and other terms and conditions of employment. Further 
more, bargaining can take place over other issues, but at the 
discretion of each of the parties.
Mr. Justice Burton wrote what has become the definitive 
rule on bargaining rights and obligations surrounding man 
datory and permissive topics of bargaining.
But that good faith does not license the employer to 
refuse to enter into agreements on the ground that 
they do not include some proposal which is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. We agree with 
the Board that such conduct is, in substance, a 
refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within 
the scope of mandatory bargaining. This does not 
mean that bargaining is to be confined to statutory 
subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is 
lawful in itself. Each would be enforceable if 
agreed to by the unions. But it does not follow that, 
because the company may propose these clauses, it 
can lawfully insist upon them as a condition to any 
agreement. 12
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Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation 
v. National Labor Relations Board
(85 S. Ct. 398 (1964))
The United States Supreme Court decided Fibreboard in 
1964. The facts of the case were as follows. Just prior to the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, 
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation indicated to the 
union that substantial savings could be realized by contract 
ing out the maintenance work at the expiration of the collec 
tive bargaining agreement. Prior to the next meeting with the 
union, which was to take place the day before the contract 
expired, Fibreboard engaged a firm to do the maintenance 
work. The company stated that further negotiations on a 
new agreement would be pointless. Formal negotiations be 
tween Fibreboard and the union, the United Steelworkers of 
America, had existed since 1937.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
... on the facts of this case, the 'contracting out' 
of work previously performed by members of an 
existing bargaining unit is a subject about which the 
National Labor Relations Act requires employers 
and the representatives of their employees to 
bargain collectively. We also agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the Board did not exceed its 
remedial powers in directing the Company to 
resume its maintenance operations, reinstate the 
employees with back pay, and bargain with the 
Union. 13
The bases for the decision of the majority were that 
(a) contracting out falls within the literal meaning of "terms 
and conditions of employment," (b) the industrial peace was 
likely to be promoted through the negotiation of the issue, 
and (c) the industrial practices of the United States indicated 
frequent negotiations over the issue of subcontracting. Fur-
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thermore, the changes being considered by the company in 
volved no capital investment. It simply was a case of one set 
of workers being substituted for the company's employees.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion also addressed the 
issue of the likely success of negotiations settling the dispute. 
They wrote, "As the Court of Appeals pointed out, (i)t is not 
necessary that it be likely or probable that the union will 
yield or supply a feasible solution but rather that the union 
be afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate 
complaints that its maintenance was unduly costly." 14
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however, became 
more influential than the majority opinion. Justice Stewart 
narrowed the scope of the decision by suggesting that the 
Court's decision was not a general rule, but only applied to 
the facts of this case—replacement of bargaining unit 
workers with others doing the same work in the same loca 
tion. Only under circumstances such as these would the 
employer be required to bargain with the union over the deci 
sion to terminate the activity.
Justice Stewart limited the majority's opinion by stating 
that
... it surely does not follow that every decision 
which may affect job security is a subject of com 
pulsory collective bargaining. . . . An enterprise 
may decide to invest in labor saving machinery. 
Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go 
out of business. Nothing the Court holds today 
should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain 
collectively regarding such managerial decisions, 
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. 
Decisions concerning the commitment of invest 
ment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise 
are not themselves primarily about conditions of 
employment, though the effect of the decision may 
be necessarily to terminate employment. 15
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National Labor Relations Board 
v. Adams Dairy, Inc.
(322 F.2d 553) (1963)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
decided this case in 1963. The facts of the case were as 
follows. Adams Dairy employed driver-salesmen and also 
engaged independent contractors to distribute their pro 
ducts. The driver-salesmen were members of a union that 
had negotiated formal agreements with Adams Dairy since 
1954. In the course of negotiating a new contract, the 
employer expressed concern about the relative costs of the 
delivery service. A new contract was executed, however, 
without specifically addressing the costs of delivery service.
After the contract was signed, the employer initiated new 
discussions concerning its unfavorable competitive situation 
due to these higher costs. No specific proposals were in 
troduced, nor was it indicated that the driver-salesmen 
would be terminated if no accord was reached. Subsequent 
ly, while the contract was still in force, Adams Dairy 
substituted independent contractors for its own driver- 
salesmen and terminated these employees.
The question was: Is the decision to terminate distribution 
of one's product a subject of mandatory bargaining under 
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act? The 
Court began their analysis by asserting that "union member 
ship is not a guarantee against legitimate or justifiable 
discharge or discharge motivated by economic necessity." 16 
The Court also indicated that intent, motivation and natural 
consequences cannot be ignored when determining whether 
an unfair labor practice has been committed.
The Court held that the decision to terminate was not a 
mandatory topic of bargaining because the substitution of 
independent contractors for the driver-salesmen was made 
for legitimate business reasons. The intent and motivation 
was not to destroy the union, as evidenced by the fact that
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they had attempted to negotiate with the employees on 
previous occasions concerning an adjustment of the commis 
sion payments. The rest of the Court's ruling also is very 
significant. Specifically, they wrote: "After that decision 
had been made, however, Section 8(a) (5) did require 
negotiation with reference to the treatment of the employees 
who were terminated by the decision." 17 Thus, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
concept of "effects" bargaining.
In placing this case in perspective, it is important to recall 
that the employer had attempted to negotiate with the driver- 
salesmen concerning the commission payments. When no 
relief was forthcoming, they substituted the independent 
contractors for the driver-salesmen. Therefore, they had 
established that this was a legitimate concern of their 
business and that if an accommodation could have been 
reached with the driver-salesmen, no change would have 
been made in employment.
Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington 
Manufacturing Company et al., and National 
Labor Relations Board v. Darlington 
Manufacturing Company, et al.
(85 S. Ct. 994) (1965)
The United States Supreme Court decided this case in 
1965. The Textile Workers Union successfully organized the 
workers of the Darlington Manufacturing Company in 
September of 1956. The Board of Directors met several days 
later and decided to liquidate the Darlington Manufacturing 
Company. The plant ceased operations in November and all 
equipment was sold in December. It was determined in the 
proceedings that the owner (Deering Milliken) of Darlington 
Manufacturing Company also operated 16 other textile 
manufacturers.
The issues to be adjudicated were the following. First, was 
Darlington Manufacturing Company a separate manufac-
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turer or part of the entire Deering Milliken enterprise? Sec 
ond, does a company have the right to close part or all of its 
business regardless of its motives? The Supreme Court im 
plicitly held that Darlington Manufacturing Company was a 
separate company. It explicitly ruled: "We hold that so far 
as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the 
absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason 
he pleases, but disagree with the Court of Appeals that such 
right includes the ability to close a part of a business no mat 
ter what the reason." 18
In developing its opinion, the Supreme Court asserted the 
primacy of decisions based on sound economic reasons as 
opposed to those with a discriminatory motive. Those deci 
sions with sound business justifications, irrespective of the 
effect on concerted employee activity, would not be found in 
violation of Section 8(a) (3), which holds that it is an unfair 
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in employ 
ment on the basis of membership in a labor organization. 19
The Supreme Court also evaluated the expected future 
benefit derived from the antiunion activity, such as 
discouraging collective employee activities. The Supreme 
Court considered this, but suggested instead that a complete 
liquidation of business, even though it was done for anti- 
union reasons, would not generate future benefits for the 
firm. They retreated from this statement by indicating that 
the expected future benefit not be in the same line of 
business. They stated:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is 
being closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an in 
terest in another business, whether or not affiliated 
with or engaged in the same line of commercial ac 
tivity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality 
to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the 
discouragement of unionization in that business; 
(2) act to close their plant with the purpose of pro 
ducing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship
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to the other business which makes it realistically 
forseeable that its employees will fear that such 
business will also be closed down if they persist in 
organizational activities, we think that an unfair 
labor practice has been made out. 20
National Labor Relations Board v. The William 
J. Burns International Detective Agency
(346 F.2d 897) (1965)
The International Guards Union of America was certified 
as the collective bargaining agent for the Burns Detective 
Agency, guard employees in the metropolitan Omaha area. 
A meeting was arranged between the local Burns' manager 
and the union to begin negotiations. However, before this 
meeting took place, all but one of the establishments to 
which Burns provided services in the Omaha area notified 
Burns that they were going to cancel their service contracts 
with them. Burns then cancelled their service contract with 
the only establishment that continued to demand their ser 
vices.
The manager of Burns wrote a letter to the union in 
dicating that a negotiating session would not be necessary 
since Burns would not have any contracts in the Omaha area. 
The union filed charges against Burns alleging failure to 
bargain with the union as the exclusive bargaining agent. 
Further, it was alleged that the mere refusal to consult with 
the union about the termination of services is a violation of 
Section 8(a) (5), which defines employment conditions that 
require bargaining.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distinguished 
this case from Fibreboard, arguing that Burns had complete 
ly discontinued its operation in Omaha.
Unlike the Fibreboard situation, Burns is not conti 
nuing the same work at the same plant under 
similar conditions of employment. No form of con-
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tracting out or subcontracting is here involved. 
Burns for valid economic reasons has withdrawn 
completely from providing any services in the 
Omaha area. 21
This case raises several intriguing questions. First, there is 
the juxtapositioning of the election victory by the union with 
the Agency's termination of its one remaining contract, 
thereby completely ending service in that market. Was there 
an antiunion animus? Second, how much can be expected of 
a firm when its services are no longer being demanded? It 
would not be able to service this market from a different 
location, which would be possible if this was a manufactur 
ing facility. Third, is the expected benefit to an unfair labor 
practice restricted to that market of operation? Might dif 
ferent interpretations be necessary for manufacturing 
facilities as opposed to service establishments? Finally, no 
agreement had ever been negotiated. What was the expected 
return from notification and negotiation?
In terms of the labor law at the time, the only issue on 
which this case should have been decided was the antiunion 
animus. There was no substitution of employees, so 
Fibreboard would not apply. Neither would Adams Dairy. If 
it was judged that there was antiunion animus, then it must 
be determined whether withdrawing from this market was a 
partial or complete closure. Technically, Burns was closing 
down one part of its operation. But Burns was completely 
leaving this market. However, if one wants to use expected 
benefit in defining the status as partial or total, the answer 
probably is that unionization attempts could have been 
forestalled at other locations. Thus, it would seem that it 
should have been considered a partial closure, and therefore 
an unfair labor practice.
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National Labor Relations Board v. Royal 
Plating and Polishing Company
(350 F.2d 191) (1965)
The Royal Plating and Polishing Company had two plants 
located within one block of each other. The two plants com 
prised a single bargaining unit. The production and 
maintenance workers were represented by the Metal 
Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Helpers International Union. 
A bargaining relationship had existed for 17 years, although 
the union had only been certified as the exclusive agent for 
the last 3 years. There had been little labor trouble between 
the union and company.
The union and company had just reached a new agree 
ment. The Company, however, also was negotiating with the 
local housing authority since the property on which the plant 
was located was designated for redevelopment. Prior to sign 
ing the new contract with the union, the company had given 
the housing authority an option to purchase the plant. The 
housing authority exercised the option and the company 
closed the plant one month after the new agreement with the 
union had been signed.
The union charged that the company violated Sections 
8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by 
unilaterally closing the plant. Section 8(a) (1) defines 
employer interference in union activities as an unfair labor 
practice. 22 In considering this case, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit stressed the fact that the 
land on which the plant was located had been designated for 
redevelopment by a public body. Thus, "there was no room 
for union negotiation in these circumstances. The union 
could only attempt to persuade (the owner) to move his 
operation to another location." 23 Also, since the decision in 
volved a major change in the economic direction of the com 
pany, the employer did not have a duty to bargain with the 
union concerning the decision to shut down.
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The Appeals Court did raise an important issue for effects 
bargaining:
However, under the circumstances such as those 
presented by the case at bar an employer is still 
under obligation to notify the union of its inten 
tions so that the union may be given an opportunity 
to bargain over the rights of the employees whose 
employment status will be altered by the 
managerial decision. 24
This was followed by a statement that had even greater 
significance:
There can be no doubt that the Company, by 
withholding information of its intention to ter 
minate the Bleeker Street operations, deterred the 
Union from bargaining over the effect of the shut 
down on the employees. 25
This ruling dictated that there was a mandatory duty to 
bargain over the effects of the closure, i.e., to negotiate such 
issues as severance pay, vacation pay and pensions. 
Moreover, the phrase, "by withholding information of its 
intention to terminate," could be interpreted as indicating 
that the Court of Appeals was requiring timely advance 
notice be given to the employees in order to bargain over the 
effects. Withholding information can occur only prior to the 
actual occurrence. However, this interpretation has not been 
adopted, nor has agreement evolved on what constitutes 
timely advance notice.
Ozark Trailers Incorporated 
and International Union, 
Allied Industrial Workers of America, 
Local No. 770,AFL-CIO 
(161 NLRB No. 48) (1966) (63 LRRM 1264)
The National Labor Relations Board decided this case in 
1966. Ozark Trailers Incorporated was one division of a
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multiplant operation, although all three operations had dif 
ferent names. In March 1963, the Allied Industrial Workers 
union was certified as the bargaining agent, and in April 
1963, the union and Ozark Trailers executed their first col 
lective bargaining contract, a one-year agreement.
The following January, the board of directors of Ozark 
Trailers decided to close the plant for economic reasons. 
They claimed that low productivity, poor workmanship and 
an inefficiently designed facility were the reasons for the 
closure. No notice of closure was given to the union; in fact, 
the union representative was told that the layoff was tem 
porary. The plant was closed prior to the end of the contract.
The National Labor Relations Board determined that 
there was a duty to bargain over the decision. Its decision 
was based on four separate considerations. They were:
1. Decisions important to management are likely to be im 
portant to employees.
2. The economic reasons for closing were particularly 
suited to resolution through collective bargaining.
3. The duty to bargain only requires that full and frank 
discussions of the topic be held, not that an agreement 
be reached by the parties.
4. Bargaining limited to the effects is not likely to be mean 
ingful when there is no possibility of reversing the deci 
sion.
In making the argument concerning the importance of the 
decision to both management and employees, the Board 
drew the parallel between physical capital and human 
capital. Specifically, the Board wrote:
For, just as the employer has invested capital in the 
business, so the employee has invested years of his 
working life, accumulating seniority, accruing pen 
sion rights, and developing skills that may or may 
not be salable to another employer. And, just as the 
employer's interest in the protection of his capital
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investment is entitled to consideration in our inter 
pretation of the Act, so too is the employee* s in 
terest in the protection of his livelihood. 26
The second consideration drew heavily from the 
Fibreboard decision, in which the majority opinion stressed 
the fact that issues involving labor costs were particularly 
suited to resolution through the collective bargaining pro 
cess. Furthermore, they pointed out that there were strong 
similarities between subcontracting and the partial closure, 
therefore rendering the latter amenable to resolution through 
collective bargaining.
In developing the argument pertaining to the duty to 
bargain, but not necessarily the duty to agree, the Board re 
jected the argument that this would impede management 
decisionmaking. The basic purposes of the National Labor 
Relations Act would be furthered by requiring bargaining, 
and since the partial closure is a relatively infrequent event, 
the cost to society of requiring bargaining would not be 
unreasonable.
The final consideration is based on the relationship be 
tween decision bargaining and effects bargaining. What is 
the source of bargaining power for the union when bargain 
ing over the effects? Since it is after the fact, there is only the 
goodwill of the employer to rely on to generate a fair out 
come. When there is a duty to bargain over the decision, 
potentially there is greater bargaining power because the 
enterprise is still an active concern. Tradeoffs can be made in 
the process of arriving at a decision that is mutually 
beneficial.
International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 
of America, UA W and its Local 864, 
v. National Labor Relations Board
(470 F.2d 422) (1972)
General Motors (GM) owned and operated a facility in 
which retail trucks were sold and serviced. The employees at
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this facility were represented by the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and had been covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement for four years before GM began negotiations to 
sell the outlet to an independent operator.
The UAW requested that they be kept informed of the 
potential transfer and also that GM and the UAW bargain 
over the decision before it was made. GM asserted there was 
no reason to discuss the decision until after it was made. The 
UAW filed suit. Subsequently, GM completed the transac 
tion with the independent dealer. Several days later the in 
dependent dealer advised the current employees that no jobs 
would be available for any of them. GM officials then began 
discussing the effects of the sale and offered assistance in 
securing employment in other GM facilities.
In a marked reversal from its earlier decisions, the Na 
tional Labor Relations Board ruled that the transfer was a 
"sale of the business." Therefore bargaining was not re 
quired under Section 8(a) (5) because this decision was at the 
"core of entrepreneurial control." The UAW countered that 
the action was a case of "contracting out" because GM 
maintained substantial control and essentially retained its 
position in the market.
The Circuit Court of Appeals sided with GM's assertion 
that this sale was part of a national strategy to get out of the 
business of running dealerships. Therefore, GM was under 
no obligation to bargain over the decision.
This decision was not unanimous. Judge Bazelon 
dissented on the grounds that there had been inadequate con 
sideration of the employees' interest in bargaining and an 
overestimation of the employer's interest in not bargaining. 
Specifically, he wrote:
The employer's duty to bargain may cost him time 
and it may threaten the confidentiality of his 
negotiations; these problems exist whether he is 
negotiating a subcontract, a sale or a franchise. But 
these costs can hardly be said to increase because
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"title" passes, because day-to-day management 
changes hands, because he used the words "buyer" 
and "seller"; or even necessarily because capital is 
withdrawn by the employer and invested by the "buyer." 27
The issue may not have been defined correctly from the 
start. There had not been a change in the business. The 
business operation still was engaged in the same services. The 
only change had been in the financial arrangement. There 
had been a substantial change in the scope of General 
Motors; they were no longer in the dealership business. Con 
versely, they did not totally extricate themselves from this 
line of business.
Brockway Motor Trucks, 
Division of Mack Trucks, Inc. 
v. National Labor Relations Board
(582 F.2d 720) (1978)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
decided this case in 1978. According to the record, Brockway 
operated a number of truck manufacturing plants that also 
served as sales facilities. Employees at the plant, who were 
represented by the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers, were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. After a three-year contract expired, 
negotiations ensued for about nine months prior to the union 
calling a strike. After two months of the strike, management 
unilaterally decided to close the struck plant. Management 
did not consult the union about the decision nor did it pro 
vide any advance notice of the closing.
The union brought suit arguing that management had 
violated Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Rela 
tions Act. Management stipulated that closing the facility 
was based on "economic considerations" and was not the 
result of antiunion animus. The economic considerations 
necessitating closure were not specified, however.
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The Board ruled that Brockway's action violated Section 
8(a) (5) because when an action directly affects the condi 
tions of employment, there is a duty to bargain irrespective 
of the assertion that the requirement significantly restricts 
the employer's ability to run the business. Moreover, the 
Board ruled that there is only a duty to bargain, not 
necessarily a duty to reach an agreement.
The Court of Appeals first of all stressed the need to 
specify the economic considerations leading to the decision 
to close one plant or change the direction of the business. In 
recounting previous cases in which economic considerations 
had been at issue and the finding had been that there was no 
duty to bargain, it noted that economic considerations were 
major ones such as being necessary to remain in business or 
the firm having lost considerable sums of money.
Both parties advanced perse rules. Brockway asserted that 
"when a partial closing is predicated on * economic con 
sideration,' whatever they may be, there can be no duty to 
bargain about it." 28 The Board's rule was "that an employer 
has a duty to bargain about a decision to close one of its 
facilities, for such an action intimately affects the interests of 
the employees and is the sort of subject that the NLRA was 
designed to reach." 29 The Court of Appeals rejected both 
per se approaches and attempted to fashion an alternative.
They started with the premise that the aims of collective 
bargaining would be furthered by requiring negotiations be 
tween an employer and the union before irrevocably closing 
a plant. They also added that closing a plant was likely to 
lead to the termination of employment and therefore it might 
be called a "condition of employment." Thus, the initial 
presumption was that "a partial closing is a mandatory sub 
ject of bargaining." 30
However, because the Court had rejected both per se 
rules, additional analysis was necessary after the initial 
presumption. First, the Appeals Court stated that the in 
terest of the employees in bargaining must be considered
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since, in most circumstances, it is hard to imagine that 
workers would not have a strong interest in trying to change 
a decision that affected their employment.
The next element to be considered is the likelihood that the 
decision could be altered through the bargaining process. 
The Court recognized that there are certain areas in which 
the union has greater or lesser expertise and control. The 
area of labor costs is one area in which labor has more con 
trol. Thus, there is a positive likelihood that bargaining can 
be successful. Furthermore, as in Fibreboard, the Appeals 
Court cited that considerable bargaining had taken place 
over plant closure.
The final element to consider is the employer's counter 
vailing interest in not bargaining. To presume that all 
economic considerations outweigh the employee's interest is 
as inappropriate as arguing that management's interest could 
never be so great as to eliminate the duty to bargain over the 
decision. The Court stated that it could not use the balancing 
test in this case because Brockway did not specify the nature 
of the economic considerations. 31
First National Maintenance Corporation 
v. National Labor Relations Board
(101 S. Ct. 2573) (1981)
The most recent ruling of the United States Supreme 
Court on the plant closure issue was its decision in First Na 
tional Maintenance. The facts of this case are as follows. The 
company provided housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance and 
related services for commercial customers in the New York 
City area. In return for the maintenance services, the com 
pany was reimbursed for its labor costs and also received a 
set management fee. Personnel were hired separately for 
each contract (location) and employees were not transferred 
among locations.
In March 1977 a certification election was conducted 
among the employees at this location, and the National
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Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees was certified 
as the bargaining agent. First National Maintenance Cor 
poration (FNM) was experiencing difficulties with a pur 
chaser of its services at this time due to disagreement over the 
management fee. In July the union wrote FNM of its desire 
to begin negotiations. FNM never responded. Later in July, 
FNM notified the purchaser of its maintenance services that 
it was cancelling the agreement unless the management fee 
was increased. The purchaser would not increase the fee, the 
agreement was cancelled and the employees were given three 
days notice that they were being discharged.
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against 
FNM charging that FNM interfered in the activities of the 
union, Section 8(a) (1), and refused to bargain with the 
elected representatives of the union, Section 8(a) (5). Both 
the Administrative Law Judge and the National Labor Rela 
tions Board adopted the position that FNM had failed to 
satisfy its duty to bargain about the decision to terminate or 
about the effects. The Court of Appeals adopted the position 
of the Board, but put forth a different line of reasoning. 
Following Brockway, they indicated that no per se rule was 
appropriate under the law. Rather, there was a presumption 
in favor of mandatory bargaining over the decision, with 
that position being rebuttable if the purposes of Section 8(d) 
would not be furthered. Examples of such circumstances 
might include:
1. Bargaining would be futile.
2. The decision to close was due to emergency financial cir 
cumstances.
3. Firms in that industry customarily had not bargained 
over such decisions, as demonstrated by their absence 
from collective bargaining contracts.
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The Supreme Court's majority decision, which was writ 
ten by Justice Blackmun, did not adopt the rebuttable 
presumption rule developed by the Court of Appeals. In 
stead, it developed its own balancing test.
In view of an employer's need for unencumbered 
decisionmaking, bargaining over management deci 
sions that have a substantial impact on the con 
tinued availability of employment should be re 
quired only if the benefit, for labor-management 
relations and the collective bargaining process, 
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of 
business. 32
The Supreme Court, on the basis of its balancing test, 
determined that the employer's need to operate freely 
outweighed the incremental benefits that might arise from 
permitting the union to participate in the decision. 
Therefore, when a business is shut down for purely economic 
reasons, there is no mandatory duty to bargain over the deci 
sion under Section 8(d). If the shutdown is due to an anti- 
union animus, the duty to bargain is protected under Section 
8(a) (3), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of union 
membership.
The Supreme Court took great pains to limit the 
generalizability of the holding. First, they wrote: "In this 
opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types of 
management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other 
kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be 
considered on their own particular facts." 33 Second, the 
Court noted that the union had no control over the size of 
the management fee, which was the reason for closing. Thus, 
bargaining would not have been a factor in changing 
management's mind. Third, the Court pointed out that the 
management fee had been an issue prior to the selection of 
the union as the bargaining representative.
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Because of the caveats given by the Court, it must be ques 
tioned whether they established a per se rule for shutdowns 
of operations based on economic reasons. It appears that the 
Court felt it established a perse rule because it expounded on 
the difficulties of case-by-case adjudication such as would be 
necessary under the rebuttable presumption rule. First, the 
employer never totally knows if his shutdown requires 
bargaining or not. Second, if the employer bargains and does 
not reach an agreement, he does not know with certainty 
whether he has met the requirements for good faith bargain 
ing. Third, if the employer does not bargain, feeling that the 
purposes of the Section 8(d) would not be advanced, and is 
incorrect, the potential cost of that decision could be 
onerous due to the requirement of paying wages back to the 
day of the decision.
The Supreme Court raised the most pertinent issue. What 
is the real purpose of requiring bargaining over the decision 
to close? Is the purpose to compel discussion of the closure? 
Is it to forestall closure or is it to provide information? The 
Court adopted the positions that (a) the union will seek to 
halt the shutdown, (b) bargaining will occur volun 
tarily—initiated by management—if labor costs are an im 
portant consideration, and (c) requiring bargaining will not 
improve the flow of information.
The counter position is that information will not be made 
available without mandatory bargaining. Information is 
needed to determine (a) the reason for the shutdown and 
(b) what changes will be necessary to continue operations if 
the reason for shutting down is amenable to bargaining. 
Once that information is available, the union can make the 
decision whether it should pursue bargaining. This issue is 
addressed at greater depth in the next chapter.
Negotiations in the formal contract also were used as 
evidence. Whereas the majority in Fibreboard drew upon
60 Judicial Interpretations
current practice in negotiated contracts to find a duty to 
bargain over subcontracting, the majority in First National 
Maintenance cited current practices to find no duty to 
bargain over the decision to close. Specifically, they wrote: 
"We note that provisions giving unions a right to participate 
in the decisionmaking process concerning alteration of the 
scope of an enterprise appear to be relatively rare. Provisions 
concerning notice and 'effects' bargaining are more 
prevalent." 34
In conclusion, due to the facts of this case, the Supreme 
Court probably only could rule that there was no duty to 
bargain over the decision. It is questionable, however, 
whether this case should serve as a significant precedent for 
future decisions. It is severely limited due to the facts of the 
case.
Los Angeles Marine Hardware Company 
v. National Labor Relations Board
(602 F. 2d 1302)(1979)
A significant recent development in labor law concerns the 
relocation of work during the course of the collective 
bargaining agreement. The position that has been taken by 
the National Labor Relations Board, which has been upheld 
by the United States Court of Appeals, is that the relocation 
of work, even if it is for economic reasons, while the contract 
is in force, violates Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) and Section (d) 
of the National Labor Relations Act. Although several cases 
have helped to develop this rule, the two principal cases are 
Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring which are 
discussed below.
Mission Marine Associates was a holding company for 
two divisions, Los Angeles Marine Hardware Company and 
California Marine Hardware Company. Cal Marine was an 
inactive shell prior to March 1977 whereas LA Marine was
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an active division. LA Marine had an established bargaining 
relationship with the Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Ware 
housemen and Helpers Union dating back to 1956.
LA Marine was facing potential operating deficits that in 
part were due to the high union wages it was paying. The 
company tried to obtain relief from the union during the 
1975 round of negotiations, but was unsuccessful. The com 
pany met with the union in 1977, indicated it was planning to 
relocate and proposed a new contract for the relocation. The 
union refused to discuss the matter, given the existing con 
tract. The company proceeded with the relocation, ter 
minated the union workers and activated Cal Marine.
For purposes of establishing whether an unfair labor prac 
tice had been committed, it was determined that LA Marine 
and Cal Marine were the same employer. Cal Marine was 
simply continuing the operations of LA Marine and, 
therefore, the relocation, firing of union workers and 
establishing a new pay schedule all constituted mid-term 
repudiations of the contract. LA Marine countered that the 
collective bargaining agreement only covered work done at 
the old location.
The two principal legal points made by the Appeals Court 
were:
1. An employer cannot alter mandatory contractual terms 
while a contract is in effect without the agreement of the 
union.
2. An employer is not relieved of its duty to recognize the 
union by relocating when the relocation is an unfair 
labor practice.
The results potentially could generate some interesting 
twists. The unfair labor practice arose because the terms and 
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement were not 
applied to the new employees at the new location—wages
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had been changed unilaterally. What if the company had 
simply relocated from LA Marine to Cal Marine and had not 
lowered wages? Would this have been a strict instance of 
relocation and therefore not subject to bargaining? The firm 
could have used this tactic and then subsequently sought 
decertification and reduced the wage costs at the new loca 
tion, say one year later. The reason for the relocation could 
simply have been a more efficient structure or the potential 
for a more efficient operation.
According to one writer, "good faith bargaining under 
Section 8(a) (5) requires not only that the parties abide by the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, but that 
neither party will undermine, circumvent, or avoid the provi 
sions of the agreement." (Bosanac 1983) Conversely, 
another writer indicated that "An employer that is not 
specifically prohibited by an agreement from relocating 
bargaining unit work during the term of the agreement re 
tains the right, after bargaining, to relocate that work during 
the term of the agreement if the relocation is taken in 
response to a need to reduce high labor costs." (Klaper 1983)
It is obvious that there is considerable disagreement about 
the extent of this ruling. It also brings out the fragile demar 
cation that exists between unfair labor practice cases and 
justifiable actions. Specifically, according to the Board's rul 
ing, the unfair labor practice did not arise from relocating 
the work, it was due to reducing wages. Had the company 
argued that the new work relocation was more efficient, and 
had it maintained the collective bargaining agreement, the 
employer's actions most likely would not have been found to 
be an unfair labor practice. 35
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Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois 
Coil Spring Company and United 
Automobile Workers (UA W) 
and its Local 547 
(265 NLRB No. 28, 111 LRRM 1486) (1982)
This case was decided by the National Labor Relations 
Board in 1982. The Board applied the theory developed in 
Los Angeles Marine to decide this case.
The facts of this case were as follows. The parent com 
pany, Illinois Coil Spring Company, had a union facility in 
Milwaukee and a nonunion facility in McHenry, Illinois. 
While a contract was in effect at the Milwaukee facility, the 
company asked the union to forego a wage increase and to 
grant other contract concessions, partially because some 
business had been lost. The company then proposed to 
relocate the assembly operations from Milwaukee to 
McHenry, where wage payments were considerably lower. 
The union refused to grant the concessions, but it did in 
dicate that it was willing to continue discussions. The com 
pany proceeded with the plans to relocate the work to the 
McHenry facility.
The union charged that the decision to relocate work dur 
ing the course of the contract constituted a mid-term 
repudiation of the collective bargaining contract. The reloca 
tion was due solely to the desire to go from the higher labor 
costs at the union facility to the lower labor costs at the 
nonunion facility.
The company asserted that because it had engaged in deci 
sion bargaining, and because it had offered to engage in ef 
fects bargaining, it could relocate the work. Furthermore 
this was possible because the collective bargaining agreement 
had no express prohibition against relocation.
The Board ruled that the company's relocation of work 
during the contract violated Section 8(d) because the union
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had not waived its right to object to the move, even though it 
had bargained over it, and the collective bargaining contract 
also did not contain language indicating the union had un 
equivocally waived its right to object to the relocation. 
Specifically, the Board wrote:
The Board has held that Section 8(d) forbids altera 
tion by an employer of the terms and conditions of 
employment embodied in a collective bargaining 
agreement during the term of the agreement 
without the consent of the union, even though the 
employer may have previously offered to bargain 
with the union about the change and the union has 
refused. 36
Both the company and the union were bound by the terms of 
the collective bargaining contract while it was in force.
In some respects, the thrust of the decision is counter 
productive. Consider the following scenario. A collective 
bargaining contract is in force. The firm begins to experience 
financial difficulty. It approaches the union for some 
assistance in making it through the period of difficulty. 
However, no agreement is reached with the union to alter 
mandatory terms. The firm has four choices.
1. The company can close the operation and there is no 
violation of Section 8(d).
2. The company can continue operating at the facility until 
the financial difficulties become so severe that it has no 
choice but to close the facility. There is no violation of 
Section 8(d).
3. The company can operate the facility until the contract 
expires, at which time it proposes Draconian terms. If 
no agreement is reached, it can relocate the work 
without violating Section 8(d).
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4. The company can relocate the work in an attempt to ob 
tain financial relief and incur a violation of Section 8(d).
Loss of markets or other financial difficulties do not 
necessarily occur on the same cycle as the collective bargain 
ing contract. As the options above indicate, without a 
mechanism for mid-term flexibility, all or nothing solutions 
will be used. It is somewhat incongruous that closure is a 
"legal" solution whereas relocation while a contract is in ef 
fect is not, even though both can generate the same impact 
on the workers at the site. 37
Although an appeal had been filed with the Seventh Cir 
cuit Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relation Board 
requested that Milwaukee Spring I be remanded to the 
Board. In July 1983, the Court of Appeals relinquished 
jurisdiction; oral arguments were presented in September 
1983 and the Board reversed its decision January 1984 in 
Milwaukee Spring II (268 NLRB No. 87).
In reversing its decision, the NLRB ruled that the firm did 
not violate Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act 
because the contract did not expressly cover the condi 
tion—relocating work from one facility to another. Since 
there was no contract provision under which the union had 
to agree to a change, Milwaukee Spring's obligation simply 
was to bargain in good faith to impasse over moving work 
before instituting the change.
The Board adopted the logic presented in Los Angeles 
Marine, but to the advantage of the employer. The Board 
agreed that the contract was still in force at the Milwaukee 
facility and there had been no change in terms and condi 
tions at that facility. Had any workers been employed at the 
Milwaukee location, they would have been entitled to the 
contractually agreed on wages.
This writer's reading of the opinion suggests that an 
unintended precedent may have been set. It appears that the
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Board considered relocation of work a mandatory topic of 
bargaining. Specifically, the Board wrote: "If the employ 
ment conditions the employer seeks to change are not 'con 
tained in' the contract, however, the employer's obligation 
remains the general one of bargaining in good faith to im 
passe over the subject before instituting the proposed 
change." Prior to this ruling, relocation was not necessarily 
considered a term or condition of employment. The wording 
in this context implies that it is.
Although the NLRB has ruled that a firm can relocate its 
work, this question is still not resolved. Specifically, there 
now is a "split in the circuits." Los Angeles Marine also still 
serves as a precedent. Depending on which case a court relies 
on—Los Angeles Marine or Milwaukee Spring II— the out 
come could be quite different, with vastly different cost im 
plications for firms.
Summary and Conclusions
The summation of the 12 cases, provided in table 3.1, in 
dicates several disturbing features of the decisions. They are 
(a) the concern with process and not outcomes, (b) the 
unspecified nature of economic considerations, (c) the treat 
ment of antiunion animus, (d) the sharp distinction between 
relocation and plant closure, and (e) effects bargaining.
The concern with process and not outcomes is very evident 
in the Fibreboard and Adams Dairy cases. What is the dif 
ference in the outcomes between replacing drivers-salesmen 
with independent contractors to distribute and market pro 
ducts, and subcontracting out maintenance activities that 
had been performed by employees? In both instances, 
employees were replaced with nonemployees. Both activities 
were designed to reduce the costs of a particular operation. 
The products produced did not change nor did the firms 
change their lines of business. They did not change their at-
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tachment to a particular market. They changed an activity. 
Although A dams Dairy did engage in some disinvestment of 
capital because it no longer needed to own a fleet of trucks, it 
is an overstatement to say that it was a major change in the 
operation of business.
Conversely, suppose Adams Dairy had not been able to 
reduce its labor costs associated with the delivery of its pro 
duct and had gone out of business as a result. That would 
not have been a satisfactory solution, either. Numerous 
employees would have lost their jobs. Thus, the distinction 
between Fibreboard and Adams Dairy is unclear, and 
therefore, the determination whether there is a duty to 
bargain over the decision on the basis of terminology of the 
process.
In this regard, consider the UAW-GM dealership case. 
There was no change in the actual business, the dealership. 
Ownership of it had changed by means of a sale. Although 
GM was changing the nature of its business, there was no 
change in the product/service nor probably in the skills of 
the individuals necessary to produce the product/service. 
However, because it was a sale, the NLRB considered it a 
totally different situation, even though the impact on the 
employees was the same as closure.
Economic considerations are evident in all of these cases. 
Examples could include unsatisfactory profits, loss of 
market share, high labor costs, poor workmanship and low 
productivity, and managerial difficulties with clients/sup 
pliers. All of these are economic difficulties and considera 
tions. The key difference is that some issues are more likely 
to be resolved through collective bargaining, whereas in 
other situations the economic considerations are likely to be 
beyond the scope of the bargaining relationship.
Consider Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring I in 
this light. The economic difficulty was high labor costs in the 
former, and high labor costs and a lost subcontract in the lat-
68 
Judicial Interpretations
sa2sceOU1DM•w § bf>1^£<"§o> o!•§H«5ao09c,0*5•3at Q>.o"c?S*s£&gsen
at
T3§3i- a
Q
, 
g
15 e 
S 1
I
f
l 
^
K
Resolutiona» 
1&'?S'
en
IS
 ^
*^ 
O
^o .2
u .ti
a 73
C
 
g
u 
O
TJ o
. ctf
c1 6
'5 ^ c
e« *^ 
o
is * E
C
 
trt 
>>
o
—
o
 
£
 «"E
1
 8 S
t/3 o a>
>, o
i"«« S3 
1
- 
l
l«
'
Q 
re 
u 
'3
*2
 
E
III
0 J
 —
p ^3
III
IB|X)*^ e^-
>% 60
3 -S
73 1
l-c 
C
D
 
o
IIl_
Judicial Interpretations 
69
H
<2 2
o•sc8
§
0
 
~
 
2
.S
-o
.<sc10 £gsS.2S ws S•!= <u ca %w 5 i- <5 
U
.8
8 S
-5
IBS
0> 
. 
li 
•O
 
g
C
^
J
l<
2
| 
"0
*
3
«
"H
 I c
 
3-a 5 S3
a g-§
sN§
. 
"71 
V
 ;r"!
0 5
o'S. S
O 
«o
<-• .t; 41
&"&!
S^^
1
8
3
 
1^2
ca 
. *3
•aS1^
S's a
•2 "3 '3 -s
S 8?" ^ 
8^-5-^
S
«
o
l|
4> •" XJ 
u
 
-g 
o
 
O
Z
Q
5
 o.
<u 
-o
A
 
U
^
2
 S
No duty 
to bargain 
becausi benefits of bargaining wou not outweigh 
the costs imp on the 
employer.
2 ™
«
 
C
•S o
Employer 
cannot 
alter mar contractual terms 
while a c is 
in 
effect 
without 
the agreement 
of 
the 
union.
^
1
Relocation 
of 
work 
during contract 
violates 
Section 
8( because 
union 
had not 
wai1 rights.
.x 
ca 
o
Relocation 
of 
work 
during contract 
does not 
violate Section 
8(d) 
unless 
there 
is provision 
in 
the contract prohibiting 
relocation 
of w
111,
: 
«
*i 
4)
. a * S
' 
3
 
O> 
4> 
|
g
g
I£g£ 
si"
* I -a c
•S
§ 6 -2
pany ults i
1281
e.a o -"
ceo3 " «>
U
 S ca-S
G 2 c.2
S
 •" 
4> T3
••§ ^
S
 3 
rti3 a
& *3 
O O*
 § S
•a-IS
ic
i^
:
^§
a
|
O
 
O
 
41
•g JS £«
» c
.^
2
 
^
-2
^
^
 
.ca o
o -a 
Q
 3.S
s2!^
« £
 8 g
SS a&
o a a u
rr; 
ca 
"-1 
•*-• 
4> «^, 
o
u a &
 "» 
°> 5 2
 ±1
111!
5
III
70 Judicial Interpretations
ter. The higher labor costs also were coupled, though, with 
having alternate facilities available. Presumably, it would 
have been possible in both cases to begin bidding projects 
from the alternate plant. As projects were completed at the 
current facility, those workers could be phased out, and the 
plant eventually closed. Instead, at least in the latter case, 
they attempted to negotiate. What could have facilitated 
those negotiations so that they would have resulted in 
satisfactory outcomes for both management and labor? The 
ruling in Milwaukee Spring II comes closer to this position 
by implicitly holding that relocation is a mandatory topic of 
bargaining.
The treatment of antinuion animus also is problematic 
throughout these cases. Darlington closed to avoid having to 
negotiate a contract with the duly elected representatives of 
the workers. Burns Detective Agency closed shortly after a 
representation victory. Ozark Trailers closed one year after a 
representation election was won by the union. First National 
Maintenance decided to discontinue the particular opera 
tions shortly after the representation election was won by the 
union. Only in Darlington were there no mitigating cir 
cumstances, however. The juxtapositioning of certification 
and closure has clouded (a) whether there is a duty to 
bargain, (b) whether the reason for closure is amenable to 
resolution through collective bargaining, and (c) whether an- 
tiunion animus is present in these cases.
Are there differences in the nature of markets and goods 
and services produced that should impact on the determina 
tion of antiunion animus? For example, in Darlington the 
Supreme Court's ruling was partially premised on the ra 
tionalization that there must be some potential benefit for 
the firm from unfair labor practices in order for there to be a 
judgment of antiunion animus. Thus, complete closure 
would generate no future benefits because the owner would 
not be in business to take advantage of them.
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Partial closure of a manufacturing facility would generate 
these benefits because (a) the company still could serve the 
market with goods produced at the other facility and (b) the 
action would have a chilling effect on union organizing ac 
tivities at the other plants.
Would partial closure of a service operation arising from 
antiunion animus generate these same benefits? For a firm 
providing services, the market area is limited geographically. 
It may not be possible to provide the same services from a 
geographically separate location. Thus, the closure of a ser 
vice establishment is tantamount to complete closure; it is a 
total withdrawal from a market. However, the diffusion of 
the information and the benefit derived from an unfair labor 
practice are not restricted in the same way. The timing of the 
representation election victory and the closure of the Omaha 
operation in Burns Detective could have sent a clear signal to 
other establishments, if they were not already organized, 
that selection of a representative could result in closure.
Another area of concern is the sharp distinction that has 
arisen between relocation and plant closure. The outcomes 
for the employees, again, are the same—loss of employment. 
However, in the former case it might be suggested that the 
economic considerations in the decision to relocate are not 
quite as severe as they are in the closure decision. The 
judicial interpretations encourage the firms to take the more 
drastic step, closing the facility. As spelled out in Milwaukee 
Spring I, the firm could escape the unfair labor practice 
charge by closing the plant outright. However, the firm 
could not relocate the work because it is an unfair labor 
practice.
Milwaukee Spring II maintains the distinction between 
relocation and closure, and some of the logic is questionable. 
But the broad interpretation, which mandates bargaining 
over relocation but permits relocation during the contract if 
the bargainers reach impasse, is more consistent with main 
taining profitable operations and employment.
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The final issue is effects bargaining. There seems to be no 
disagreement that bargaining over the effects of closure is a 
mandatory topic of bargaining under Section 8(a) (5). The 
closing bargain is the last resort position. "Effects bargain 
ing usually involves rights of employees that arise as a result 
of closing, such as severance pay, pensions, other accrued 
benefits, grievances and possible reemployment in other 
parts of an employer's enterprise." (Heinsz 1981)
Whether actual bargaining can take place when there is 
only a duty to bargain over the effects must be questioned. 
The Appeals Court in Royal Plating and Polishing wrote:
There can be no doubt that the Company, by 
withholding information of its intention to ter 
minate the Bleeker Street operations, deterred the 
Union from bargaining over the effect of the shut 
down on the employees. 38
The Board in Ozark Trailers doubted the meaningfulness of 
bargaining over the effects when there is no possibility of 
reversing the decision.
If effects bargaining could be combined with decision 
bargaining, a number of the concerns expressed above could 
be alleviated. First, notice would be given so the plant would 
still be in operation. Second, tradeoffs could be made be 
tween the duties to bargain. For example, the union could 
waive future effects bargaining, with its associated cost, in 
return for a commitment to keep the plant operating. On the 
other hand, the union could seek a more attractive closing 
bargain by waiving the duty to bargain over the decision to 
close.
In conclusion, the judicial interpretations of the duty to 
bargain over the decision to shut down a plant are proble 
matic. The decisions reviewed have demonstrated (a) the 
concern with process and not outcome , (b) the unspecified 
nature or narrow interpretation of economic considerations, 
(c) the treatment of antiunion animus, (d) the sharp distinc-
Judicial Interpretations 73
tion between relocation and plant closure, and (e) effects 
bargaining.
The uncertainties associated with case-by-case adjudica 
tion have prompted some students of these issue to propose 
alternatives, such as per se rules which would define more 
clearly when there is a duty to bargain over the decision to 
close. These per se rules, which would require a legislative 
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act or enuncia 
tion by the United States Supreme Court, are presented and 
evaluated in the next chapter.
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The Duty to Bargain
Chapter 4 Per Se Rules
Introduction
A number of the students of labor-management relations, 
as well as the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Courts, have attempted to develop guidelines, tests or rules 
for determining whether and under what conditions there is a 
duty to bargain over the decision to close. Naturally, the 
determination could be made on a case-by-case basis, but 
that is extremely costly. As St. Antoine (1981) has written, 
"this has the attraction of maximizing fairness in individual 
situations, but it can lead to uncertainty and unpredictabili 
ty."
Notions of equity have led to the rejection of the polar per 
se rules: (a) there is no duty to bargain over partial plant 
closures, relocations or major technological changes 
resulting in large scale displacement of labor; (b) there is a 
mandatory duty to bargain over all decisions leading to the 
permanent displacement or dislocation of workers from a 
particular employment. Furthermore, the more recent rul 
ings on mid-term contract repudiations also are unsatisfac 
tory because they encourage closure rather than achieving a 
solution that maintains employment and profitable opera 
tions.
The guidelines, tests or rules that have been suggested have 
several features in common. They hope to cover as many of
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the potential circumstances as possible without requiring 
bargaining in all situations. Also, they hope to be 
straightforward and easily interpretable so as to create the 
least confusion possible. The four approaches to be con 
sidered below are Schwarz's employment substitution rule, 
Rabin's seven point guideline, the three part test developed 
in Brockway and Heinsz's rule of rebuttable presumption. 
This chapter ends with the presentation of a new proposal 
addressing the determination of the duty to bargain over the 
decision to close.
Employment Substitution Rule
Schwarz (1970) proposed the employment substitution 
rule in his article, "Plant Relocation or Partial Termination- 
The Duty to Decision-Bargain." The rule is:
Decision-bargaining should be required in all cases 
where the employer plans to substitute non-unit 
workers for unit workers.
It is a straightforward restatement of the decision presented 
in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National 
Labor Relations Board, which involved "the replacement of 
employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an in 
dependent contractor to do the same work under similar con 
ditions of employment." 1 However, whereas the above 
represented a definition of contracting out, Schwarz's rule 
also would apply to relocations.
Schwarz's approach has the desirability of being 
straightforward. There are no probability statements 
associated with it. The union would need to be consulted if 
employment is substituted; if not, there would be no need for 
consultation.
However, this rule would not require bargaining in all cir 
cumstances where a solution may be forthcoming and would
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require bargaining in others where perhaps there is no 
possibility of a solution being reached. To evaluate this, it is 
necessary to develop a taxonomy of closures. They can take 
the following forms:
1. The firm continues operations at the location, but some 
employees are displaced by individuals who have been 
contracted to perform the same duties.
2. The firm relocates its operation so that it is producing 
the same or similar product in a different facility and 
with new employees.
3. The plant closes because it is no longer competitive due 
to high labor costs or low productivity.
4. The plant closes or relocates because the present market 
for its product no longer exists.
The employment substitution rule would require decision 
bargaining in the first two instances, and also sometimes in 
the fourth circumstance. It would not apply in the third in 
stance, which may be the critical one. According to Schmen- 
ner's (1982) analysis, high labor costs or work rules were the 
principal reason for closure in over one-fifth of the cases. 
Thus, the expectation is that negotiations possibly could save 
jobs and restore profitable operations in the third instance, 
yet decision bargaining would not be required.
Bargaining could be required when there is no possibility 
of a solution being reached. This rule would require bargain 
ing when a firm relocates its operation because the present 
market for its product no longer exists. For instance, con 
sider the firm that has been a supplier to a firm that has 
relocated. In order to stay in business, it is forced to relocate 
to an area in which it can negotiate new contracts. It still is in 
the same line of business, although it has substituted 
employees. Bargaining would have a very low probability of
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altering the decision to relocate. In this instance, effects 
bargaining would be more important.
Rabin's Seven Point Criteria
Rabin (1971) proposed a seven point criteria for determin 
ing when there should be and when there should not be a 
mandatory duty to bargain over the decision to close a plant. 
The seven points are as follows:
1. The impact on employees must be certain and direct.
2. The decision must not be minor or recurrent.
3. The issue must be within the expertise of both parties.
4. The decision to terminate operations must be based on 
factors that are not so compelling that the bargaining 
process could not possibly alter them.
5. An "established," not merely "technical," bargaining 
relationship must have been in effect prior to the deci 
sion.
6. The statutory requirement of good faith bargaining, 
particularly as to notice, must be interpreted flexibly so 
that the employers freedom to act is not unduly imped 
ed.
7. The parties should be given wide latitude to allocate 
management functions by consent.
The first two points remove such decisions as new sales or 
marketing strategies, which may ultimately diminish employ 
ment, from mandatory bargaining. Conversely, a plant clos 
ing, a major technological change or a relocation all have 
certain and direct impact on employment in the short run 
and do not necessarily recur on a regular basis. Therefore, 
decision bargaining would be mandatory on these issues 
assuming the other criteria are met.
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The third and fourth points establish that the reason for 
the relocation or partial closure possibly could be altered 
through the bargaining process in order to mandate decision 
bargaining. Stating that the "issue must be within the exper 
tise of both parties" can be interpreted narrowly or expan 
sively. The narrow interpretation would hold that only labor 
costs and work rules would be within the expertise of both 
parties. A more expansive interpretation would contend that 
production processes, major purchases of equipment and 
perhaps new markets also fall in the area of expertise of both 
parties. The quality of work life movement, quality circles 
and other manifestations of labor-management cooperation 
have shown that production processes and the general opera 
tion of facilities also are within the expertise of some labor 
organizations.
The definition of compelling factors is not sufficiently 
clear to forestall case-by-case adjudication. For example, is 
loss of a key source of a factor of production a compelling 
reason? Consider the case when another source becomes 
available, albeit at a higher price. The higher price does not 
permit profitable production of the product, but bargaining 
with the union results in labor costs being reduced so that 
production can be resumed with the new source of the fac 
tor, and the output can be sold at a profit. Although the 
compelling reason was altered through bargaining, the prob 
ability of bargaining being successful in this instance is likely 
to be quite low.
Restricting the duty to bargain to established bargaining 
relationships would accomplish two things. First, it would 
separate the duty to bargain controversy, Section (8) (d), 
from the unfair labor practices issue, Section (8) (a) (3). If a 
closing occurred on the heels of a union representation elec 
tion, without a contract formally bargained, the issue could 
simply be settled on whether this was an unfair labor prac 
tice. By bringing in the duty to bargain, precedents are
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established about the duty to bargain even though no 
bargaining has ever occurred.
Second, there would be a history of bargaining between 
the two parties which could be built upon in developing ex 
pectations for a settlement. Several cases, the most impor 
tant being First National Maintenance Corporation v. Na 
tional Labor Relations Board, involved a situation where the 
union selected in the representation election never had 
negotiated a contract with the employer. Thus, the facts of 
the case did not lend themselves to making a judgment about 
the potential efficacy of bargaining.
One criticism raised frequently of the duty to decision 
bargain is that there is no incentive for the union to reach an 
agreement concerning the potential closure because the 
longer bargaining continues, the longer the plant remains in 
operation. Furthermore, there is the fear that breaking off 
negotiations, even if no progress is being made, will be judg 
ed as failure to bargain in good faith, with penalties assessed 
accordingly. Rabin's sixth point, by suggesting flexibility in 
the interpretation of good faith bargaining, hopes to en 
courage sincere bargaining by ensuring that the process can 
be ended without requiring management to reach an un 
favorable bargain. However, a flexible interpretation does 
not necessarily reduce uncertainty or unpredictability until 
after sufficient experience exists to develop a reasonable ex 
pectation of the definition of flexible interpretation of good 
faith bargaining.
Mature bargaining relationships may specify prerogatives 
of both management and labor in the bargaining contract. 
Rabin's seventh point suggests that judicial interpretations 
should not overrule these prerogatives so that both partners 
can be reasonably certain about what issues they must 
negotiate and those in which management can act unilateral-
Per Se Rules 83
ly without fear of being found in violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act.
It is very ironic that neither Schwarz's employment 
substitution rule nor the seven point criteria developed by 
Rabin would have required the First National Maintenance 
Corporation to negotiate with the union over the decision to 
close. Yet this case served as the vehicle for the most recent 
United States Supreme Court ruling on the duty to bargain in 
partial plant closures.
Three Part Test of Brockway
The majority opinion in Brockway Motor Trucks, Divi 
sion of Mack Trucks, Inc., v. National Labor Relations 
Board took exception with per se rules that either mandate 
no duty to bargain or mandate a duty to bargain in all cases 
of plant closure. The majority opinion reflected that the 
basic problem is that no simple per se rule can adequately 
protect the interests of all parties in all of the factually 
divergent situations in which shutdowns may occur. The opi 
nion also took exception to the argument by Brockway 
Motor Trucks that because the closure was due to 
"economic considerations," although unspecified, there was 
no duty to bargain.
Instead, the majority opinion fashioned a three part test to 
determine when bargaining should be mandated in cases of 
partial plant closure. The three considerations are as follows:
1.The strength of the employees5 interest in altering 
management's decision.
2. The likelihood that bargaining would lead the employer 
to alter its decision.
3. Management's countervailing interest in not bargaining.
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The major problem with this three part test is that the 
determination of the duty to bargain must be adjudicated. 
The firm planning to close one part of its operation would 
not know with certainty whether it can do so without 
bargaining because both the strength of the employees' in 
terest and the countervailing interest of management cannot 
be evaluated a priori.
The strength of the employees' interest in altering manage 
ment's decision requires two pieces of information, of which 
only one can be obtained through the bargaining process. 
First, the probability of obtaining alternate employment and 
at what wage elsewhere in the area must be established. Sec 
ond, the concession necessary to change management's deci 
sion also must become known. If alternate employment op 
portunities are available at essentially the same wage rate, 
employees may have only a weak interest in changing the 
decision to close. Conversely, if the next best employment 
alternative, the opportunity wage, is considerably less than 
that received from the current employer, the interest in alter 
ing management's decision may be quite strong. It might be 
suggested that the strength of interest is directly proportional 
to the divergence between the current wage and the oppor 
tunity wage. But the union would not attempt to alter 
management's decision if the concession necessary placed 
their wage below the opportunity wage.
The likelihood that bargaining would lead the employer to 
alter its decision also is problematic. What is the reason for 
the decision to close? Is it loss of raw materials, a shrinking 
market, labor costs or greater opportunities elsewhere? All 
of these could be termed economic reasons, but they differ in 
their suitability to change through bargaining. Another con 
sideration is the bargaining history of these parties. Have 
they shown an ability to reach agreement in the past on 
troublesome issues?
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The countervailing management interest in not bargaining 
is the most frequently alluded to, yet the least explained. 
Dire financial distress may force the firm to close, but the 
firm should have some indication of its worsening financial 
condition prior to the actual decision. Strategic plans to alter 
the nature of the business also are undertaken prior to any 
decision to close. Decisions to enter new markets may re 
quire greater secrecy, but those decisions would require 
bargaining only if a line of business was being discontinued. 
Management's interest in not bargaining appears to be 
grounded in (a) the uncertainty of the length of bargaining 
required to bargain in good faith, and (b) the ideological 
position that certain decisions are exclusively management 
prerogatives.
Rule of Rebuttable Presumption
The rule of rebuttable presumption was proposed in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its decision 
in National Labor Relations Board v. First National 
Maintenance Corporation. 2 The following passage from this 
decision is a statement of that rule.
We believe, however, that the critical question is 
whether the purposes of the statute are advanced by 
imposition of a duty to bargain and that determina 
tion does not depend solely on whether the costs 
precipitating the decision to terminate were not 
labor originated. What appears to us to be the 
decisive factor, is whether, regardless of the origin 
of the cost which precipitated a management deci 
sion to terminate an operation, bargaining could 
reasonably be expected to modify or reverse that 
decision. 3
This rule differs from the three part test of Brockway in 
which the interests of employers and employees are to be
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balanced. Rather, in the rebuttable presumption rule, the 
key concern is whether the purposes of the statute can be ad 
vanced.
Heinsz (1981) has attempted to formalize the rule of rebut 
table presumption and to make it operational as it applies to 
plant closing. He specified six steps, which are as follows:
1. The initial presumption is that the decision to close is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.
2. If the employer fails to bargain over the decision to 
close, the employer bears the burden of proving that the 
primary reason for closing was economic necessity out 
side the employment relation.
3. If the employer has avoided all bargaining and has fail 
ed to present evidence overcoming the presumption in 
favor of negotiations, the National Labor Relations 
Board should order back pay from the date of refusal to 
bargain.
4. If the employer has bargained before announcing the 
closing decision, it should be presumed that he has 
fulfilled his duty to bargain.
5. The presumption of having fulfilled the duty to bargain 
will be nullified if the bargaining has been done in bad 
faith, e.g., providing insufficient advance notice for the 
bargaining to affect the decision to close.
6. The union also has the obligation to bargain in good 
faith. That is, it should bargain in recognition of con 
cluding the negotiation in a timely fashion and treating 
all data provided by the employer as confidential.
The rule of rebuttable presumption also appears to have 
some promise, but initial implementation would be difficult. 
Initially, Point 2 would be the subject of contention as both 
employers and employees would disagree over whether the
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primary reason for closing was outside the employment rela 
tion. For instance, assume the firm is closing the plant 
because its costs of production are too high in order to re 
main competitive. One approach is to build a new plant with 
state of the art technology. The other approach is to reduce 
the costs of labor inputs. Would the primary reason for clos 
ing be outside the employment relation?
Numerous observations would be necessary to develop the 
parameters of reasons of "economic necessity outside the 
employment relation." Initially, there would be no dif 
ference between the rule of rebuttable presumption and a 
simple mandatory duty to bargain, because the incentive 
would be to bargain due to the uncertainty of what reasons 
are acceptable and the high potential cost of not bargaining, 
as specified in Point 3.
Related to Point 3 is a concern that frequently emerges in 
the partial closure issue. Some assert that a case-by-case ap 
proach is necessary in order to be equitable to all—to max 
imize fairness; a per se rule is arbitrary because it does not 
distinguish among the various possible reasons for closing a 
plant. However, there is the potential in the case-by-case 
determination of the firm not knowing until after the judicial 
determination has been made whether the closure and the 
failure to bargain over the decision is legal. If illegal, the 
usual remedy—back pay to the date of closure—is extremely 
costly. But it appears that the costly remedy has been an 
underlying reason for not finding an unfair labor practice in 
some instances, when, in fact, an unfair practice has occur 
red.
In summary, each of the four rules reviewed here has a 
significant shortcoming. Schwarz's employment substitution 
rule would not require bargaining in plant closure cases. 
Rabin's seven point rule leaves the definition of "compelling 
factor" open, and specifying flexible interpretation of good
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faith bargaining does not necessarily reduce the uncertainty 
associated with meeting its requirements. The three part test 
of Brockway would still require case-by-case adjudication 
because determining the strength of the employees' interest 
requires negotiations; therefore, there still is extreme uncer 
tainty associated with whether or not there is a duty to 
bargain. Finally, Heinsz's formalization of the rule of rebut- 
table presumption still leaves undefined what is "economic 
necessity outside the employment relation." Thus, other 
than Schwarz's rule, each of the rules still relies heavily on 
the case-by-case determination.
A New Proposal
The four alternatives presented in the previous section are 
designed to expedite the determination of whether there is a 
duty to bargain over the decision to close. In this section, I 
will present a new proposal. The proposal has its basis in 
Coase's (1971) concept of social costs and bargaining to 
reach a solution that is satisfactory to both parties and that 
maximizes the value of production. Initially, the concept of 
social cost is examined and its application to the plant 
closure problem is detailed. The new proposal is presented at 
the end of this section.
The concept of social cost is loosely defined. Coase used 
the following definition to introduce his discussion: "those 
actions of business firms which have harmful effects on 
others." One difficulty is making Coase's concept opera 
tional, given the practicalities of collective bargaining. The 
system of collective bargaining requires that (a) negotiations 
be expeditious and confidential, (b) relative bargaining 
power be maintained, and (c) penalties be costly enough to 
deter prohibited practices but are not so severe that they are 
never levied.
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Coase's concept is based on the following five points.
1. The problem must be looked at in the total and at the 
margin.
2. The efficient allocation of resources and not necessarily 
the distribution of income is the fundamental issue.
3. The room for bargaining is between the resources' cur 
rent use and their next best use.
4. The result which maximizes the value of production is 
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is 
assumed to work without cost.
5. The result is achieved by means of a bargain between the 
parties.
The potential harmful effect on workers, the social cost 
associated with plant closure, is their lost earnings. Earnings 
loss, however, is not a given, but depends on conditions in 
the local labor market, the compensation schedule used by 
the firm, and the preferences of workers and their tenure 
with the firm, as was discussed in chapter 2. Thus, depending 
on these factors, the potential earnings loss could be signifi 
cant or negligible; but it is impossible to determine the extent 
of harmful effect on workers without negotiations. 4
The other side of the issue is whether the action by the firm 
increases productive capacity of whether it is unavoidable. 
There is no room for bargaining if the closure is the only ac 
tion possible. Bargaining, however, could address unex 
plored alternatives to closure. Finally, the action by the firm 
may be solely designed to maximize private profits, such as 
relocation to a lower wage area. Thus, alternatives for firms 
could be (a) closure because it is the only alternative, 
(b) closure although not all alternatives have been explored, 
and (c) relocation to a more profitable area or region.
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Therefore, there are six potential combinations of the ef 
fect of closure on workers and the motivations of the firm. 
They are as follows:
1. Harmful effect on workers - No alternative to closure 
for the firm.
2. Harmful effect on workers - Alternatives to closure not 
explored.
3. Harmful effect on workers - More profitable oppor 
tunities for the firm.
4. No effect on workers - No alternative to closure for the 
firm.
5. No effect on workers - Alternatives to closure not ex 
plored.
6. No effect on workers - More profitable opportunities 
for the firm.
Decision bargaining is only meaningful when there is the 
potential of changing a closure decision. No such potential 
exists in 1 or 4. Although deferred compensation may be an 
issue in 1 or 4, the only reasonable option is to address it dur 
ing "effects bargaining." In some instances, closure would 
not necessarily result in a loss of current earnings for a ma 
jority of the workers. The experience of workers under 40 
cited by Holen (1981) fits this category.
"Alternatives to closure not explored" could include 
reasons ranging from low productivity or higher wages, to 
producing a product for which the market is shrinking, to 
loss of line of credit. In some circumstances closure could be 
averted but not in others. Bargaining also might improve the 
profitability of the current plant, making relocations less at 
tractive. Thus, of the six possible interactions spelled out 
above, Cease's concept would suggest that there be an op 
portunity for "decision bargaining" in four of them, situa 
tions 2, 3, 5 and 6.
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The following are two possible scenarios. Assume a plant 
announces that it is going to close. It is located in a relatively 
small local labor market. The reason for closing is loss of 
market share due to noncompetitive prices. Alternative job 
opportunities are limited and wages are 30 percent lower in 
those opportunities. The firm indicates that a 20 percent pay 
cut is necessary to retain competitiveness, and that figure is 
verified. Thus, the range of bargains is between a 30 percent 
and a 20 percent cut in pay. Workers agree to a 20 percent 
pay cut because it represents the best alternative. They have 
incurred an earnings loss, but that loss is less than it might 
have been, and the productive capacity has been maintained 
in the community. This represents the minimum social cost 
associated with maintaining production capacity.
The second scenario assumes that a plant announces that it 
is closing in order to relocate its facility to a low cost area. 
The local labor market affords numerous opportunities and 
most workers can obtain alternate employment and incur on 
ly a 10 percent cut in pay. The firm claims a 20 percent cut in 
pay plus significant technological changes are necessary in 
order to make the current location competitive. In this in 
stance closure is the best alternative for both parties because 
resources can be reallocated to more productive uses without 
significantly damaging the earnings potential of workers. 5
The discussion of the court cases and NLRB rulings has 
demonstrated that the courts generally have been willing to 
accept economic reasons as a justifiable circumstance for 
closing a plant or displacing a large part of the workforce. 
The term "economic reasons" is a bit contrived, however. 
For instance, closing a plant to avoid bargaining with a 
union is expected to generate economic benefits for the firm. 
Labor costs that are sufficiently high to make a firm non- 
competitive also would appear to be an economic reason. 
Below are described the types of actions of firms that appear 
to constitute economic reasons according to the definitions 
of the courts.
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1.A major capital investment. The capital investment 
could result in the displacement of a significant part of 
the workforce as the process becomes more automated. 
Presumably, the physical capital investment is under 
taken to maintain or enhance the competitive position 
of the firm. The major capital investment also could 
take the form of a relocation.
2. Altering the line of work. By altering its line of work, 
the skills possessed by a significant part of the 
workforce and the skills required to produce the new 
product or service may no longer match. Stated dif 
ferently, the firm has diversified to meet changing 
market conditions.
3. Loss of market. The loss of market, which results in 
closure, could be for several reasons.
a. the firm is no longer competitive in its industry or 
market.
b. the market for the product no longer exists because 
consumer demands have shifted.
c. the firm loses its ability to produce for this market. 
It may have lost its line of credit or no longer have 
access to its natural resource base.
To these a fourth point is added which is:
4. The firm is no longer competitive because wages are too 
high, productivity is too low, or restrictive work rules 
impair flexibility.
If one takes a very narrow view of what bargaining can 
resolve, bargaining reasonably could be expected to generate 
a solution only in the fourth situation.
A more expansive view of issues that might be resolved 
through decision bargaining could also include the first 
point. For instance, a change in work rules or a decrease in 
wages could make a major capital investment less necessary.
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Altering the line of work and changing the skill needs of 
workers, the second point, could be facilitated by bargaining 
over retraining programs for workers, but this is effects 
bargaining. The loss of a market is the one general area in 
which the potential impact of bargaining is expected to be 
quite limited.
Calabresi (1970) has attempted to develop liability rules 
that promote efficiency, which is defined as minimizing the 
sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs. Acci 
dent costs are those costs directly associated with the closure 
such as the earnings loss of workers. Accident prevention 
costs are those costs incurred to regulate or limit the occur 
rence of the accident.
Calabresi has concluded that the sum of accident costs and 
accident prevention costs would be minimized if liability for 
the costs was assigned to the party best able to affect the 
decision. If we consider a plant closure an accident, since 
costs are imposed on individuals not party to the decision, 
this would suggest that liability be assigned to the employer. 
The employer has the information—the reason for closure 
and what changes are necessary to avoid closure. 6
If management has the necessary information, why not 
simply rely on management to initiate discussions when 
economic considerations can be altered through bargaining? 
Are they not in the best position to determine if there is 
something that labor can do to forestall the closure or 
displacement?
The question has merit, but it ignores several issues. First, 
whether the concessions demanded by the firm will increase 
productive capacity for society depends on the alternatives 
available and the preferences of the workers. The value of 
goods and services produced is less than that attainable if 
workers are not employed in their best alternative. Second, 
since both the worker and the firm have invested capital, is it
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equitable to permit only management to determine those 
cases in which bargaining should occur—to assign priority 
rights to physical capital? Firms and workers are unequally 
positioned to respond to change due to the time input re 
quirement of human capital. 7 Third, where is the bargaining 
power for the union? The only power is the right to not 
agree, which would be very costly to exercise when the union 
is given only selective opportunities to participate in decision 
bargaining. Fourth, it ignores the potential of workers pro 
viding innovative ideas that may be effective in situations 
that management did not consider possible. Fifth, there is 
the fear that employers may misuse the threat of closure, us 
ing it to gain concessions in situations where there is no real 
potential for closure.
Placing the decision rather than obligation with manage 
ment may result in fewer agreements being reached than 
desirable. Management does not know the union perfectly. It 
is not fully aware of the concessions the union will be willing 
to make, nor the internal political positioning of members. A 
concession that management may think the union would be 
willing to make may be rejected, whereas one they thought 
impossible may be agreed to readily. Moreover, not all 
plants should remain open. In some instances the economic 
sacrifice by employees would be greater than the improve 
ment in productive capacity. Most important, closures are 
relatively infrequent, so the expected transactions cost is 
relatively small.
Although others have attempted to establish criteria for 
the duty to decision bargain, there is excessive uncertainty 
associated with case-by-case adjudication. Making Coase's 
concepts operational requires a per se rule: there is a man 
datory duty to bargain over the decision to close a plant or 
relocate its operation. The key consideration is expeditiously 
determining when additional bargaining is warranted. The
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new proposal presented below attempts to have a quick 
determination of when additional bargaining could lead to a 
socially more productive solution than closure.
Recall that bargaining potentially could resolve the situa 
tion in four of the six combinations of effects of closure and 
motivations of firms. In the other two of the combinations, 
bargaining could not possibly alter the decision: closure is 
the only alternative. In two more of the combinations (2 and 
5) some bargaining is necessary to explore the alternatives to 
closure. In some instances alternatives may be available, but 
not in others. Finally, bargaining is needed to explore the 
more profitable alternatives for the firm in light of the op 
portunities for workers. Consider the following procedure 
for implementing the duty to bargain over the decision to 
close a plant and for meeting this obligation:
1. Firms are required to notify the NLRB and the union of 
the plan to close one part of an operation or to relocate. 
This notice should contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for closure and financial data as appropriate.
2. The NLRB determines if bargaining might be fruitful 
using the criteria established in Brooks-Scanlon;* the 
reasons for closure are beyond the control of the parties 
to the collective bargaining agreement.
3. Information bargaining occurs in those instances where 
it is determined that bargaining might be fruitful.
4. Based on the information provided, the NLRB, the 
union or bargaining unit, and the firm determine 
whether further bargaining is appropriate.
5. Bargaining continues in those instances where two of 
the three (the NLRB, the union or bargaining unit, and 
the firm) think progress is being made and/or a solution 
is possible, but for no more than 90 days after the initial 
notice.
96 PerSe Rules
6. If bargaining has been in good faith, but no agreement 
is reached within the time period, the firm is free to pro 
ceed with its action.
7. The firm is required to bargain over the effects.
This proposal establishes a per se rule, but attempts to in 
troduce steps that ensure that decision bargaining will not be 
required in circumstances where there is no reasonable 
chance of resolution. The proposal places a greater obliga 
tion on management than is currently required, but reduces 
uncertainty and the potential of costly penalties. The 
bargaining power of the union is limited, but is more than 
currently exists for effects bargaining.
One of the employer's concerns that surfaces is the uncer 
tainty associated with meeting good faith bargaining re 
quirements. The 90-day time limitation addresses this. The 
limitation should be absolute in order to discourage play 
acting, and to promote bargaining.
The NLRB is charged with furthering the purposes of the 
National Labor Relations Act, which is to establish and 
maintain industrial peace to preserve the flow of commerce. 
It may be felt that the initial reaction of the Board will be 
that these purposes are best served by requiring bargaining in 
all situations, irrespective of the probability of changing the 
outcome. However, the Board, in its Brooks-Scanlon deci 
sion, has moved to the position that bargaining should not 
be required over the decision to close when there is no 
likelihood of reversing the decision. In Brooks-Scanlon, the 
firm lost its source of raw materials and the Board rejected a 
duty to bargain.
The proposal envisions a two step process. After initial 
bargaining has occurred, the progress will be reviewed to 
determine if a solution is likely. If none is likely, as indicated 
by two of the three parties agreeing so, further bargaining
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over the decision will not be required in order to meet good 
faith requirements. This second step would cover the situa 
tion where the market has changed so rapidly that the firm 
cannot possibly keep the plant open 90 days.
An important element of establishing a per se rule is that 
plant closure is a relatively infrequent event. Therefore, the 
additional costs of administering the proposal would be 
limited. Furthermore, it would use existing structures, but 
require that the National Labor Relations Act be amended to 
include plant closures and relocations as falling within the 
"terms and other conditions of employment."
Summary
Perse rules to guide the duty to bargain have been propos 
ed because the judicial determination of the duty to bargain 
over closure is problematic. Perhaps the most troublesome 
aspect is that substantive labor law has been made in the area 
of plant closure through cases in which management and 
labor have never negotiated a contract. For example, neither 
Schwarz's nor Rabin's criteria would have required decision 
bargaining in the First National Maintenance decision.
One of the appealing features of using collective bargain 
ing to help resolve the plant closure problem is that closure is 
a relatively infrequent event. As reported earlier, there were 
619 closures in 1982, a year that has been compared to the 
Great Depression in terms of its impact on some sectors. 
Although the impact on the workers dislocated may be 
severe, the administrative impact for an agency such as the 
National Labor Relations Board should not be overly 
burdensome. For example, in fiscal year 1980, the NLRB 
handled over 44,000 unfair labor practice cases (Forty-fifth 
Annual Report of the NLRB, 1981).
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Conversely, case-by-case determination can be extremely 
costly in the individual situation. Other per se proposals to 
accommodate the partial closing judicial conundrum have 
been reviewed. Each attempt is noteworthy, but each one is 
flawed. The two areas on which they seem to stumble is en 
suring that the negotiations are expeditious and introducing 
certainty into who is required to bargain over the decision.
The proposal presented above requires decision bargain 
ing, but sets a time limit to the bargaining. It establishes a 
per se rule, but envisions a quick determination if further 
bargaining would be fruitful. For example, closure due to 
the loss of market likely would lead to the quick determina 
tion that bargaining over the decision would be fruitless and 
would permit early negotiations over the effects. 9
NOTES
1. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 85 S. Ct. 398, 405 (1964).
2. National Labor Relations Board v. First National Maintenance Cor 
poration, 628 F.2d 596 (1980).
3. 627 F.2d 596, 602.
4. For the purposes of this monograph, earnings losses are divided into 
two components: (a) the difference in wages received between the posi 
tion in the closed plant and the new job, and (b) the uncompensated 
deferred compensation.
5. Naturally, there may be short-run adjustment costs for workers 
associated with the closure. But the extent of opportunities should 
minimize the income loss, and therefore the adjustment costs.
6. Although one of Cease's five points held that the efficient result is in 
dependent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work 
without costs, that may not be the case due to the unequal distribution of 
information. Bargaining then becomes the mechanism for equalizing the 
distribution of information.
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7. The importance of human capital to firms is evidenced by the fact that 
some service firms have issued stock. These firms do not produce goods 
in the traditional sense, so there is no physical capital—buildings, 
machines, inventories—which could be liquidated to generate some 
return to the shareholder. For example, consider investment houses or 
consulting firms. Some have gone public and shares in the company are 
being traded. The company may lease space and have no inventory, 
although it may have a portfolio of stocks. In actuality, the values of the 
shares of stock are based on the human capital of the individuals 
employed by the company. Thus, one must question the preoccupation 
of the Courts with physical capital.
8. Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Local 1017, Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 
102 LRRM 1606 (1979).
9. A difficult feature of the proposal is that it does not accommodate the 
Adams Dairy problem. The establishment continues, but a subset of 
workers is replaced. Do we continue to rely on Fibreboard or do we at 
tempt to bring this situation under the proposal?

Plant Closure Protections
and the Collectively
Chapter 5 Bargained Contract
Introduction
When a plant is closed or a large scale dislocation occurs, 
certain protections may be in place or may have been provid 
ed for workers to ease the transition between jobs. Severance 
pay, usually a lump sum, may be paid to those who have 
stayed until the plant is closed. Supplemental unemployment 
benefits (SUB) may have been negotiated to augment 
unemployment compensation. Job search or relocation 
assistance may be provided or advance notice of the closure 
or dislocation may have been given. Other workers may have 
secured the right to transfer to a new facility or obtained 
preferential hiring rights in those instances when the closure 
actually represents a relocation of the production facilities of 
the plant.
Several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have 
referenced the incidence of negotiated provisions in the con 
tract. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. Na 
tional Labor Relations Board, the finding that a significant 
number of contracts included provisions limiting the ability 
of firms to contract out work was an important piece of 
evidence in leading the Supreme Court to rule that subcon 
tracting was a mandatory topic of bargaining. In First Na-
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tional Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Rela 
tions Board, the U.S. Supreme Court used the fact that pro 
visions requiring management to bargain with the union over 
the decision to close, or similar decisions, were relatively rare 
as an indication that mandatory bargaining over these deci 
sions was not warranted. Instead, the greater frequency of 
bargaining over advance notice, interplant transfer and 
relocation, and other "effects" issues indicated to the court 
that "effects bargaining" and not "decision bargaining" 
was more appropriate. Therefore, the extent of bargaining 
over plant closure is important not only as an indicator of 
the number of workers covered, but also of how changes in 
the extent of bargaining may portend adjustments to judicial 
interpretations.
Why individual contracts contain some plant closure pro 
visions and others do not may go beyond differences in sheer 
bargaining power. There are economic incentives involved in 
these types of protections for both management and labor. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these incentives for 
bargaining over plant closure. The first general question con 
cerns the incidence of bargaining over the contractual pro 
tections. The second question concerns whether the inclusion 
of these protections is a response to changed realities about 
employment security. Specifically, have management and 
labor used formal contract negotiations to obtain protec 
tions and to develop solutions for workers and firms "at risk 
of closure?"
Incentives Associated With Plant 
Closure Provisions
Severance Pay
Severance pay is the compensation given to a worker who 
is terminated. The connotation associated with it is that the 
leaving is involuntary and perhaps unexpected. For example,
Plant Closure Protections 103
severance pay is given to workers who are let go whereas pen 
sions are paid to workers who retire. The usual presumption 
is that severance pay is given to ease the pain and to tide the 
workers over until something new can be found following 
the involuntary separation. However, severance pay also can 
be used as a deterrent to closure.
Because severance pay is multifaceted, it may be the most 
desirable contractual provision covering plant closure from 
the union's perspective. (As was shown in chapter 2, increas 
ing severance payments due workers may reduce the prob 
ability that a firm will close one plant in order to relocate to a 
new location.) This conjecture is consistent with the finding 
(reported below) that severance pay is the most frequently 
negotiated contract provision of this group.
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
Supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) are payments 
to workers who are separated from their jobs, either tem 
porarily or permanently. This is a payment in addition to the 
benefits received through the unemployment insurance 
system of the state. However, rather than being part of a 
pool of firms in which some cross subsidization occurs, the 
program is funded directly by the firm. The cost of the pro 
gram is borne by the firm that is laying off the workers or 
closing the operation.
Just as with severance pay, SUB increases the costs to the 
firm of shutting down an operation. By the same token, SUB 
benefits are likely to be available only to those employees 
who are terminated or who remain with the firm until 
closure, and not to those who leave voluntarily. For the 
worker, it also provides an extra financial cushion such that 
the loss of employment does not result in a drastic drop in in 
come, and permits greater selectivity in searching for a new 
position. Because SUB payments generally are available to
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most workers in a union, there is not likely to be the conflict 
in union bargaining goal determination between more senior 
and less senior workers.
Advance Notice
One issue at the heart of the plant closure policy debate is 
whether a firm should be required to provide advance notice 
of the closing. Workers assert that advance notice is 
necessary so that (a) they may investigate options to save 
their jobs, (b) they have time to adjust psychologically to the 
loss of their job, and (c) they may begin the search for a new 
job immediately in order to minimize the period of 
unemployment and the potential wage loss. Firms, on the 
other hand, have tended to oppose advance notice arguing 
that (a) employee morale and productivity would be reduc 
ed, (b) employees would leave so the firm would be unable to 
fill its final orders, and (c) employees would sabotage the 
plant and equipment, therefore reducing the value of these 
assets.
What are some of the potential costs associated with pro 
viding advance notice? All of the reasons provided above are 
somewhat speculative. Will employee productivity decline? 
Will the attrition of workers increase? Will workers sabotage 
plant and equipment? For instance, consider employee pro 
ductivity. Employee productivity tends to decline as the 
economy enters the downturn of a business cycle in order to 
make the work last as long as possible before layoffs begin. 
Weber and Taylor (1963), in their classic article on plant 
closure, indicated that this problem had not developed in the 
plant closings they studied. But this must still be considered a 
real possibility, because there appears to be the potential for 
increased costs due to reduced productivity.
Another source of costs would be if advance notice in 
creased the quit rate above the normal level of attrition.
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There are fixed costs associated with hiring and training new 
workers, or retraining existing workers, so if advance notice 
increased the quit rate, the firm would experience an increase 
in costs. But the impact on the quit rate is likely to be a func 
tion of the reasons for closure. If the closure is due to 
cyclical circumstances either for the industry or the 
economy, workers may not quit because there are fewer op 
portunities available. If the closure is due to circumstances 
specific to the firm, attrition may increase, and therefore 
there would be additional hiring, training, or retraining costs 
for the firm.
The issue of sabotage probably is most speculative; as 
Weber and Taylor (1963) also found, "all reports indicate 
that this problem has not developed." (p. 312)
The greatest benefits of advance notice probably are in the 
potential to avert closure. With advance notice, the union 
may have the opportunity to propose alternatives that might 
keep the plant open, that is, to engage in "decision bargain 
ing." However, resistance to this may occur since this could 
give workers a foothold in an area traditionally reserved as a 
management right. The benefit derived from the opportunity 
to adjust psychologically to the loss of employment is ob 
vious, although not necessarily quantifiable. Since severance 
pay and supplemental unemployment benefits generally re 
quire staying until closure, it is questionable whether the ad 
vance notice would be used to engage in labor market search. 
Advance notice might be more beneficial to workers when 
displaced worker programs are available.
Relocation and/or Transfer Rights
Relocation and/or transfer rights provide the potential for 
employment continuity with the same firm, albeit at a dif 
ferent location. They differ from the other plant closure pro 
visions in that they are not necessarily deterrents to the firm.
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Facing a requirement to relocate its workforce could deter a 
firm from closing one plant and opening another elsewhere; 
but one could suggest that the firm also might desire this type 
of provision, particularly if its labor force is specially skilled. 
It is expected that these provisions would be more prevalent 
in single-firm, multiple plant operations or industries that 
have faced changing geographical markets for their pro 
ducts. 1
The Frequency of Plant Closure Provisions
The frequency of key plant closure provisions in major 
collective bargaining agreements is presented in this section. 
Two major comparisons are made: (1) frequency by region, 
and (2) frequency by "right-to-work" status of the state. 
The first comparison is made because there is the presump 
tion that establishments in the Northeast and Midwest are 
more likely to be losing employment and that the plants are 
at greater risk of being closed.
The second comparison is made because states have used 
their right-to-work status as an indicator that unions are less 
powerful and that the collective bargaining environment is 
more favorable to management. Right-to-work laws essen 
tially limit a union's right to negotiate a union security clause 
which requires workers to pay periodic dues and initiation 
fees as a condition of employment. Such a clause is con 
sidered crucial to a union's strength because it enhances the 
financial resources the union can count on and mitigates the 
potential "free-rider" problem. 2
The key plant closure provisions are advance notice of 
shutdown (SHUTDWN), relocation allowances 
(RELOCATE), transfer rights (TRANPLT), preferential 
hiring rights (TRANHIRE), a combination of transfer rights 
and hiring rights (TRANCOMB), severance pay
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(SEVRANCE), supplemental unemployment benefits 
(SUB), and advance notice of technological change 
(CHANGE).
The data source is the United States Department of 
Labor's file of contracts covering more than 1,000 workers 
in effect in 1974, and the contracts covering more than 1,000 
workers in effect in 1980. These contracts were negotiated 
principally in 1971, 1972 and 1973, and in 1977, 1978 and 
1979, respectively. Only those agreements in the manufactur 
ing sector (SIC 200 through SIC 399) were used. After 
editing the data and limiting the analysis to just those con 
tracts covering production workers, 631 contracts were 
available for analysis for 1974 and 676 for 1980. The Depart 
ment of Labor coded the provisions in the contract, usually 
indicating the presence or absence of the provision. Due to 
the method of coding, the provisions have become 
homogeneous even through there may have been con 
siderable variation in the way they were written or have been 
interpreted by the parties to the contract.
Table 5.1 provides a listing of the incidence of provisions 
related to plant closure by region in 1974. The same data for 
1980 are presented in table 5.2. 3 The most frequently 
negotiated provision in 1974 was severance pay, which was 
included in as few as 24 percent of the contracts in the 
Pacific region to as many as 47 percent of the Interstate con 
tracts. Interstate contracts cover establishments in more than 
one state. Since severance pay usually is a money payment to 
employees who have been terminated and since termination 
can occur for a variety of reasons, severance pay protection 
is not exclusively a plant closure provision.
Supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) tended to be 
the second most frequently negotiated provision. It was most 
common in the Interstate contracts (39 percent) and least 
common in those contracts covering establishments in the
Table 5.1
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure 
Related Provisions in 1974, by Region*
Provisions
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE
Total contracts
Northeast
(percent)
4
13
2
4
40
23
11
12
166
Midwest
(percent)
8
17
5
8
43
27
12
6
160
South &
Plains
(percent)
2
13
4
2
36
14
14
11
160
Pacific
(percent)
4
16
4
7
24
10
16
9
70
Interstate
(percent
31
20
16
19
47
39
20
12
75
Q o*
en 
C •-I 
<T>
^ <-t 
O
SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1974.
*The states grouped in the following regions:
Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania. 
Midwest: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin.
South & Plains: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, 
Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Loui 
siana, Oklahoma, Texas, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada. 
Pacific: Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
Table 5.2
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure 
Related Provisions in 1980, by Region
Provisions
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE
Total contracts
Northeast
(percent)
6
15
3
4
40
19
12
13
160
Midwest
(percent)
8
21
5
8
34
31
9
6
155
South &
Plains
(percent)
5
22
6
2
38
13
16
14
172
Pacific
(percent)
9
24
7
5
32
11
16
8
74
Interstate
(percent
34
17
20
23
47
55
24
13
115
SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980.
JBC3
r*
0 o*
110 Plant Closure Protections
Pacific region (10 percent). Provisions providing relocation 
allowances and preferential hiring rights were the least fre 
quently negotiated for those contracts covering 
establishments in any of the four distinct regions. However, 
relocation allowance was a relatively common provision in 
the Interstate contracts.
Given the usually strong opposition to legislative pro 
posals with advance notice requirements, the presumption is 
that significant union bargaining power is required to obtain 
them. The stronger, more aggressive unions are concentrated 
in the Midwest. Thus, it is somewhat paradoxical that the ad 
vance notice provisions are slightly more frequent in the 
South & Plains. This issue is addressed more rigorously later 
in this chapter.
Contract outcomes related to plant closure in 1980 were 
characterized by significant changes in the incidence of both 
severance pay and transfer rights provisions. Specifically, 
the incidence of severance pay provisions dropped 9 percent 
age points between 1974 and 1980 in contracts covering 
establishments in the Midwest, but increased 8 percentage 
points in contracts in the Pacific regions. There also was a 
marked increase in most regions in the incidence of transfer 
rights between 1974 and 1980. For instance, there was a 9 
percentage point increase in the frequency of TRANPLT in 
the South & Plains region and an 8 percentage point increase 
in the Pacific region. One explanation is that this increase 
may have been a response to the fear of industrial relocation. 
On the other hand, given the reluctance of workers to 
relocate, this provision may be a low-cost concession for 
firms, thereby increasing its frequency.
T-tests were conducted to determine if the differences be 
tween regions in the frequency that these provisions were in 
cluded in the contracts were statistically significant. For the 
1974 file, the only statistically significant difference between
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the Northeast and the South & Plains was for the SUB provi 
sion. Only the incidence of transfer rights was significantly 
different between these two regions in 1980.
In 1974, differences in the frequency of contract provi 
sions, relocation allowance, a combination of transfer rights 
and preferential hiring rights, and supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits in the contracts covering establishments in the 
Midwest versus the South & Plains were statistically signifi 
cant. The incidence of the three provisions was greater in the 
Midwest. However, by 1980, the incidence of advance notice 
of shutdown and advance notice of technological change 
also were significantly different between these regions, but 
these two provisions were more common in contracts cover 
ing establishments in the South & Plains.
The t-tests conducted involving the Northeast and the 
Pacific found statistically significant differences between 
these two regions in the frequency of severance and sup 
plemental unemployment benefits in 1974, whereas in 1980, 
the only difference was in transfer rights, with the frequency 
being greater in the Pacific region.
The comparison of the Midwest with the Pacific followed 
a similar pattern. Specifically, there were statistically signifi 
cant differences in the frequency of supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits and severance pay in 1974, but in 1980, the on 
ly difference in the contracts covering establishments in these 
two regions was the frequency of supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits.
The final step was to determine if there were any 
statistically significant differences in the frequency of these 
contract provisions between the South & Plains region and 
the Pacific region. In 1974, the differences in the frequency 
of a combination of preferential hiring rights and transfer 
rights, and severance pay were statistically significant. In
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1980, however, no statistically significant differences in these 
contract provisions emerged.
The expectations concerning contractual provisions 
related to plant closure were based on the accepted cliche 
that manufacturing establishments in the Northeast and 
Midwest had been losing employment. However, an ex 
amination of production worker employment growth in 
those 3-digit industries represented in the major contracts 
file portrays a different picture.
As shown in table 5.3, the largest proportion of firms in 
industries with growth rates exceeding 25 percent in the 1967 
to 1979 period were in the Midwest and Northeast. Fully 18.1 
percent of the contracts in the Midwest covered 
establishments in industries where employment growth ex 
ceeded 25 percent in that period. Furthermore, only in the 
Midwest region were there more contracts in industries in 
which employment was growing rather than declining. Thus, 
the growth rate in plant closure provisions in contracts 
covering establishments in the South & Plains and the Pacific 
is quite consistent with relative employment growth in those 
regions.
Instead of separating the incidence of provisions by 
region, the states were grouped into right-to-work (RTW) 
states and states which do not have right-to-work laws. 
There were 19 states in 1974 that had right-to-work laws, and 
those states are listed in table 5.4. 4 Generally, right-to-work 
laws are an indicator of the political climate towards 
organized labor. Therefore, we would expect the frequency 
of plant closure provisions to be less in right-to-work states. 5
As indicated in table 5.4, this expectation holds more for 
the contracts covering establishments in 1974 than for 1980. 
In fact, there is no difference statistically between these two 
groups of states in the frequency of provisions covering 
preferential hiring rights, transfer rights, severance pay, ad-
Table 5.3
Percent of Establishment by Industry's Manufacturing Growth Rates 
Over the 1967 to 1979 Period for 3-Digit SIC Industries*
South &
Northeast Midwest Plains Pacific Interstate 
Manufacturing growth____(percent)____(percent)____(percent)____(percent)____(percent
Greater than or equal
to 25 percent 9.0 18.1 6.9 5.7 5.3 
10 percent to 24 percent 18.7 15.0 17.5 22.9 20.0 
0 percent to 9 percent 17.5 19.4 16.9 8.6 13.3
-9 percent to -1 percent 19.3 18.1 26.2 25.7 30.7
-24 percent to -10 percent 19.9 22.5 20.6 28.6 25.3 
Less than or equal 
to-25 percent 15.7 6.9 11.9 8.6 5.3 ^
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— S3
SOURCE: Author's calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, £.
United States, 1909-1978 and Supplement. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1978 and 1982. 5*
-The 3-digit industries are those in which an establishment or establishments with more than 1,000 production workers are covered by a collec- c
tive bargaining contract. o>
TJi-»
or*n> oi-*5'
3
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vance notice of plant closings and advance notice of major 
technological changes in either 1974 or 1980. Therefore, at 
least in the area of plant closure, the differential impact of 
unionization on contractual outcomes in the right-to-work 
states relative to the other states is minimal.
Table 5.4
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure
Related Provisions in 1974 and 1980, by Right-to-work Status
of State in Which Establishment is Located**
1974 1980
RTW NoRTW RTW No RTW
Provisions (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE
0
13
1
1
33
8
10
10
6*
15
4
6*
39
23*
14
10
4
21
6
1
35
10
16
12
7
22
4
6*
37
22*
12
10
Total contracts 104 452 113 448 
Number of workers_____207.100 1.217,250 231,400 1,029,300
SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1980.
NOTE: Contracts classified as Interregional are not included in this analysis.
•Statistically significant difference in mean values at .10 percent level using a t-test.
**Right-to-Work states in 1974 were: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
Louisiana adopted a Right-to-work law in 1976. New Hampshire has no Right-to-work 
law statute, but a decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court effectively provides the 
same requirements of a Right-to-work law.
Several points need to be highlighted. Severance payments 
are the most frequently negotiated provision, both in right- 
to-work states and the other states. Severance payments
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serve a dual purpose. They provide income protection in the 
case of closure, but they also increase its cost. There also has 
been a substantial growth in the incidence of interplant 
transfer rights. Between 1974 and 1980, the proportion of 
contracts including interplant transfer rights increased 8 
percentage points and 7 percentage points in right-to-work 
states and the other states, respectively.
One of the difficulties of analyzing collective bargaining 
contracts is that there is a need to place provisions into 
categories, yet this assumes that similar provisions are 
homogeneous across contracts, when in fact they are not. 
For instance, one contract may provide for a $500 relocation 
allowance and another contract may require a $1,000 reloca 
tion allowance. According to the framework used thus far, 
the contracts simply would be categorized as having a reloca 
tion allowance provision. Yet the differences in the provi 
sions covering relocation could indicate significant dif 
ferences in bargaining power, industry conditions, et cetera. 
Unfortunately, when using the population of contracts 
covering 1,000 workers or more, which already has been cod 
ed by the U.S. Department of Labor, it is not possible to 
recognize the heterogeneity of most contract provisions. Nor 
is it usually practical to attempt to account for these dif 
ferences in statistical analyses.
Two instances in which this is possible are advance notice 
of plant closure (SHUTDWN) and advance notice of 
technological change (CHANGE). The provisions have been 
coded according to the number of days of advance notice 
that is to be given. Table 5.5 provides this information for 
SHUTDWN and similar data for CHANGE is provided in 
table 5.6.
As shown in table 5.5, in 1974 the majority of the con 
tracts did not specify the actual number of days of advance 
notice of closure. By 1980 greater specificity had been incor-
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porated in the contract. Between 1974 and 1980 there was a 
substantial increase in the number of contracts and the 
number of workers covered specifying 1 to 30 days of ad 
vance notice. In 1974, 12 contracts covering over 23,000 
workers had provisions requiring 1 to 30 days of notice. By 
1980 there were 19 contracts covering more than 112,000 
workers requiring this length of notice. There also was a 
doubling in the number of contracts and workers covered 
receiving 61 to 90 days of notice of closure over the six years.
Table 5.5
Variations in Advance Notice
of Closure (SHUTDWN) Provisions
1974 and 1980
1974 1980
Length of notice
1 to 30 days
31 to 60 days
61 to 90 days
91 days or more
Notice, but unspecified
Contracts
12
7
7
12
49
Workers
23,650
47,950
14,750
37,150
220,990
Contracts
19
7
14
13
47
Workers
112,250
47,050
30,350
40,400
172,350
Total contracts 
with advance notice______87 344,490 100 402,400
SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 1974 and 1980.
Provisions providing for advance notice of technological 
change were even less specific than those described above. In 
both 1974 and 1980, almost 60 percent of the major con 
tracts including advance notice of technological change did 
not specify the length of advance notice. The largest share of 
contracts that did specify length provided between 1 to 30 
days notice. The paucity of contracts covering technological 
change is quite surprising. Not only is there the more recent 
interest in the impact of technological change, but the late
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1950s and early 1960s were influenced by the automation 
scare. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962 initially was targeted to workers impacted by 
technological change. Thus, one would have anticipated 
greater sensitivity to this issue.
Table 5.6
Variations in Advance Notice
of Technological Change (CHANGE) Provisions
1974 and 1980
1974 1980
Length of notice
1 to 30 days
31 to 60 days
61 to 90 days
91 days or more
Notice, but unspecified
Contracts
19
1
4
1
37
Workers
78,300
3,500
11,400
3,300
210,300
Contracts
20
3
7
1
44
Workers
78,950
7,750
16,150
1,650
579,750
Total contracts 
with advance notice______62 306.800 75 684.250
SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 1974 and 1980.
Provisions designed to mitigate the problems arising from 
plant closure are not widespread in major collective bargain 
ing agreements. The two most frequently negotiated provi 
sions, SEVRANCE and SUB, however, are not exclusively 
"closure" or "significant technological change" provisions. 
There also is considerable variation in the frequency of the 
eight provisions. Between 1974 and 1980, there was a marked 
increase in the frequency of only one provision, transfer 
rights (TRANPLT). One unanticipated finding is that dif 
ferences in these bargaining outcomes among the regions are 
disappearing.
Contract provisions do not have to be widespread, 
however, to suggest that bargaining is moving toward solu-
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tions and protections. All that is necessary is that the popula 
tion at risk has obtained such protections. Determining 
whether this has occurred is the subject of the next section.
The Determinants of Plant Closure Provisions 
in Formalized Negotiations
The objective of this section is to investigate the deter 
minants of the inclusion of provisions addressing plant 
closure or permanent dislocation of workers in the formally 
bargained contracts in effect in 1974 and 1980. The underly 
ing hypothesis is that changes in bargaining outcomes are 
responses to long-run changes in the structure of manufac 
turing and in the location of economic activity. Through this 
analysis it is hoped that the following question can be 
answered: Have management and labor used formal contract 
negotiations to obtain protections and to develop solutions 
for workers and firms at risk of closure? "At risk of 
closure" is defined in two ways. In the first instance, it is 
those industries in which production worker employment 
declines have been relatively great. In the second instance it 
is those industries in which the rate of plant closure has been 
relatively high.
Much has been made of the "concession bargaining" that 
occurred in a number of key negotiations in 1981 and 1982. 
The one side of concession bargaining has been the union 
givebacks of wages and/or fringe benefits. The other side is 
that, in a number of these negotiations, management has 
conceded employment security guarantees and greater input 
in plant closure decisions. Kassalow (1983) indicates that 
new protections, such as improvements in severance pay, 
supplementary unemployment plans and transfer rights, 
were gained by unions during the 1981-82 period of conces 
sion bargaining in exchange for waiving future benefits. The 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (1983) reported that 50 of
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the 203 concessionary agreements provided explicit employ 
ment security guarantees and 9 of these contracts gave the 
unions a say in company decisions. Kassalow also notes that 
unions not under pressure to make concessions obtained ad 
vance notice provisions for plant closure or transfer of work 
while negotiating substantial improvements in the economic 
conditions of their employment.
Establishing the determinants of plant closure provisions 
can indicate which workers have either the greatest taste for 
the protection afforded by these provisions or consider 
themselves most at risk to be affected by closure. 
Establishing the determinants also should demonstrate 
which workers have the bargaining power necessary to ob 
tain these protections.
However, the concession negotiations of 1981-1982 may 
not be indicative of labor-management relations in the long 
run. Establishing the determinants of these outcomes under 
less severe circumstances, the 1970s, may provide a better 
understanding of the underlying conditions and motivations. 
The 1970s also was a period, as Cappelli (1983) has noted, in 
which import penetration was increasing and union represen 
tation was decreasing in a number of industries. The 
economy was stagnating. Union success in certification elec 
tions decreased precipitously relative to the 1960s (Prosten 
1979). The average size of manufacturing plants in the 
largest Fortune 500 firms decreased from 895 to 855 
employees and, more important, the average size of the new 
plants they opened was only 307 employees (Schmenner 
1983).
Because of these factors, the distinct difference between 
employment reductions due to cyclical factors and those due 
to large scale reductions or plant closure should have become 
more apparent. As Mitchell (1983) has indicated, traditional 
employment security provisions protect senior workers from
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cyclical reductions but not from plant closure. Since senior 
employees are more likely to be involved in developing union 
bargaining policy objectives, union policy should have 
become more sensitive to the threat of closure or large scale 
reductions during the 1970s.
Conceptual Framework
The underlying premise of this research is that contract 
provisions over plant closure are scarce resources. 
Therefore, an economic choice in addition to the expenditure 
of bargaining capital is involved in their inclusion in 
negotiated contracts. Economic choice not only entails 
deciding whether to attempt to bargain over plant closure 
provisions, it also includes deciding over which provisions to 
bargain.
There are general trends in the economy that impact 
workers and to which some response is expected. For exam 
ple, the rapid inflation of the second half of the 1970s in 
creased the pressure for cost-of-living adjustments. Similar 
ly, it is hypothesized that significant employment declines 
and the increased attention given to the problems arising 
from plant closure would sensitize workers to the need for 
contractual protections. Since contract provisions are scarce 
resources, it is expected that the workers in those industries 
and locations undergoing the greatest structural changes 
(shifting demand for their labor) would be willing to make 
the tradeoffs required to obtain these provisions. 6
Based on this scenario, the following hypotheses are con 
sidered.
1. Variations in the incidence of provisions addressing per 
manent job dislocation in individual contracts should be 
negatively related to variations in employment growth 
across manufacturing industries, holding other factors 
constant.
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2. Variations in the incidence of provisions addressing per 
manent job dislocation should be positively related to 
variations in the percent of plants closed in that in 
dustry, holding other factors constant.
3. Since plant closure provisions place a cost on the 
employer, the union's ability to obtain plant closure 
provisions depends on the strength of the union. Thus, 
variations in the incidence of contract provisions should 
be positively related to the extent that the industry's 
workforce is covered by collective bargaining 
agreements and negatively related to the extent of union 
rivalry, holding other factors constant.
4. Since right-to-work (RTW) laws are a positive signal of 
a pro-business environment, contractual outcomes 
should vary negatively with whether the contract covers 
an establishment(s) in a state with a right-to-work 
statute, holding other factors constant. 7
It is not possible in the data sets available to observe in 
dividual contracts over time due to limitations in the ability 
to track contracts. Therefore, cross-sectional analysis is con 
ducted on each of the data sets. By examining relationships 
at two different long-run positions, we should be able to 
observe changes in the ultimate determinants of bargained 
outcomes during this period.
Although most of the research on collective bargaining 
outcomes has addressed wage levels and wage changes, 
several studies recently have been conducted on the deter 
minants of other contract provisions such as cost-of-living 
clauses in bargained contracts (Hendricks and Kahn 1983; 
Ehrenberg et al. 1982), the bargaining structure (Hendricks 
and Kahn 1982) and the correlates of general bargaining out 
comes (Kochan and Block 1977).
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One of the main difficulties in examining bargaining out 
comes other than wages is that the outcome is not easily 
quantifiable. Furthermore, it is the expectation that these 
provisions are particularly sensitive to the characteristics of 
the workers in the bargaining unit. Some years ago, Sayles 
and Strauss (1952) found that bargaining units with older 
workers tended to seek pension benefits through collective 
bargaining whereas units with younger workers tended to 
seek health insurance coverage. Since we seldom know the 
demographic characteristics of the bargaining unit, calibra 
tion of the demand for nonwage provisions is more difficult. 
Not only is it difficult to obtain the demographic 
characteristics of the bargaining unit, union bargaining goal 
determination moves us into the realm of voting behavior 
and the power of relative interest groups within an organiza 
tion (Farber 1978).
One other problem that plagues research on the deter 
minants of bargaining outcomes is that the main 
hypothesis—the response of workers to a condition affecting 
their employment prospects—really is an attempt to model 
the propensity to negotiate over an issue. However, since on 
ly outcomes are observed, we may not be measuring the ac 
tual responsiveness of the union. Negotiating over these 
types of protections does not assure that they will be includ 
ed in the final contract—hence, the need to emphasize the 
relative bargaining power of the union and the political en 
vironment for collective bargaining.
Data and Methodology
The basic sources of data were the U.S. Department of 
Labor's files of major collective bargaining agreements in ef 
fect for 1974 and 1980. These files include all major 
agreements in effect in the respective years. The major 
agreements are limited to those covering more than 1,000 
workers. Only those agreements in the manufacturing sector
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(SIC 200 through SIC 399) were used. After editing the data 
and limiting the analysis to just those contracts covering pro 
duction workers, the number of contracts available for 
analyses were 631 for 1974 and 676 for 1980.
Eight contract provisions were categorized as addressing 
the permanent worker displacement issue. They were: 
(a) relocation allowances (RELOCATE), (b) transfer rights 
(TRANPLT), (c) preferential hiring rights (TRANHIRE), 
(d) a combination of b and c (TRANCOMB), (e) severance 
pay(SEVRANCE), (f) supplemental unemployment benefits 
(SUB), (g) advance notice of plant shutdown (SHUTDWN), 
and (h) advance notice of technological change (CHANGE).
The Department of Labor also coded the structure of the 
bargaining relationship, single firm-single plant (PLANT), 
single firm-multiple plant (MULTI), industry (INDUS), 
association (ASSOC); the number of workers covered by the 
contract (WORKERS); and the state in which the establish 
ment is located. The state variable was used to segment the 
data by region and also to create a variable indicating 
whether or not the contract covered workers in a right-to- 
work state (RTW).
The structure of the bargaining relationship variables are 
primarily control variables, but there is an expected 
systematic relationship. 8 It is expected that multi-employer 
agreements result in less favorable agreements than single- 
employer agreements. The theoretical arguments lead to an 
ambiguous conclusion, but empirical work has shown that 
multi-employer outcomes lead to less favorable outcomes for 
unions (Kochan and Block 1977). However, if the negotia 
tion is with a single firm, a firmwide agreement rather than a 
single plant agreement tends to be more advantageous for 
the union because it is not possible for the firm to whipsaw 
the union when all or most of the plants of an employer are 
covered in the same agreement.
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The expectation for the coefficient of the number of 
workers is ambiguous. On the one hand, the greater the 
number of workers, the more resources the union is likely to 
have access to, which should enhance the union's ability to 
negotiate a more favorable bargain. On the other hand, 
management resistance to contract provisions may be in 
creased as the number of workers covered increases.
Collective bargaining coverage (COV) at the 3-digit SIC 
level, a measure of union bargaining power, was taken from 
the estimates developed by Freeman and Medoff (1979). 
Their estimates of contract coverage were for 1968-1972 
period.
Following Hendricks (1975), collective bargaining 
coverage also was measured by three dichotomous variables. 
Low coverage was defined as between 0 and 50 percent of the 
industry organized. Moderate coverage set the bounds at be 
tween 50 percent and 80 percent of the industry organized, 
and the high coverage dichotomous variable was assigned to 
those industries in which the percent covered by collective 
bargaining agreements exceeded 80 percent. The reasoning 
underlying this specification is that the relation between 
union bargaining power and coverage of industry does not 
increase in a smooth and continuous manner. Rather, there 
are critical levels of bargaining coverage beyond which a 
union's bargaining power changes by a disproportionate 
amount.
Changes in production worker employment (GROW74) 
and (GROW80) at the 3-digit SIC code for the periods 1967 
to 1973 and 1973 to 1979, respectively, were calculated from 
Employment and Earnings. 9 These periods were chosen 
because each starting and ending year were near or at the 
peak of a cycle of economic activity. Consequently, the 
measured change in employment should be reflecting long-
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run structural influences as opposed to short run cyclical 
changes.
The probability of plant closure (CLOSE) is calculated as 
the ratio of the number of plants that were closed by Fortune 
500 firms in the 1970s to the total number of plants at the 
start of the decade by 3-digit industries. This ratio was then 
multiplied by 100. This value was calculated from a com 
puter printout provided by Roger Schmenner to the author. 
Schmenner's data set is based on his survey of Fortune 500 
firms (see Schmenner 1982). However, it was not possible to 
calculate separate closure rates for the early part of the 
decade and for the latter part. Although the data used in the 
analysis is for 3-digit industries, an indication of the varia 
tion in closure rates across 2-digit industries is provided in 
table 5.7. 10 Closure rates varied from 20 percent of all plants 
in the leather and leather products industry to 3.0 percent in 
petroleum refining.
A variable that is included in several specifications is the 
length of the contract (LENGTH). As the contract length in 
creases, greater risks are assumed by both sides. One of these 
risks is that changed market conditions could place the 
establishment and employment security in jeopardy. 
Although reopening a contract is possible, it generally re 
quires the agreement of both parties. Thus, it is expected that 
more protections would be sought as the length of the con 
tract increases.
Two other variables that were calculated are the degree of 
product market concentration at the 3-digit SIC level 
(CONC) and the extent of union rivalry (RIVAL). CONC 
was calculated as the weighted average value of the percent 
of shipments accounted for by the four largest companies in 
those 4-digit SIC industries comprising the 3-digit SIC. 11 The 
basic data were collected from the Census of Manufactures 
for both 1972 and 1977. CONC also was respecified as a set
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of dichotomous variables where low concentration, 
moderate concentration and high concentration were defined 
as ratios of 0-40 percent, 40-70 percent and 70-100 percent, 
respectively. The expected association between CONC and 
the dependent variable is ambiguous. Weiss (1966) asserted 
that it should be advantageous for the union to negotiate 
with firms in which the degree of product market concentra 
tion is high because these large firms will attempt to buy 
public favor by granting more union demands. Levinson 
(1967) argued that the large firms characteristic of concen 
trated industries have the financial resources to not grant 
union demands, but to incur long strikes.
RIVAL was calculated as the inverse of the number of 
unions negotiating major agreements at the 2-digit SIC, and 
therefore was derived from the 1974 and 1980 data sets. In 
creases in RIVAL represented increased concentration of 
major agreements with one union. The expected relationship 
is that as RIVAL rises, more resources are concentrated with 
the union, thereby increasing the union's ability to bargain 
more effectively.
The measures of employment growth, GROW74, 
GROW80, and the probability of closure (CLOSE) are in 
dicators of expected job security. If employment in the in 
dustry declines, it may signify the increased probability that 
the establishment may close in the future, which should 
prompt the union to place provisions concerning closure as 
priority bargaining goals. 12 If a larger percent of plants close 
within an industry, it may indicate a structural shift such as 
increased foreign competition, which places all firms at risk. 
As indicated above, senior workers are not protected from 
job loss resulting from plant closure and the goals of senior 
workers tend to receive greater weights in the formation of 
union bargaining goals.
Plant Closure Protections 127
Table 5.7
Percentage of Plants Closed in Manufacturing Industries 
in the 1970s by Fortune 500 Firms
Number of Number Percentage 
Industry plants closed closed
Food & Kindred Products (20)
Tobacco Manufacturers (21)
Textile Mill Products (22)
Apparel (23)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Furniture & Fixtures (25)
Paper & Allied Products (26)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Chemicals & Allied Products (28)
Petroleum Refining (29)
Rubber Products (30)
Leather & Leather Products (31)
Stone, Clay, Glass
& Concrete Products (32)
Primary Metals Industries (33)
Fabricated Metal Products (34)
Machinery, Except Electrical (35)
Electrical Machinery (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Scientific Instruments (38)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (39)
2,174
32
383
267
401
183
907
258
1,739
397
494
80
648
603
947
1,056
965
607
326
212
222
1
36
24
30
23
60
15
119
12
38
16
44
49
89
75
85
37
23
23
10.2
3.1
9.4
9.0
7.5
12.6
6.6
5.8
6.8
3.0
7.7
20.0
6.8
8.1
9.5
7.1
8.8
6.1
7.1
10.8
SOURCE: Calculations based on computer printout provided by Roger Schmenner,
August 16, 1983.
NOTE: Two-digit SIC code in parentheses.
The concern with right-to-work status of the state is it 
reflects that the division of political power between manage 
ment and unions favors management, and that there are 
limits on unions' access to resources. All of these would sug 
gest that the ability to obtain protections would be limited in 
these states.
The provisions were grouped into three categories and in 
dices were developed for each category. An overall index
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also was calculated based on the eight provisions for each 
contract. Each provision was weighted equally in the con 
struction of each index. The value of each index ranges be 
tween 0 and 100. The first index, INDEX1, is constructed 
from RELOCATE, TRANPLT, TRANHIRE and TRAN- 
COMB. The second index, INDEX2, is constructed from 
SEVRANCE and SUB. The third index, INDEX3, is con 
structed from SHUTDWN and CHANGE. INDEX4 is con 
structed from all eight provisions. Indices of bargaining pro 
visions have been used by other researchers, most notably 
Gerhart (1976) and Kochan and Block (1977). 13
The associations are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) multiple regression analysis. Although OLS violates 
the assumptions of the best linear unbiased estimator, the 
estimates are consistent, and since the relationships primarily 
are associative and not necessarily causal, statistical 
significance rather than the exact marginal change is of 
greater interest. Furthermore, it has been shown that the im 
provement in the reliability of the estimates using alternate 
techniques such as logit or probit can be limited. (Werner, 
Wendling and Budde 1979)
Results
First Hypothesis: This hypothesis concerns whether the in 
cidence of contract provisions addressing permanent job 
dislocation is directly related to negative employment growth 
in the industry in which the contract is negotiated. The key 
variables for testing this hypothesis are the percentage 
changes in production worker employment between 1967 
and 1974 (GROW74), and between 1973 and 1979 
(GROW80), respectively, in the three-digit industry. (It 
should be noted that contracts covering establishments in 
more than one state, interstate agreements, have been ex 
cluded from this phase of the analysis.)
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The results for 1974 are listed in table 5.8 and the 1980 
results are presented in table 5.9. Mean values and standard 
deviations for the variables are reported in table 5.10. The 
estimating equations explain only a relatively small percent 
age of the variation in the incidence of the contract provi 
sions. As shown in table 5.8, the R-squared value ranges 
from .144 for INDEX1—relocation allowances, transfer 
rights—to .029 for INDEX3—advance notice of plant shut 
down and technological change. GROW74 is of the 
hypothesized sign and statistically significant at conventional 
levels when INDEX3 and INDEX4 are the dependent 
variables for the 1974 analysis. Other findings of note are 
that collective bargaining coverage (COV) is positive and 
statistically significant for three of the tests, and the same 
finding holds for the number of workers covered 
(WORKERS). Thus the incidence of these provisions in con 
tracts is strongly related to decreasing employment oppor 
tunities, size of the bargaining unit and collective bargaining 
coverage of the industry (union bargaining power).
The results for 1980 differed considerably, as is evident in 
table 5.9. GROW80 was not statistically significant in any of 
the analyses. Instead, variations in the incidence of plant 
closure provisions tended to be related to size of the bargain 
ing unit, union bargaining power and the absence of rivals 
for the union. Perhaps as interesting a result is that the right- 
to-work dichotomous variable is not statistically significant 
in three of the four estimates. The presence of a right-to- 
work law usually is taken as a signal of a less favorable at 
titude towards unions. Yet, there does not appear to be a dif 
ference in bargained outcomes relating to plant closure 
depending on the presence or absence of a right-to-work law. 
Thus, on the basis of this analysis, there was only limited 
response to changed employment opportunities, and that 
response disappeared in the latter part of the 1970s.
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Table 5.8
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW74
RIVAL
CONC74
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
-.033
(.033)
-.011
(.044)
.057*
(.034)
.055*
(.027)
.037* 
(.015)
-3.860*
(1.420)
2.009
(1.792)
10.844*
(1.978)
1.396
(3.233)
-2.837
.144
556
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
-.074
(.081)
.134
(.109)
.099
(.084)
.312*
(.068)
.100* 
(.038)
-11.113*
(3.521)
-6.130
(4.441)
-8.504*
(4.903)
-10.023
(8.013)
6.830
.085
-.102*
(.059)
.110
(.080)
.031
(.061)
-.027
(.050)
-.014 
(.028)
-.650
(2.576)
-5.792*
(3.249)
.554
(3.588)
3.599
(5.864)
14.122
.029
INDEX4
-.060*
(.035)
.055
(.047)
.061
(.036)
.099*
(.029)
.040* 
(.016)
-4.871*
(1.516)
-1.975
(1.912)
3.434
(2.111)
-.908
(3.451)
3.819
.105
* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.9
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW80
RIVAL
CONC80
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
.076
(.052)
-.005
(.055)
.030
(.038)
.051*
(.031)
.068* 
(.022)
-1.091
(1.599)
3.044
(2.095)
8.585*
(2.250)
7.502*
(3.648)
-1.437
.074
561
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
-.140
(.111)
.221*
(.118)
.165*
(.081)
.260*
(.067)
.093* 
(.047)
-7.443*
(3.415)
-3.594
(4.477)
-1.215
(4.808)
-.893
(7.794)
-1.405
.070
-.081
(.082)
.526*
(.087)
-.113*
(.059)
-.004
(.050)
.042 
(.034)
1.952
(2.516)
1.072
(3.298)
4.394
(3.542)
9.584*
(5.742)
6.134
.093
INDEX4
-.017
(.050)
.189*
(.053)
.028
(.036)
.089*
(.030)
.068* 
(.021)
-1.918
(1.549)
.891
(2.030)
5.087*
(2.180)
5.924
(3.534)
1.416
.080
* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.10 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of Variables
1974 and 1980 
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Variables
GROW74, GROW80
CLOSE
RIVAL
COV
WORKERS (100s)
CONC74, CONC80
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INDEX1
INDEX2
INDEX3
INDEX4
Number of contracts
Year
1974
-8.62
(16.57)
7.90
(4.57)
13.58
(12.45)
69.87
(22.23)
25.61
(35.48)
37.52
(17.88)
.18
(.39)
.61
(.48)
.21
(.40)
.03
(.18)
6.92
(13.47)
28.86
(32.30)
11.24
(22.94)
13.48
(14.06)
556
1980
2.03
(12.28)
7.90
(4.74)
13.58
(11.91)
71.25
(22.50)
22.47
(28.24)
37.90
(18.30)
.20
(.40)
.60
(.48)
.21
(.41)
.03
(.18)
8.91
(14.96)
28.07
(31.91)
11.76
(23.80)
14.41
(14.55)
561
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The most interesting results relate to INDEX3, the 
measurement of the incidence of advance notice of shut 
downs or technological change. These provisions probably 
have been the most frequently mentioned in policy discus 
sions of plant closure. They also most directly address the 
question of management rights. 14 The equation, particularly 
for 1974, explains a very small percentage of the total varia 
tion. The industry's growth rate was negatively related to the 
frequency as hypothesized; but union bargaining power was 
not statistically significant. Thus, there is very little insight 
into what features of the bargaining relationships or en 
vironments have resulted in approximately 15 percent of the 
contracts containing these provisions.
Second Hypothesis: This hypothesis addresses whether the 
incidence of contract provisions relating to plant closure is 
positively related to variations in the rate of plant closures 
across industries. Recall that the closure rates reported in 
table 5.7 ranged from 3.0 percent in the petroleum industry 
to 20.0 percent in the leather and leather products industry. 
Closure rates vary by industry because changes in consumer 
demands, foreign competition and other factors associated 
with structural change do not affect all industries to the same 
degree.
The percent of plants closed by Fortune 500 firms by 
3-digit industry (CLOSE) was substituted for the employ 
ment growth measures in the estimating equation of the four 
indices. The results for 1974 and 1980 are reported in table 
5.11 and table 5.12, respectively.
CLOSE is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications, and the sign generally is negative, which is 
counter to expectations. The statistical insignificance of 
CLOSE is quite surprising. The frequency of plant closure in 
the industry should be a reasonably good indicator of the "at 
risk" potential for the workers and the bargaining unit.
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Table 5.11
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
CLOSE
RIVAL
CONC74
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
-.164 
(.121)
-.014 
(.043)
.049 
(.034)
.050* 
(.027)
.040* 
(.015)
-3.678* 
(1.416)
2.305 
(1.795)
11.140* 
(1.973)
1.899 
(3.242)
-1.153
.145
556
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
.265 
(.302)
.124 
(.108)
.086 
(.086)
.302* 
(.068)
.106* 
(.038)
-10.749* 
(3.513)
-5.595 
(4.452)
-7.925 
(4.894)
-9.138 
(8.040)
9.570
.085
-.090 
(.221)
.092 
(.079)
.030 
(.060)
-.034 
(.050)
-.007 
(.028)
-.268 
(2.576)
-5.403* 
(3.266)
1.124 
(3.590)
4.168 
(5.898)
15.117
.024
INDEX4
-.171 
(.130)
.047 
(.046)
.053 
(.037)
.092* 
(.029)
.045* 
(.016)
-4.593* 
(1.514)
-1.596 
(1.919)
3.870* 
(2.109)
-.292 
(3.466)
2.740
.103
* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.12
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
CLOSE
RIVAL
CONC80
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
-.089
(.142)
-.006
(.055)
.023
(.039)
.050
(.032)
.070* 
(.022)
-1.268
(1.596)
3.666*
(2.069)
8.994*
(2.237)
7.879*
(3.694)
-.601
.071
561
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
.121
(.303)
.242*
(.118)
.175
(.084)
.259*
(.068)
.088* 
(.047)
-7.081*
(3.409)
-4.701
(4.418)
-1.963
(4.779)
1.418
(7.890)
1.417
.068
-.161
(.223)
.532*
(.086)
-.124*
(.062)
-.012
(.050)
.041 
(.034)
2.354
(2.510)
.622
(3.252)
3.982
(3.518)
10.170*
(5.808)
8.457
.092
INDEX4
-.055
(.137)
.190*
(.053)
.024
(.038)
.087*
(.031)
.067* 
(.021)
-1.816
(1.544)
.813
(2.000)
5.002*
(2.164)
6.127*
(3.573)
2.167
.080
•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Perhaps, the risk of closure must be more immediate, such 
as a closure in the same county or another plant of the same 
company in order for statistically significant variations to 
emerge. On the other hand, even though there was variation 
in the risk of closure in the 1970s, the absolute rate, 8.0 per 
cent for the entire decade, may not have been significant 
enough to make unions and workers consider it a critical 
issue. Inflation or workplace safety and health may have 
been more pressing issues.
The sizes, signs and statistical significance of the coeffi 
cients of the other variables parallel those when employment 
growth was the key variable. Specifically, collective bargain 
ing coverage and workers are positive and statistically 
significant when INDEX1, INDEX2 and INDEX4 are the in 
dependent variable. RTW is negative and statistically signifi 
cant in three of the estimates. The findings for 1980 corres 
pond very closely to those reported above.
Third Hypothesis: This hypothesis concerns the use of 
union bargaining power to obtain contractual protections. 
Bargaining power entails both union coverage of the in 
dustry's workforce (COV) and rivalry among the industry's 
unions (RIVAL). As indicated in table 5.8 and table 5.9, the 
extent of bargaining coverage is a positive and significant 
determinant of the frequency of these provisions in the 
negotiated agreements. For the 1974 analyses, RIVAL is not 
a determinant, but becomes positive and statistically signifi 
cant in three of the equations for 1980.
An alternate version of the union bargaining power 
hypothesis, particularly as it relates to the differences in the 
bargaining environment between states that do have right-to- 
work laws and those that do not, is that two unions, the 
United Auto Workers (AUTO) and the United Steel Workers 
(STEEL), possess sufficient strength to obtain their demands 
irrespective of the bargaining environment. Both unions
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have organized major plants throughout the United States. 
Two new dichotomous variables have been specified. The 
first, AUTO, takes on the value 1 if the contract is 
negotiated by the United Auto Workers. The second, 
STEEL, takes on the value 1 if the contract is negotiated by 
the United Steel Workers. The contracts also are segmented 
by right-to-work status of the state in which the organized 
establishment is located and separate analyses are con 
ducted. The results are reported in table 5.13 through table 
5.16.
The analyses for 1974 are reported in tables 5.13 and 5.14, 
with the contracts covering establishments in RTW states 
analyzed in table 5.13. As expected, the coefficients of 
AUTO and STEEL are positive and statistically significant 
in three of the four estimates covering contracts in states 
where there is no right-to-work law. However, contrary to 
expectations, these two variables are not significant predic 
tors of contractual outcomes of contracts covering 
establishments in right-to-work states.
The importance of these two unions in those states without 
RTW statutes is evident in table 5.14. Both AUTO and 
STEEL are statistically significant and positive for INDEX 1, 
INDEX2 and INDEX4 in 1974. The impact on the frequency 
of the provisions also is greater for STEEL than AUTO. 
There are two somewhat surprising findings reported in table 
5.14. First, there is the absence of a statistically significant 
relationship between GROW74 and variations in the indices. 
The second one is the lack of explanatory power of both 
AUTO and STEEL in INDEX3. These provisions simply 
may not have been bargaining goals for these unions, or they 
may not have been evaluated to be worth the necessary 
tradeoff. The analysis was repeated for 1980. The results 
were very similar to those for 1974. Although not reported 
here, they are available from the author.
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Table 5.13
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in Right-To-Work States
in Major Collective Bargaining Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW74
WORKERS (100s)
PLANT
MULTI
AUTO
STEEL
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
-.023
(.052)
.092 
(.060)
.200
(8.260)
7.544
(8.494)
10.128*
(3.459)
4.501*
(2.492)
-.705
.195
104
Dependent variable
INDEX! INDEX3
-.200
(.174)
.172 
(.201)
-37.709
(27.641)
-33.764
(28.424)
8.641
(11.575)
16.166*
(8.340)
50.396
.068
-.196
(.134)
-.085 
(.155)
8.649
(21.247)
11.776
(21.850)
-2.251
(8.898)
-9.919
(6.411)
3.064
.058
INDEX4
-.111*
(.066)
.067 
(.076)
-7.164
(10.471)
-1.724
(10.768)
6.661
(4.385)
3.812
(3.159)
13.012
.102
* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.14
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in States Without Right-To-Work Laws
in Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW74
WORKERS (100s)
PLANT
MULTI
AUTO
STEEL
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
-.043 
(.037)
.035* 
(.016)
2.110 
(1.660)
10.991* 
(1.932)
5.304* 
(2.403)
7.268* 
(1.850)
1.611
.151
452
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
-.055 
(.087)
.104* 
(.038)
-3.344 
(3.841)
-7.340 
(4.471)
17.895* 
(5.560)
35.140* 
(4.281)
25.236
.156
-.061 
(.066)
.015 
(.029)
-7.048* 
(2.919)
-.009 
(3.398)
3.655 
(4.226)
-2.087 
(3.254)
15.946
.026
INDEX4
-.051 
(.039)
.040* 
(.017)
-1.542 
(1.716)
3.658* 
(1.997)
8.039* 
(2.484)
11.897* 
(1.912)
11.101
.124
'Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.15
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in Right-To-Work States
in Major Collective Bargaining Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW80
RIVAL
CONC2
CONC3
COV2
COV3
WORKERS (100s)
LENGTH
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS**
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
.223 
(.137)
.026 
(.099)
4.245 
(3.055)
-.166 
(5.710)
-1.251 
(4.972)
-3.713 
(4.473)
.053 
(.094)
-.020 
(.024)
5.137 
(13.879)
11.411 
(14.255)
— -
2.953
.094
113
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
-.271 
(.274)
.020 
(.198)
10.585* 
(6.107)
22.090* 
(11.413)
23.085* 
(9.939)
21.380* 
(8.941)
.091 
(.189)
.052 
(.049)
-28.932 
(27.740)
-20.876 
(28.490)
—
22.611
.182
-.502* 
(.252)
.644* 
(.182)
-2.852 
(5.614)
-19.120* 
(10.493)
23.799* 
(9.137)
20.658* 
(8.219)
-.128 
(.173)
-.061 
(.045)
23.762 
(25.502)
26.359 
(26.191)
— -
-29.944
.184
INDEX4
-.081 
(.131)
.153 
(•095)
4.055 
(2.922)
.659 
(5.461)
10.845* 
(4.755)
8.652* 
(4.278)
.017 
(.090)
-.012 
(.023)
1.276 
(13.274)
7.076 
(13.633)
— -
-.356
.122
•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
**No industry wide agreements existed in RTW states in the 1980 contract file.
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Table 5.16
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in States Without Right-To-Work Laws
in Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent 
variables
GROW80
RIVAL
CONC2
CONC3
COV2
COV3
WORKERS (100s)
LENGTH
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N
INDEX1
.051 
(.060)
.027 
(.070)
-.736 
(1.710)
-.579 
(2.844)
2.635 
(2.038)
4.429* 
(2.120)
.068* 
(.023)
.000 
(.040)
3.594 
(2.254)
9.198* 
(2.431)
7.352* 
(3.754)
.008
.078
448
Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3
-.122 
(.128)
.219 
(.149)
4.675 
(3.651)
11.397* 
(6.075)
1.128 
(4.352)
11.774* 
(4.529)
.100* 
(.050)
.146* 
(.087)
-.595 
(4.814)
2.028 
(5.192)
.204 
(8.018)
13.954
.073
-.042 
(.089)
.483* 
(.105)
-4.649* 
(2.561)
-3.446 
(4.261)
-3.405 
(3.053)
-3.470 
(3.177)
.049 
(.035)
-.012 
(.061)
.863 
(3.377)
4.867 
(3.642)
9.468* 
(5.625)
6.574
.097
INDEX4
-.015 
(.057)
.189* 
(.067)
-2.699* 
(1.650)
1.697 
(2.746)
.748 
(1.967)
4.290* 
(2.047)
.071* 
(.022)
.033 
(.039)
1.864 
(2.176)
6.323* 
(2.347)
6.094* 
(3.624)
5.136
.090
•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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The inability to explain variations in the inclusion of ad 
vance notice provisions in these contracts is frustrating. 
Traditional determinants of bargained outcomes are not ef 
fective. But this inability may explain why advance notice of 
plant closure has been the frontispiece of numerous 
legislative proposals. The bargaining power of unions may 
be insufficient to obtain this provision through contract 
negotiations, and therefore they are seeking this protection 
through legislations.
Fourth Hypothesis: This hypothesis addresses the dif 
ferences in bargaining outcomes that may arise in states with 
right-to-work laws relative to those outcomes in states 
without right-to-work laws. Although the coefficient of the 
RTW variable is negative in all equations in table 5.8 and 
table 5.9, it is statistically significant in only one instance in 
1980. The surprising feature is that it is insignificant since the 
existence of a RTW statute is seen as an indicator that 
employers have significantly greater political power than 
unions. Thus, it is expected that this distribution of power 
would hold in the bargaining relationship, particularly for 
provisions that may impinge on management rights.
The analyses for 1980 are provided in table 5.15 and table 
5.16. The analysis for 1974 is not reported here. The 
measures of union bargaining power tend to be positive and 
statistically significant in over half of the estimates covering 
establishments in right-to-work states. However, there is a 
lack of consistency in the relative values of COV2 and COV3 
in table 5.15. Specifically, COV2 tends to be greater than 
COV3, whereas the normal expectation is the converse. This 
may represent a measurement error problem since the 
estimates of contract coverage are from 1968-1972 and those 
estimates may no longer be representative of more recent 
conditions. It also may simply indicate moderately organized 
industries have pursued these nonwage provisions.
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In states without right-to-work laws, the influence of the 
product market concentration measures is not predictable. 
However, COV3 and RIVAL emerge as statistically signifi 
cant determinants in several of the estimates. GROW80 is 
not a significant determinant in this set of estimates.
Summary
These estimates do not indicate that workers and firms "at 
risk of closure" have moved toward protections and solu 
tions through the bargained contract. The regression 
estimates show that contractual outcomes became less sen 
sitive to changes in employment, and instead became more 
dependent on the bargaining power of the union in 1980 
relative to 1974. Even more surprising, however, was the 
lack of statistical significance of the frequency of closure in 
the industry as a determinant of successful negotiations over 
these provisions. Furthermore, the results were not consis 
tent. Variables that were significant in one time period were 
not in the following one, or vice versa. This lack of 
robustness raises severe doubts whether the negotiations are 
sufficiently deterministic.
There are a number of factors which may have contributed 
to the disappointing findings. First, the cross-sectional 
analysis of the incidence of provisions may have obscured 
the changes that did take place. It would have been desirable 
to track individual contracts from one period to the next, so 
that the analysis could have been conducted on the actual 
changes in the contract, but this was not possible. Second, it 
was not possible to measure other bargaining outcomes that 
occurred in the same negotiations. Thus, no estimate could 
be made of the actual tradeoff that may have been required 
to obtain plant closure provisions.
A troubling feature of the analysis is the very low ex 
planatory power of the equations for variations in INDEX3,
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the advance notice provisions. The issue of advance notice of 
plant closure has been one of the most hotly debated topics 
in the plant closure debate. Is it a question of bargaining goal 
determination, or of employer resistance to granting this 
provision? Making this protection the frontispiece of 
legislative proposals simply may be a response to the inabili 
ty to obtain it directly in negotiations.
One conclusion that seems quite tenable is that significant 
bargaining power is required to obtain plant closure contrac 
tual protections in RTW states. However, there are restric 
tions on this conclusion because when two of the most 
powerful unions were entered explicitly in the specification, 
AUTO and STEEL, their coefficients generally were not 
statistically significant. Combining this latter finding with 
the generally low explanatory power of these equations sug 
gests that we do not have a good understanding of these 
negotiations and outcomes. Of course, it may simply be the 
problem mentioned above: union bargaining goals do not 
necessarily become contract provisions.
NOTES
1. The data set available limits some of the questions that can be asked in 
this monograph about the presence or absence of these provisions in a 
contract. Several interesting hypotheses could include the following: 
first, it is expected that workers in local labor markets where employ 
ment alternatives are limited would tend to pursue relocation/transfer 
right provisions; second, it is expected that relocation/transfer right pro 
visions would be more prevalent where union-management relations 
have been "good"; and finally, it is expected that bargaining units that 
are dominated by young and more mobile workers would be more likely 
to negotiate relocation/transfer right provisions.
2. The "free-rider" problem is when individuals receive the benefit of 
some collective activity, but do not pay to support the collective activity. 
For example, the nonpayment of union dues by individuals covered by a 
collective bargaining contract is a free-rider problem.
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3. The frequencies in both 1974 and 1980 of the plant closure provisions 
are as follows:
1974 1980 
PROVISION percent percent
SUB
SEVRANCE
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE
22
39
8
15
5
7
14
10
26
38
11
19
7
3
15
11
Number of Contracts 631 676
4. To ensure comparability, the set of states having right-to-work laws in 
1974 were used throughout the analysis. New Hampshire was not includ 
ed because it does not have a specific right-to-work statute.
5. This assumes that these provisions represent primarily union imposed 
constraints on management rights. This seems like a reasonable assump 
tion for most of these provisions.
6. See Audrey Freedman (1978). She wrote: "Still it seems axiomatic that 
as an individual job hunter's chances in the open labor market worsen, 
job security becomes more important." (p. 67)
7. Newman (1983) has demonstrated that the favorable economic growth 
consequences of right-to-work laws are not purely a Southern 
phenomenon.
8. There is a simultaneity question with the structure of bargaining rela 
tionship variables. Specifically, Hendricks and Kahn (1982) determined 
that the actual structure used is a function of industry and union 
characteristics.
9. Although the demarcation is necessitated by the data sets, it also is 
fortuitous given that Lilien (1982) has suggested that the structural shift 
accelerated after 1973.
10. Three-digit closure rates are available on request from the author.
11. The 3-digit concentration ratio was calculated as follows: 
CONCj= £ /CONj
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where
CONCj = concentration ratio in the jth 3-digit industry.
CONjj = percent of shipments accounted for by the 4 largest firms in 
in the ith 4-digit industry of the jth 3-digit industry.
VSjj = Value of shipments of all firms in the ith 4-digit industry of the 
jtn 3-digit industry.
VSj = Value of shipments of all firms in the jth 3-digit industry.
12. Cappelli (1983) used two other measures to address a related concept, 
variations in the demand for union labor. He used the trend in import 
penetration in the particular industry and the trend in union coverage in 
the particular industry. The trend in union coverage is a more direct 
measure of the pressure on the union sector to attempt to stabilize 
employment demand. For example, employment growth could be stable, 
but the unionized sector could be declining in number and the non- 
unionized sector could be increasing in number. Since the emphasis is on 
overall change, however, employment growth will continue to be used.
13. Using equal weights implies that each provision is equally desirable 
or effective. This is a tenuous assumption, particularly when only eight 
provisions are involved and may be partially responsible for the results 
that follow.
14. A series of regressions were run incorporating whether the bargained 
agreement included a management rights clause. The coefficient on this 
variable was not statistically significant.
Synthesis 
Chapter 6 and Conclusions
The principal economic impact of plant closure on 
workers is the earnings loss that they may experience. First, 
there is the direct earnings loss due job loss. Second, there is 
the initial reduction in wages because the available oppor 
tunities simply do not pay as much as the former job. Third, 
the earnings profile of the worker may be reduced because 
his/her career has been disrupted. Another type of loss is the 
deferred compensation the firm may owe its workers, but 
which is never paid because the plant closes.
The deferred compensation arises from compensation 
schedules that pay junior workers less than the value of their 
marginal product and pay senior workers more than the 
value of their marginal product. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with such a schedule. However, if some event occurs 
that interferes with the worker being employed until the 
deferred compensation has been paid back, this unpaid 
deferred compensation may establish an obligation from the 
firm to its workers beyond the closure. This may represent a 
classic case of social costs since the firm's action imposes 
costs on people not party to the decision. The question is: 
Can collective bargaining play a role in minimizing social 
costs while promoting greater productive capacity?
Collective bargaining and plant closure are linked in three 
ways. First, judicial interpretations of the National Labor
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Relations Act (NLRA) have held that the employer must 
negotiate with the union over the effects of closing a plant, 
the closing bargain. Second, the current judicial interpreta 
tion is that there is no duty to bargain over the decision to 
close one plant of a multiplant operation. There are, 
however, certain ambiguities in this interpretation that limit 
its applicability. Third, a union and an employer may use the 
formal bargaining process to negotiate contract provisions 
covering plant closure.
To understand and evaluate the role that collective 
bargaining could play, both the case law that has evolved in 
the formulation of the judicial interpretations and the actual 
contract provisions negotiated in major collective bargaining 
agreements have been examined. Coincident with the 
analysis of the case law, several rules and procedures, which 
have been suggested to expedite the determination of 
whether there is a duty to bargain over the decision, also 
have been studied.
The examination of the judicial interpretation of the duty 
to bargain found several troublesome areas. First, substan 
tive labor law has been formulated in the plant closure area 
based on cases in which the parties to the dispute had not 
negotiated a formal contract. The closure occurred almost 
on the heels of the union winning the representation election. 
Thus, a determination has been made on the efficacy of col 
lective bargaining resolving an issue even though the parties 
have never bargained. As pointed out in the text, the most re 
cent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this issue occurred in 
First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor 
Relations Board, a case in which the parties did not have an 
established bargaining relationship.
Second, there has been an overriding concern with the ter 
minology used in cases of displacement rather than with the 
outcome. For example, subcontracting has been differen 
tiated from replacing existing employees with independent
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contractors. The outcome has been the same, the process 
very similar, but the duty to bargain over the decision dif 
fers. A similar demarcation is occurring between plant 
closure and relocation. In both instances a facility is closed, 
and the reason for closure may be quite similar—the firm is 
no longer competitive at the location—but the case law treats 
these quite differently.
The case law draws the marked distinction between the 
rights and privileges of the owners of physical capital as op 
posed to the rights and privileges of the owners of human 
capital. Human capital is not positioned equally with 
physical capital in its ability to respond to economic change. 
However, giving priority to the owners of human capital in 
all situations would move us to a system of property rights in 
jobs, which is not necessarily desirable. As was stated in 
Adams Dairy, "union membership is not a guarantee against 
legitimate or justifiable discharge or discharge motivated by 
economic necessity." What is necessary is a balancing be 
tween the rights of the owners of physical capital and human 
capital. Collective bargaining may be uniquely positioned to 
conduct this balancing test.
The major concerns over the use of collective bargaining 
to mitigate the plant closure problem are establishing criteria 
which (a) require bargaining only in those instances in which 
the circumstances suggest a positive probability of success, 
and (b) introduce certainty into the process as to who must 
bargain and what shall constitute good faith bargaining. 
Perhaps, however, there has been more concern than war 
ranted about not requiring bargaining in low probability 
cases. Recall that there were 619 plant closings in 1982, a 
year in which the economy was mired in a recession. The 
relatively infrequent nature of plant closing increases the at 
tractiveness of collective bargaining as a policy alternative.
Formal collective bargaining already occurs over plant 
closure, or at least, over provisions to minimize the effects of
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closure. Contractual provisions that have been negotiated in 
clude severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, 
relocation allowances, transfer or preferential hiring rights, 
and advance notice in case of shutdown or major 
technological change. The concern from the policy perspec 
tive is whether management and labor have used formal con 
tract negotiations to obtain protections and to develop solu 
tions for workers and firms "at risk of closure."
The results of the econometric analysis of major collective 
bargaining agreements (631 contracts in 1974 and 676 con 
tracts in 1980) did not find that workers at risk were obtain 
ing these protections. Variation in closure rates by industry 
was not a significant determinant of variations in contractual 
outcomes. Instead, the regression estimates showed that the 
contractual outcomes became less sensitive to changes in 
employment, and instead became more dependent on the 
bargaining power of the union in 1980 relative to 1974. The 
results also were not consistent. This lack of robustness 
(a) pointed out the difficulty of modeling some processes 
and outcomes, and (b) raised doubts about whether formal 
negotiations could be relied on to accommodate these 
disruptions.
Therefore, amending the National Labor Relations Act's 
definition of mandatory topics of bargaining under "terms 
and other conditions of employment" to include bargaining 
over the decision to close may be one policy alternative for 
the plant closure dilemma. There are positive and negative 
aspects of this approach. The most obvious negative aspect is 
that the NLRA covers only those plants and workplaces 
where employees have elected a bargaining agent. Since plant 
closures are not restricted to unionized plants, protection 
will not be afforded in all instances. However, workers in 
nonunionized facilities generally are not protected by the 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Although 
this lack of coverage is problematic, it is not fatal.
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A positive feature of using the NLRA is that coverage is 
uniform throughout the United States. As mentioned earlier, 
two states have statutes placing obligations on employers in 
the event of closure, legislation has been proposed in many 
other states, and the National Employment Priorities Act 
(H.R. 2847) has been introduced in the U.S. Congress. 
However, state-by-state adoption of legislation would only 
increase the competition among the states. Kochan (1979) 
wrote:
those states most interested in stemming the tide of 
plant closings and job loss are most likely to act, 
but by doing so, may further increase the incentives 
of businesses to locate in the southern states that do 
not pass this type of legislation (p. 19).
Unions may find fault with this approach because they will 
be expected to use up their bargaining capital in order to ob 
tain the protections that they would prefer be provided 
through legislation. The greater the number of areas 
prescribed by governmental regulation, the more bargaining 
power can be concentrated in other areas. Management also 
may disagree with the proposal because it places a greater 
burden on them than currently required. Given the unique 
circumstance of each workplace and the preferences of 
workers, collective bargaining may be ideally suited to 
developing solutions to this problem. Regulation and 
bargaining are both designed to get employers and unions to 
do something they do not want to do and, therefore, to a 
degree they are substitute policies.
What is being considered is a policy that neither manage 
ment nor labor prefers. But perhaps that is the only type of 
policy possible. "The political problem is to shift the focus 
of public discussion away from the fruitless search for 
painless solutions to the question of how costs of adjustment 
can be allocated in the most equitable way." (Martin 1983, 
p. 105)
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The proposal of this monograph attempts to permit 
bargaining to minimize the earnings loss of workers while ex 
ploring more profitable opportunities for the firm. The pro 
posal is based on Coase's (1971) concept of minimizing 
social cost while maximizing the value of production. As 
always, the difficulty is making an abstract concept opera 
tional. The following per se rule and implementation pro 
cedures are proposed.
1. Firms are required to notify the NLRB and the union of 
the plan to close one part of an operation or to relocate. 
This notice should contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for closure and financial data as appropriate.
2. The NLRB quickly determines whether bargaining 
might be fruitful using the criteria established in 
Brooks-Scanlon: whether the reasons for closure are 
beyond the control of the parties to the collective 
bargaining agreement.
3. Information bargaining occurs in those instances where 
it is determined that bargaining might be fruitful.
4. Based on the information provided, the NLRB, the 
union or bargaining unit, and the firm determine 
whether further bargaining is appropriate.
5. Bargaining continues in those instances where two of 
the three (the NLRB, the union or bargaining unit, and 
the firm) think progress is being made and/or a solution 
is possible, but for no more than 90 days after the initial 
notice.
6. If bargaining has been in good faith, but no agreement 
is reached within the time period, the firm is free to pro 
ceed with its action.
7. The firm is required to bargain over the effects.
This proposal has the basic premise that management and 
labor will want to obtain a bargain that leads to profitable
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operations and is the best alternative in the labor market. If 
the concessions necessary to maintain profitable operations 
require wage cuts greater than necessary as dictated by 
market alternatives, no agreement will or should be reached. 
If operations as profitable as the alternative can be achieved, 
management will and should stay at the existing plant. If no 
agreement is possible within the parameters, effects bargain 
ing can be used to obtain the deferred compensation.
Wachter and Wascher's (1983) examination of the displac 
ed worker problem led them to conclude that the earnings 
losses experienced by displaced workers can be avoided only 
by avoiding job loss in the first place. Job specific skills, 
seniority pay and union differentials all result in wages above 
the alternatives available in the market. Job training, special 
assistance programs or employment vouchers are unlikely to 
generate employment opportunities at previous wage levels. 
Since public controls, such as direct employment protection, 
impose significant costs on the overall economy, Wachter 
and Wascher suggest collective bargaining initiatives trading 
wage premiums for enhanced job security.
The proposal of this monograph is in the same spirit as 
their conclusion. Neither management nor labor have perfect 
foresight. Formal negotiations every two or three years can 
not accommodate all contingencies. Equity considerations 
suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity to 
minimize earnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing 
so also imposes costs on employers, the proposal has been 
structured to be flexible and to expedite the bargaining pro 
cess.
Requiring decision bargaining is only one element, but a 
major one, of a comprehensive policy toward the plant 
closure problem. Bargaining will not result in preserving jobs 
in all instances. Other programs need to be in place to assist 
workers when closure is the only alternative. But in devising 
programs, consideration must be given to the "managerial,
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institutional and political factors that determine the effec 
tiveness of policies in practice." (Bacow 1980, p. 132) Ex 
pansive legislative proposals that prescribe the behavior of 
firms intending to close are not consistent with the 
managerial, institutional and political constructs of our 
economic system. Instead, states have started to turn away 
from the regulatory initiatives and have been developing 
assistance programs for displaced workers, such as job 
clubs, job fairs and retraining programs.
It is important not to stop just with assistance programs 
for displaced workers. There are other institutions in place 
which, with minor changes, could become flexible enough to 
smooth the adjustment to economic change. One is the tax 
deductibility of training costs associated with developing a 
new skill. Given the adjustment problems of human capital 
in the presence of economic change, it is incongruous that in 
vestments to deepen one's human capital in an obsolete skill 
are deductible for federal income tax purposes whereas in 
vestments to broaden one's human capital and develop new 
skills are not deductible. Another change would be permit 
ting workers to obtain training while receiving unemploy 
ment compensation. (It should be noted that this is permitted 
in some states under certain circumstances.) Since the 
unemployment insurance system is funded by employer con 
tributions, it would seem appropriate that these funds be us 
ed to support retraining efforts necessitated by industrial 
change.
The final point is that funds be available to study the 
viability of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) when 
closure is being considered. Wintner's (1983) results have 
demonstrated that ESOPs can be viable in some instances. 
(In fact, her results are very supportive of the potential for 
collective bargaining in addressing the plant closure prob 
lem.) Since workers generally are subjecting themselves to 
double jeopardy in ESOPs—a possible wage reduction plus
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placing their savings at risk—the viability of the ESOP 
should be studied thoroughly.
In conclusion, as we consider the plant closure issue and 
the problem of displaced workers, one criterion should be 
kept in mind as alternative policies are considered. Any pro 
gram contemplated should not increase the firm's direct cost 
of using labor relative to capital. Increasing the cost of labor 
will simply make the adoption of new technology more at 
tractive for employers, possibly exacerbating the problem.

Appendix
Displaced Older Workers
The problems displacement causes for older workers re 
quire special mention. Hall (1982) has shown that firms in 
the United States provide near-lifetime employment (more 
than 20 years) for a significant part of the labor force. For 
example, 51.1 percent of all men are likely to work 20 years 
or more for the same firm. A recent Department of Labor 
(1983) study shows that many workers already have been 
employed with the same firm for a relatively long time. For 
workers between the ages of 40 and 44 years, 42.7 percent 
have worked for the same firm for more than 10 years and 
for those between the ages of 50 to 54 years, 56.5 percent 
have worked for the same firm for more than 10 years. If it is 
assumed that the revealed behavior reflects the expectations 
of workers, the loss of their job can be a severe blow.
Perhaps more problematic is that many incentives cause 
the impact of closure on older workers to be very severe in 
the short run. The usual process of attrition and gradual 
reduction in employment prior to closure returns younger 
workers (less senior) to the labor market first. That attrition 
permits these younger workers to search for available open 
ings when fewer workers are competing for them.
When closure finally occurs, the older workers are return 
ed to the labor market simultaneously. This fact is exacer 
bated by policies which require workers to stay until closure 
in order to receive severance pay and other related benefits. 
Their work skills may be somewhat obsolete, their job search 
skills have atrophied and their numbers may greatly exceed 
the available openings in the market when they begin to seek 
new employment. Moreover, since their skills tend to be
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firm- or industry-specific, they may have significant difficul 
ty in transferring them to other employment opportunities.
Several studies have documented the extent of the wage 
loss incurred by workers who have been displaced by plant 
closure. These are instructive even though it is argued in the 
monograph that the initial loss can be an artifact of the 
firm's compensation schedule. Arlene Holen et al. (1981) 
developed estimates of earnings losses from a sample of 
9,500 workers who were impacted by 42 different plant clos 
ings in 21 different states from 1968 to 1972. The analysis 
was restricted to nine different industries.
The differences in earnings loss by age group are very 
striking. Workers under the age of 40 experienced a 13.4 per 
cent drop in average earnings in the year after closure 
relative to the year before closure. Workers over the age of 
40 experienced a 39.9 percent reduction in earnings in the 
year after closure. Furthermore, the average earnings of 
workers over 40 in the year after closure were less than the 
average earnings of those under 40, as indicated in table A. 1. 
In addition, the labor force activity of the older group 
declined by approximately 33 percentage points, whereas the 
reduction in labor force activity for the younger workers was 
approximately 7 percentage points.
A study of a plant closure in Western Michigan further 
demonstrates the impact on older workers (McAlinden 
1981). The average seniority for the workers left at the time 
of the closing was over 17 years. The average age of the 
workers was approximately 45 years. The wages for skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers had been $10.22, $9.97 
and $9.43 per hour, respectively. Approximately 11 months 
after the closing, the workers were surveyed, and the average 
hourly wages for those who had found jobs were $10.02, 
$7.51 and $6.52 for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers, respectively. Skilled workers suffered only a 2 per-
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cent loss in wages, but semi-skilled and unskilled workers' 
losses were 25 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Further 
more, over one-half of the workers were still unemployed at 
the time of the survey, with the largest proportion of them 
being semi-skilled and unskilled.
Table A.I
Mean Real Earnings and Labor Force Activity of Males 
by Age, Before and After Closure*
Under 40
Average earnings 
Percent change
Year prior 
to closing
$5,705
Year after 
closing
$4,943 
-13.4<7o
Over 40
Year prior 
to closing
$8,111
Year after 
closing
$4,877 
-39.9%
Full-time labor 
force activity (%) 82.9 76.1 93.5 60.1
SOURCE: Calculations based on data provided in Arlene Holen et al., Earnings Losses of 
Workers Displaced by Plant Closings, Public Research Institute of the Center for Naval 
Analysis, CRC 423, December 1981. 
*1970 Constant dollars.
Older workers suffer significant short term losses because 
there are just fewer job offers available for them. Older 
workers may be more expensive to hire than younger 
workers because defined benefit pension plans are most cost 
ly to provide for older workers than for younger workers 
(Barnow and Ehrenberg 1979). Assuming a 6 percent rate of 
return, $1 of pension benefits will cost an employer $1 for a 
worker retiring in a year, whereas the cost will be $. 17 for the 
35-year-old worker who won't retire for 30 years. As a 
result, even though an older worker and a younger worker 
may be willing to work for the same wage, the former will be 
more costly to hire if pension benefits are part of the com 
pensation. It has been estimated that approximately 70 per 
cent of private pension plans are defined benefit plans.
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Older workers may restrict their job search to the local 
market because they are homeowners, and to that subset of 
relatively high paying jobs because of their wage expecta 
tions. Thus, their expected duration of unemployment tends 
to be longer and their expected wage loss is likely to be 
greater.
Holen's estimates were of the earnings losses individuals 
incurred within five years of closure. Jacobson and 
Thomason (1979) estimated lifetime earnings losses. Their 
analysis determined that the lifetime earnings loss associated 
with displacement tends to increase as the unemployment 
rate in the local labor market increases. Second, the earnings 
loss tends to be inversely related to the size of the local labor 
market.
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